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SUMMARY AND MAIN FINDINGS 
 
1 
In 2010 EU labour markets lagged behind while 
economic growth was resuming, but there are 
signs of an incipient employment recovery…  
Employment in most EU countries proved 
considerably resilient immediately after the 2008 
recession, notably in light of the strong adjustment 
of hours worked, in some cases facilitated by the 
operation of government sponsored Short Term 
Working schemes. Labour shedding became more 
relevant at the end of 2009 and employment did 
not resume until the last quarter of 2010. The 
belated response of employment to the recovery 
was the counterpart of labour hoarding during the 
recession and was accompanied by a considerable 
rebound in labour productivity. In both the euro 
area and the EU, the unemployment rate in 2010 
remained persistently high, close to 10%, with no 
substantial improvement compared with 2009, 
including in light of highly resilient participation 
rates.  
Headcount employment started rising in late 2010, 
as soon as the growth of working hours was 
levelling off, and is expected to gain momentum in 
2011 and 2012. Nonetheless, the employment 
recovery is not expected to be sufficiently strong to 
bring about a significant reduction in the 
unemployment rate over the medium term. The 
speed at which unemployment will go back to pre-
crisis levels will depend not only on the growth 
outlook but also on the presence of supportive 
policy frameworks. 
…which however will hardly contribute to narrow 
the dramatic differences in unemployment rates 
across EU Member States 
In spite of these general trends, the labour market 
situation in the euro area and the EU exhibits an 
unprecedented degree of diversity. Unemployment 
divergences are large and persistent, reflecting not 
only the asymmetric effects of the crisis and 
different constraints for the financial sector and 
fiscal policy, but also cross-country differences in 
the sectoral composition of past employment 
losses and different institutional settings. 
The labour market deterioration following the 
crisis proved particularly acute in the Baltic 
countries, Spain, Ireland, Greece. Considerable job 
losses were recorded also in Bulgaria, Denmark, 
Portugal, Slovakia, the UK. Labour markets were 
instead particularly resilient in Germany, Austria, 
Malta, Luxemburg. In general, the countries hit by 
the burst of housing bubbles and constrained in 
their policy manoeuvre by external and fiscal 
imbalances are those where job losses were the 
most severe. Seven countries in 2010 exhibited 
unemployment rates above 12 % (the three Baltics, 
Spain, Ireland, Greece, Slovakia). The 
unemployment rate is below 8 % (i.e. below the 
value prevailing before the crisis in the EU on 
average) in 11 countries. The unemployment rate 
is back at or below pre-crisis levels in Austria and 
Germany.   
Looking forward, the employment recovery is 
expected to follow different patterns in different 
countries, reflecting the current multi-speed output 
recovery. No significant reduction in 
unemployment disparities is in sight. While the 
prospects appear relatively rosy in the Baltics, 
unemployment is expected to further grow in 
Spain, Ireland, Greece and Portugal in 2011. The 
unemployment rate of Germany, at the record level 
of 7.1% in 2010, a value not reached since the 
early 1990s, is expected to further fall in 2011 and 
2012. 
Wage moderation, coupled productivity 
improvements, create the conditions for stronger 
labour demand looking forward and cost 
competitiveness gains 
Nominal wage growth remained muted in 2010, 
amid compressed or even negative wage dynamics 
in the public sector. Although there was evidence 
of adjustment in nominal compensations to the 
labour market slack already in 2009, bargained 
wages in the euro area started adjusting only in 
2010. In spite of the considerable productivity 
growth, real wage dynamics further slowed down 
in 2010 in the euro are and the EU. The wage 
moderation trend started in 2009 is consistent with 
the priority of reducing unemployment, but it is 
only since 2010 that real wage adjustment became 
clearly stronger in countries with worse 
unemployment problems.  
Reductions in nominal compensation per employee 
were recorded in 2010 in the three Baltics, Greece, 
Ireland, Malta, and Hungary, largely as a result of 
salary cuts in the public sector. Sustained nominal 
wage increases were instead registered in Bulgaria, 
Poland, Slovenia, the UK, Cyprus, the Czech 
European Commission 
Labour Market Developments in Europe, 2011 
 
2 
Republic. Real compensations per employee 
deflated by producer prices fell in 13 EU countries. 
Real unit labour costs fell in most Member States, 
which means that the real wages did not keep up 
with productivity in most EU countries. In general, 
the degree of adjustment in real unit labour costs 
reflects the magnitude of unemployment. 
However, while in some high unemployment 
countries the adjustment was comparatively strong 
(the Baltics), in others it was weaker than that 
recorded in countries with low unemployment 
(Spain, Slovakia, Ireland). 
The remarkable productivity improvement, 
coupled with wage moderation, resulted in a 
reduction in unit labour costs for the euro area and 
the EU, the first since mid 1990s. The euro area as 
a whole witnessed an improvement in cost 
competitiveness above 7%, when measured in 
terms of unit-labour-cost-deflated real effective 
exchange rate. These developments seem also 
supportive to the external rebalancing of EU 
economies: the competitiveness gains were in 
general more marked in countries with larger 
current account deficits. These competitiveness 
gains are however likely to be short-lived since the 
productivity boost of 2010 is largely the results of 
a rebound in working hours after labour hoarding 
during the crisis.  
Key challenges ahead include avoiding 
unemployment becoming entrenched, keeping 
activity rates high, fighting precariousness and job 
insecurity… 
The fact that participation rates remained high 
after the recession bodes well for the recovery. 
During the recession, labour supply actually 
increased in many EU countries in spite of job 
shedding. Older workers' participation rose partly 
because of reforms in retirement age and early 
retirement schemes, partly because of concerns 
about pension income following the losses of 
pension funds during the crisis. The labour supply 
of women seems to have responded in such a way 
to compensate higher income and employment risk 
of men. This resilience of activity rates is a 
distinguishing feature of the EU compared with 
other world areas, notably the US. The fact that 
participation rates remained high while 
employment was falling contributed to high 
unemployment figures. However, the resilience of 
participation rates will be a key factor to ensure 
that employment rates resume to pre-crisis values 
and to permit a further growth in line with EU2020 
targets.  
Worsening labour matching and rising structural 
unemployment raises the question how fast pre-
crisis employment rates could be obtained looking 
forward. The evidence suggests that labour market 
matching has been worsening in the euro area, as 
there is more and more unemployment for the 
same number of vacancies. In spite of a 
considerable reduction in job separation rates after 
the recession, job finding rates remained low and 
unemployment duration has been on the rise. The 
increase in the frictional unemployment was 
accompanied by rising estimates of the NAIRU, 
the concept of structural unemployment consistent 
with stable prices. Looking ahead, these trends 
pose the question whether a phenomenon of 
“unemployment hystheresis” will repeat in Europe 
as in the eighties following the stagflation induced 
by the oil shocks. The risk is there that, in spite of 
a cyclical rebound, unemployment could remain 
persistently above pre-crisis levels. Moreover, the 
fact that long-term unemployment is on the rise 
brings the risk that an increasing number of 
workers would become discouraged or hardly 
employable, thus exiting the labour force, which 
will impinge upon the recovery of employment 
rates looking forward. 
The quality of new jobs created will also be key to 
ensure that the recovery coincides with 
reinvigorated income prospects, notably for the 
low skilled and the young. The bulk of job losses 
since the crisis were registered among the low 
skilled, in particular for those employed with 
temporary contracts. The young were also 
comparatively hardly hit by the crisis as more 
frequently employed with temporary contracts as 
compared with other age groups. The strong and 
persistent fall in job creation coupled with 
temporary job shedding led to a major increase in 
the youth unemployment rate in most EU 
countries, reaching worrisome levels in Spain, the 
Baltics, Greece, Slovakia, Italy, Ireland. The jobs 
created since the economic recovery started are to 
large extent temporary and part-time jobs and the 
question is open on the extent to which future job 
growth will offer stable income prospects. 
…which will require putting in place supportive 
policy frameworks  
Summary and main findings 
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In line with the recommendations contained in the 
European Economic Recovery Plan, Member 
States put in place after the crisis a series of 
measures to contain the impact of the financial 
crisis on aggregate demand and prevent excessive 
labour shedding in response of a temporary 
contraction of output. Consistently, Short Term 
Working Schemes were introduced or strengthened 
in a number of countries and the coverage and 
generosity of unemployment benefit systems 
increased.  
The incipient output recovery, coupled with 
mounting fiscal imbalances led to a revision in 
policy priorities. Many of the emergency labour 
market measures taken after the financial crisis 
were gradually phased out; active labour market 
and training policies strengthened in some cases; 
some countries started reforming employment 
protection systems with a view to foster job 
creation and fight labour market segmentation.  
The 2011 Commission Annual Growth Survey 
includes a series of priorities for reform in EU that 
concern labour markets: wage developments 
consistent with the rebalancing and adjustment 
needs of the economy; tax and benefit systems that 
ensure that work pays off; unemployment benefit 
systems and activation policies that reward the 
unemployed going back to work; employment 
protection systems aimed at balancing security 
with flexibility. The policy measures announced 
by Member States in 2011 in their National 
Reform Programmes by Member States broadly 
reflect that the priorities set out in the Annual 
Growth Survey. In line with the priorities in the 
Integrated Guidelines and the Annual Growth 
Survey, and on the basis of an assessment of 
existing challenges and ongoing reform actions, 
the Commission issued a series of Country 
Specific Recommendations to Member States in 
the field of labour market policies within the 
revamped framework for EU surveillance of 
economic and employment policies. 
Analytical focus 1.  Unemployment benefits: 
reform challenges after the crisis 
The present issue of this report includes analytical 
chapters focusing on two policy topics of 
particular relevance in the current juncture: 
unemployment benefit schemes and wage setting 
frameworks. 
Most European countries operate unemployment 
benefits systems. However, there are considerable 
differences not only in terms of their generosity 
(eligibility conditions, benefit net replacement 
rates benefit duration), but more fundamentally, in 
the composition of instruments used 
(unemployment insurance, unemployment 
assistance) and design of schemes (modulation of 
benefits during the unemployment spell, link of 
benefits to past earnings…).  
Unemployment benefits present a trade-off 
between income smoothing and economic 
efficiency, as the positive stabilisation effects may 
imply weakened incentives to search and accept 
jobs for the unemployed. However, the design of 
the unemployment benefit system (e.g. benefit net 
replacement rates falling over the unemployment 
spell) and the presence of flanking policies, 
notably effective activation policies, may 
substantially help addressing this trade off.  
The system of unemployment benefits plays a key 
role as fiscal stabiliser. After the financial crisis of 
2008, in line with the recommendations in the 
Commission European Economic Recovery Plan, 
several EU Member States adapted their 
unemployment benefit system to ensure effective 
stabilisation in response to a major recession, 
which required in some cases increasing benefit 
coverage and extending generosity and duration of 
entitlements.  
Looking forward, priorities are changing. As 
stressed in the 2011 Commission Annual Growth 
Survey, reforms will have to be appropriate to a 
context where growth is gradually resuming but 
labour is not yet giving its full contribution to the 
growth potential due to high and persistent 
unemployment. Consistently, he recommendations 
in the Annual Growth Survey reflect the need to 
shift the emphasis on reforms aimed at 
strengthening incentives in the labour market: 
benefit design and activation policies encouraging 
the unemployed to go back to work; tax and 
benefit systems ensuring that work pays; 
unemployment insurance that adequately adapts to 
changing economic conditions.  
Analytical focus 2: Wage setting, competitiveness, 
macroeconomic imbalances 
European Commission 
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Labour market conditions vary dramatically across 
EU countries. The current impressive differences 
in unemployment rates in the euro area are largely 
the result of idiosyncratic shocks of unprecedented 
scale in a monetary union. A number of EU 
countries also have to complete a durable 
adjustment of large external imbalances. Against 
this background, consistent wage dynamics are key 
both for the absorption of unemployment and for 
the adjustment of price competitiveness in 
countries with large imbalances.  
The above priorities were reflected in the 2011 
Annual Growth Survey and in the Joint 
Employment Report, as well in Country-Specific 
Recommendations in the framework of the Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines and the Employment 
Guidelines. Looking ahead, a proper understanding 
of the links between policies, wage dynamics, 
competitiveness and imbalances will be key for a 
successful implementation of the Excessive 
Imbalances Procedure (EIP). 
The last part of the present report discusses the 
interaction between wages, price competitiveness 
and imbalances, focusing both on issues relating to 
the assessment of wage dynamics in light of the 
need of correcting macroeconomic imbalances and 
on the role of government policies and wage 
setting frameworks in triggering appropriate wage 
dynamics  
As wages are driven by the market mechanism and 
interact with the rest of the economy, a good 
understanding of the complex interlinks between 
wages, competitiveness and imbalances is needed 
when assessing determinants and implications of 
wage developments. In this respect, the 
comparison of actual wage trends with appropriate 
benchmarks (notably permitting to check whether 
wage developments are consistent with the balance 
between labour supply and demand, with orderly 
competitiveness dynamics, with standard relations 
with economic fundamentals) seems desirable.  
Policy action in the filed of statutory minimum 
wages, government wages, labour taxes can have 
in principle a direct impact on labour cost 
developments, but the overall impact on 
competitiveness and imbalances will depend also 
on other relevant transmission channels.  
Although the assessment of the implications of 
wage bargaining characteristics on wage 
developments is notoriously complex, and there is 
no strong evidence in support of a single, superior 
wage setting model, fresh analysis carried out in 
this report suggests that a few elements of wage 
bargaining frameworks (notably affecting the 
coverage of collective agreements) may have an 
impact on wage outcomes over the medium-to-
long term, while other aspects (notably the 
centralisation and coordination of wage setting and 
indexation clauses) matter for the extent to which 
wages respond to fundamentals. 
Part I 
Labour market developments 
 
 
1. LABOUR MARKET CONDITIONS IN THE EURO AREA AND 
THE EU 
 
6 
box 
1.1. INTRODUCTION  
The consequences of the financial crisis for the 
real economy were fully felt in 2009, when GDP 
declined at an unprecedented annual rate on both 
sides of the Atlantic. Employment proved very 
resilient in Europe immediately after the recession, 
with the bulk of the adjustment taking place in 
working hours.  
Since the second half of 2009, however, job 
shedding became widespread and unemployment 
shot up in most EU countries, albeit with large 
differences. The recovery gained momentum in the 
first half of 2010 but stabilised in the remaining 
part of the year, also reflecting the fading of the 
temporary factors that jump-started the recovery, 
such as the exceptional stimulus measures. Despite 
output recovery, employment growth did not 
follow until late 2010, and unemployment 
remained at the high levels reached in 2009.  
Against this background, this chapter will analyse 
the anatomy of the current labour market 
adjustment by looking at aggregate developments 
in the EU and the euro area. In doing so, this 
chapter seeks to identify the key adjustment 
margins that are characterising the recent phase of 
economic recovery of the EU and euro area 
economy both in terms of price and quantities.  
The remainder of the chapter is organised as 
follows. The next section compares aggregate 
labour market developments in the euro area and 
the EU with those taking place in other world 
areas. Section 1.3 analyses employment and 
unemployment dynamics, while section 1.4 
reviews latest trends in wages and labour costs. 
Section 1.5 focuses on salient aspects of European 
unemployment, analysing job market flows, long-
term unemployment and labour market matching. 
A concluding section follows.  
1.2. SETTING THE SCENE: THE EU LABOUR 
MARKET IN AN INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
Although the major headwinds following the acute 
phase of the financial crisis are abating, the labour 
market outlook remains fragile and uneven in 
many advanced areas, and new risks are looming 
on the horizon. 
In many advanced economies, job creation was so 
far insufficient to hire back the workers laid off 
during the crisis, and the consequences of the 
recession are increasingly raising concern about 
the possibility of persistent effects on 
unemployment rates (Table I.1.1). (1) Conversely, 
in major emerging countries strong economic 
growth is spurring a rapid labour market recovery 
from the job losses suffered during the recession 
mainly in the export sector. By the end of 2010, in 
most of these economies unemployment and 
employment were back to pre-crisis levels. 
 
Table I.1.1: GDP growth and unemployment in selected 
countries 
2000-2007 2010 2000-2007 2010
EA17 2,2 1,7 8,6 10,1
EU 2,4 1,8 8,6 9,6
CAN 2,9 3,0 6,9 8,0
JPN 1,7 3,9 4,7 5,1
USA 2,6 2,7 5,0 9,6
OECD 2,5 2,7 6,7 8,6
BRIC: 8,0 8,7 : :
BRA 3,5 7,4 10,4 6,7
RUS 7,2 3,5 8,2 7,5
IND 7,1 8,5 : :
CHN 10,5 10,5 3,9 4,1
GDP growth Unemployment rate
Source: Eurostat and OECD. 
 
In spite of resumed growth in the EU, job creation 
has recovered very timidly (Graph I.1.2) and the 
unemployment rate remained broadly stable in 
2010. By looking at the quarter on quarter 
percentage changes in employment in Table I.1.2, 
it is evident that the number of employed persons 
was broadly stable over 2010, with some evidence 
of a recovery only in the fourth quarter. However, 
as the fall in employment levels was very acute 
during the course of 2009, the quarterly growth 
                                                          
(1) Those concerns are echoed, inter-alia, in the analyses found 
in OECD (2011), European Commission (2010), IMF-ILO 
(2010). 
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rates year over year were negative for all the first 
three quarters of 2010, both in the euro area and 
the EU. The annualized quarterly growth rate in 
unemployment was instead positive in all 2010 
quarters, while quarter on quarter changes 
followed a discontinuous pattern, with mild 
reductions recorded in mid-2010. 
Looking at overall unemployment figures in the 
euro area and EU the picture appears worrisome. 
At the end of 2010, the unemployment rate was on 
aggregate 10.1 and 9.6 for the euro area and the 
EU, respectively. The number of euro-area 
unemployed was 13 millions, 22 millions in the 
EU. The unemployment rate reached record levels 
among the youth: the unemployment rate of young 
adults (aged 20-24) reached 19.4% and 19.2% in 
the euro area and the EU respectively, a figure 
about twice as large as that for the total 
unemployment rate; about 1 out of 5 young adults 
is unemployed.  
Aggregate EU unemployment data conceals major 
differences in developments at country level. In 
particular, it is remarkable the large and rising 
dispersion of unemployment rates within the euro 
area after the recession, which appears to be still 
growing also during the recovery (Graph I.1.1). 
The widening differences in unemployment rates 
cannot be explained by GDP developments alone. 
Other relevant factors include differences in the 
extent of adjustment of working hours, different 
needs of relocating labour across sectors, notably 
away from construction, different economic and 
institutional starting conditions and heterogeneous 
policy responses since the crisis. 
In the United States, the impact of the global 
recession on employment was more abrupt than in 
the EU, notably in light of a more contained 
adjustment of working hours. In spite of this strong 
adjustment in headcount employment following 
the financial crisis, the labour market showed signs 
of only modest recovery throughout 2010 also in 
the United States. Job losses fell in construction 
and financial services while manufacturing, retail 
trade and leisure and hospitality started to create 
jobs. However, the revival of employment growth 
in the first half of the year turned out to be short-
lived and the employment recovery, which began 
in February 2010, appears weaker than in previous 
economic recoveries. (2) 
Graph I.1.1: Unemployment rates in EU 
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outcomes during recession and recovery
other euro-area countries
(1) The solid line is for countries with a change in 
unemployment in 2008 and 2009 better than the median; 
these are BE, DE, FR, IT, LU, MT, NL, AT and FI. 
Source: Commission services' on Ameco. 
At the end of 2010, the unemployment rate in the 
United States declined to 9.6%, only mildly from 
the record high of 10% one year earlier. This 
decline was partly due to a fall in the participation 
rate (0.4 pps lower than one year earlier). (3) This 
                                                          
(2) Through December 2010, in the United States employment 
increased 0.8% from the trough; over the past four 
recoveries, average employment growth from the low point 
was 1.9%; only the recovery that started in May 1991 was 
weaker.  
(3) In December 2010, the US participation rate reached 
64.3% of the population aged 16 years and over; this is the 
lowest rate since April 1984. 
 
Table I.1.2: Unemployment, compensation per employee and GDP growth in the euro area and European Union 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2010q1 2010q2 2010q3 2010q4 2011Q1 2010q1 2010q2 2010q3 2010q4 2011q1
EA 7.6 9.6 10.1 10.0 10.6 10.0 9.8 10.1 10.0 0.7 -0.6 -0.2 0.7 0.3
EU 7.1 9.0 9.6 9.5 10.2 9.6 9.4 9.6 9.5 0.8 -0.6 -0.2 0.2 -0.1
EA 1.5 26.3 6.1 -0.5 12.9 7.0 3.0 1.7 : 6.7 -5.3 -2.4 3.1 :
EU -1.2 28.1 7.7 -0.9 16.2 8.7 3.9 2.4 : 8.3 -5.2 -2.1 1.9 :
EA 3.4 1.8 1.6 2.1 1.7 1.9 1.4 1.4 1.8 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.6
EU 0.7 -1.1 3.2 3.5 3.4 3.1 2.9 2.4 1.4 0.9 0.6 0 0.9
EA 0.4 -4.1 1.8 1.6 0.8 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.5 0.3 1.0 0.4 0.3 0.8
EU 0.5 -4.2 1.8 1.8 0.7 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.5 0.4 1 0.5 0.2 0.8
EA 0.8 -1.9 -0.5 0.3 -1.3 -0.6 -0.1 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0
EU 0.9 -1.8 -0.5 0.4 -1.5 -0.6 -0.1 0.3 0.4 -0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0
Employment growth
GDP growth
Quarter over quarter of previous year quarter over quarter same year
Unemployment rate
Unemployment growth 
(LFS)
Growth of nominal 
compensation per e 
(1) The changes in the unemployment rate are in pps for the other variables the changes are in per cent. 
Source: Eurostat and AMECO. 
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is a major difference compared with the EU, where 
participation rates were generally resilient. It is 
also noteworthy the considerable increase in the 
US number of long-term unemployed and in 
unemployment duration in 2010, tendencies that 
are also common in the EU (see next section). (4) 
Graph I.1.2: Employment and GDP growth in the EU 
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In Japan, the significant loss of output in 2009  
(-6.3%) resulted in a small pick up in 
unemployment owing to labour hoarding. For this 
reasons, in 2010, the economic recovery in this 
country was accompanied by a substantial increase 
in productivity (4.6% compared to -5% of one year 
earlier). From the second half of 2009, other 
industrialised countries have witnessed a cyclical 
recovery, and in 2010 unemployment was above 
the pre-crisis average in most of them (notably, 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand). 
Looking at developments in real wages, there is 
evidence of a quite different adjustment patterns 
taking place across advanced economies between 
the recession and the recovery (Graph I.1.3). In the 
euro area, during the crisis productivity declined 
while real wages increased. In the United States 
relatively stable real wages were associated with a 
massive reduction in the headcount employment 
and limited decline in productivity during the 
recession. In Japan, the limited adjustment in head-
count employment during the crisis was 
accompanied by a decline in productivity and a 
decline of real wages. In New Zealand, Australia 
                                                          
(4) See also Casaux and Turrini (2011) for a comparison of 
transformations in unemployment structure and duration in 
the EU and the US. 
and Canada, real wages reacted fast and 
considerably to a slack labour market.  
Graph I.1.3: Real wages and productivity growth in the 
euro area and selected advanced countries 
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The adjustment patterns in wages taking place 
during the recession appear to have had 
implications for those observed during the 
recovery, as suggested by the contrast between the 
moderation in real wages in the euro area and the 
strong increase in real wages in Japan and the 
United States. (5)  
1.3. EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
1.3.1. Employment dynamics 
The counterpart to the resilience of the EU labour 
market during the recession, largely due to the 
widespread reduction in working hours, was the weak 
employment growth during the recovery. 
Employment was broadly stable until the last quarter 
of 2010, where, quarter on quarter, it grew only by 
0.2 and 0.1% in the euro area and EU, respectively. 
At the end of the year, employment in the EU was 
still 5 million below the peak achieved in the second 
quarter of 2008. The employment rate for the age 
group 20-64 in 2010 reached 68.5% for both the euro 
area and the EU, about 1 pp below the level recorded 
in 2008. 
                                                          
(5) According to a survey done by the ESCB (2009), 37.1% of 
reporting firms in the euro area left unchanged their 
nominal wages over the summer 2009 and 43.1% 
announced that they planned to do so; only 5.6% of 
reporting firms declared that they made or planned to make 
wage cuts; since German firms are not in the sample 
aggregate results may biased.  
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In spite of the economic recovery in the export 
oriented industries, driven by the strong dynamics 
of global growth and world trade in the first half of 
the year, the demand for labour in these industries 
continued to be lacklustre. Employment in 
manufacturing continued to decline, although at a 
lower pace, while a pick up in employment was 
recorded only in financial and real estate services 
(Table I.1.3). 
 
Table I.1.3: Employment and value added in sectors 
2008 2009 2010
All NACE activities 1.0 0.9 -1.8 -0.5
Industry (except construction) -0.8 -0.1 -5.2 -2.9
Manufacturing -0.7 -0.1 -5.5 -3.1
Construction 2.2 0.3 -5.1 -3.4
Wholesale, retail trade; hotels and restaurants; 1.3 1.3 -1.7 -0.6
Financial intermediation; real estate 3.2 2.7 -1.6 1.1
Public administration, community services; activities of 
households 1.4 1.0 1.3 1.2
Services 1.8 1.5 -0.4 0.5
All NACE activities 2.4 0.7 -4.3 1.9
Industry (except construction) 2.1 -1.7 -12.3 6.0
Manufacturing 2.4 -2.3 -13.3 6.3
Construction 1.8 -0.7 -6.6 -2.7
Wholesale, retail trade; hotels and restaurants; 3.0 0.8 -5.1 2.0
Financial intermediation; real estate 3.4 1.9 -2.2 0.9
Public administration, community services; activities of 
households 1.5 1.6 1.1 1.2
Services : 1.5 -2.1 1.3
Employment growth
Value added growth
2000-2007
Source: Eurostat. 
 
1.3.2. Assessing the response of unemployment to 
the cycle 
A better understanding of how the jobless rate has 
responded to the recovery can be obtained from 
Okun's law, linking the percentage change in 
output with the percentage point shift in the 
unemployment rate. This relationship describes 
well the historical data up to the recession (Graph 
I.1.4).  The EU and the euro area unemployment 
was off track only temporarily in 2009. (6) From 
2010Q1 to 2010Q4 output increased in the EU by 
1.7%, while the unemployment rate declined as 
predicted by the Okun's relationship by 0.6 pps. 
Thus the exceptional resilience immediately after 
the financial crisis has been followed by 
considerable job shedding in 2009 and a broadly 
standard response during the 2010 recovery. This 
contrasts with the developments in the United 
States, where, from the second half of 2008 
through all 2009, unemployment has been 
considerably higher than what implied by Okun's 
law; only in 2010 was the rebound in the economic 
activity accompanied by a change in 
unemployment consistent with that relationship.  
Different factors may explain the departure from 
Okun's law.  
First, unemployment may change less rapidly to 
changes in GDP growth due to adjustment taking 
place in working hours (at the intensive margin). 
This implies a strong increase in productivity and a 
small decline in unemployment during the 
recovery. (7) At the early stage of a recession, the 
hours worked per worker generally fall as firms 
prefer to cut hours in response to declines in 
demand rather than laying-off workers, especially 
if experienced and difficult to replace when the 
recovery comes. 
                                                          
(6) For the euro area, 65% of the percentage point changes in 
unemployment are explained by contemporaneous changes 
in GDP. In the United States quarterly GDP growth 
explains only 45% of contemporaneous changes in 
unemployment.  
(7) Jobs losses in sectors where the low-skilled are highly 
represented also contributed to the increase in productivity 
during the crisis. 
Graph I.1.4: Okun's law in the euro area and the United States 
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Graph I.1.5 and I.1.6, reporting the evolution of 
output, number of employees and hours worked 
per worker since the peak of GDP for the United 
States and the euro area, show that the cumulative 
decline in the working hours per employee 
differed, being substantially more abrupt in the 
euro area. Consistently, the decline in head-count 
employment was milder during the recession in the 
euro area, while in the United States the labour 
market adjustment took place since the beginning 
of the crisis largely at the "extensive margin". 
Graph I.1.5: United States – cumulative decline in GDP, 
number of employees and average hours 
worked per employee 
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Graph I.1.6: Euro area – cumulative decline in GDP, 
number of employees and average hours 
worked per employee 
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The second element that may explain the belated 
response of employment to the output growth in 
2010 is pending uncertainty on the strength and 
sustainability of the recovery. Businesses were 
reluctant to hire in spite of improved expectations 
on future economic activity (see Chapter I.4). The 
fact that employment creation in 2010 took place 
especially in terms of temporary and part-time jobs 
confirms the role played by uncertainty, as 
employers appeared very cautious to increase the 
rigidity of their costs structures (see Chapter I.2). 
The third factor affecting how the unemployment 
rate picks up changes in the economic activity is 
the response over the cycle of labour force 
participation. Activity rates in Europe were 
generally highly resilient. As shown in Graph 
I.1.7, during 2008-2010, the proportion of the 
population aged between 15 and 64 in the labour 
force remained mainly unchanged: an unusual 
development when compared to the pro-cyclical 
participation rate of previous recessions. This 
development reflects a steep increase in female 
participation (up by 0.5 pps to 64.6% respectively 
for the EU and the euro area) and a decline for 
men (by 0.3 and 0.6 pps respectively for the EU 
and the euro area). While the participation rate of 
older workers kept rising at the pre-crisis rate, 
young adults (i.e. both men and women aged 
between 19 and 24) left the labour force. (8)  
Graph I.1.7: Employment, unemployment and 
participation rates in the EU and the euro area 
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(8) In the U.S. the participation rate of young adults has 
increased during the recession, which deviates from the 
historical trend of a longer time spent in education; the 
reduced supply of credit to students and the wealth losses 
of their parents may have induced the young to search for a 
job to finance their studies (Aaronson et al. 2006).  
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Box I.1.1: Changes in female participation rates and the added worker effect
Changes in the labour force participation reflect the decision to work or search versus remaining 
out of the labour market. In a depressed labour market, individuals may give up searching and 
finance consumption out of their wealth or by borrowing against future incomes (the "discouraged 
worker effect"). However, employment uncertainty and credit constraints may play a role in 
generating short-run participation and employment patterns (e.g. Lundberg, 1985). Thus, a severe 
labour market slump combined with a reduction in financial wealth and access to credit may result 
in higher labour supply. If the husband becomes unemployed, the reservation wage of the wife 
falls, creating the incentive to search. The entry of the non-working spouse in the labour force is 
needed to smooth out fluctuations of households' consumption. The "added worker effect", i.e. the 
increase in participation of individuals who are out of the labour force (e.g. young persons, or 
mothers with children), leads to a rise in overall participation during recessions and a fall during 
expansions.  
The observed increase in female participation rates in the EU since the financial crisis could 
largely be the result of a strong added worker effect taking place in most EU countries. Table 1 
reports the participation rate of married women before and after the crisis compared to the female 
participation rates for marital status different than married. The table suggests that the participation 
rate of both groups increased after the crisis but that of married women with children more than 
other categories; this is also consistent with the US evidence. Between 2007 and 2010 US the 
participation rate of married women with children increased by 0.4pps, while that of married 
women remained mainly unchanged. 
 
Table 1. Effect of the crisis on female participation rate 
 Married women with children Other categories of women Difference 
1998-2007 71.8 81.8 10.0 
2008-2009 74.5 82.7 8.2 
Difference 2.7 0.9 1.8 
(1) The table reports the average participation rate for the Member States 
Source: Commission services. 
Table 2 reports regression based evidence of the effect of male unemployment risks on female 
participation. The regression takes into account the developments of male unemployment and the 
peculiarities of the recession, which are captured with a dummy variable taking value 1 after 2007 
and zero before. An increase in male unemployment is accompanied by an increase in the 
participation of married women with children by 0.2 pps; conversely, the participation rate of 
women with different marital status does not respond to higher risk of unemployment of men. 
Thus, income and unemployment risk for the main breadwinner appears to be one factor that 
contributed to increase the female labour supply.  
Table 2. Estimate of the effect of male unemployment rate on female participation 
Dependent variable  
Participation rate of 
married women with 
children 
Participation rate 
of other categories 
of women 
Difference between participation rate of 
married women with children and participation 
rate of other categories of women  
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) 
0.22 * 0.05 0.19 * Male unemployment 
rate (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) 
1.65 * 1.00 * 0.92 Dummy for crisis 
(0.21) (0.22) (0.11) 
Observations 230 230 230 
Number of countries 26 26 26 
R- squared 0.97 0.94 0.98 
(1) Estimation: Feasible GLS, robust standard error; Fixed effects included; * denotes significance at 1 % 
Source: Commission Services. 
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Hence, the exceptional resilience of EU 
participation rates is mostly explained by the 
behaviour of older workers, as a result of past 
reforms strengthening the incentives to stay in 
work and as a consequence of reduced pension 
income from capitalisation-based schemes, and by 
an increased attachment to the labour market by 
women, as response to increased income and 
employment risks of male earners (Box I.1.1). 
The resilience of EU activity rates bodes well for 
the recovery, as high participation rates are key to 
restore employment rates to pre-crisis levels and 
ensure progress towards Europe 2020 targets. 
However, the fact that in a number of EU countries 
participation even increased during the recession 
contributed to keep unemployment figures high 
during the 2010 recovery. 
Finally, as discussed in the next sections, the 
belated response of employment was partly linked 
to a delayed adjustment in labour costs and to a 
deterioration in labour market matching. 
1.4. WAGES AND LABOUR COSTS 
Turning to hourly labour costs, during the 
recession their evolution reflected mainly the 
adjustment of hours per worker. As the recovery 
gained momentum and hours increased more than 
employment, the growth of the hourly labour costs 
dropped. In 2010 it was 1.5%, down from the 3% 
of one year earlier.  
For the euro area as a whole, it appears that the 
labour market weakness has been reflected in 
collectively agreed wages only in 2010. On the 
basis of the Phillips curve based on the period 
2000-2008, Graph I.1.9 shows that the growth of 
negotiated wages in 2009 was about 0.5 pps above 
the rate predicted on the basis of the historical 
relationship. In contrast, the high unemployment 
rate had a dampening effect on the negotiated 
wages in 2010, broadly in line with what predicted 
on the basis of a Phillips curve-type relation. 
Graph I.1.9: Phillips curve for the euro area 2000-2010: 
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Graph I.1.8: Wage growth and unemployment in the euro area 
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The dampening effect of unemployment on wage 
growth was instead fully reflected already in 2009 
when measured in terms of compensation per 
employee. Graph I.1.10 shows that the growth rate 
of wages defined in this way was below the 
Phillips curve line already in 2009. This evidence 
supports the view that the variable component of 
wages adjusted faster to labour market slack than 
the negotiated component. 
Graph I.1.10: Phillips curve of the euro area 2000-2010: 
growth of compensation per employee 
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Source: Commission Services. 
The evolution of compensation per employee in 
the euro area contrasts with the decline in their 
level observed in some EU countries (the Baltics, 
Greece, Malta and Ireland). Apart from being more 
reactive to a slack labour market, the stronger 
wage adjustment in these countries reflects a 
stronger deceleration of the public wage bill.   
Regarding euro-area dynamics in real product 
wages (i.e. nominal compensations per employee 
deflated with product prices; the definition of real 
wage relevant for firms' hiring decisions), it 
appears that they may have somehow contributed 
to accommodate the slack in the labour market. 
After growing at 1.3% in 2008, the real 
compensation per employee based on the GDP 
deflator decelerated to 0.8% in 2009 and 2010. The 
massive decline in low skilled employment 
(accounting for about 2/3 of total net job 
destruction since 2008) may explain why, in spite 
of a high and stable unemployment rate, the 
growth of real wages in 2010 did not adjust any 
further on aggregate. 
More importantly, looking at cross-country 
patterns, it appears that real wage adjustment is 
increasingly linked to labour market slack. In fact, 
Graph I.1.8 (panel b) shows that until 2009 real 
wage dynamics were actually stronger in countries 
with worse unemployment outcomes, and that this 
pattern is inverting only in 2010. 
Graph I.1.11: Net earnings and labour costs: euro area 
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Source: Eurostat. 
While the real product wages are relevant for 
hiring decisions, the developments of the real 
consumption wages are important for the 
developments in households' consumption. As 
shown in Graph I.1.11, the fall of real product 
wages during the recession has not been 
accompanied by a reduction in the growth of real 
take-home pay, which has helped consumption 
growth to resume as labour market conditions 
improved. 
Graph I.1.12: Compensation per employee  and unit labour 
costs in the euro area 
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As for developments in productivity and unit 
labour costs, 2010 marks  a revival of labour 
productivity growth accompanied by a reduction in 
unit labour costs in the EU and in the euro area, the 
first since 1996 (Graph I.1.12). These 
developments compensate for the opposite trend 
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observed in 2008 and 2009, largely caused by 
widespread labour hoarding. 
The fact that the largest increase in compensations 
per employee was recorded in manufacturing 
reflects the shift in the composition of employment 
towards higher wage categories as well as the pick 
up in the export sector (Table I.1.4). 
In spite of the increase in compensation per 
employee, unit labour costs declined substantially 
in manufacturing owing to substantial productivity 
gains, also driven by an increase of value added 
stronger than that of the total hours worked. In 
construction, moderate wage developments 
compared to one year earlier did not match the 
decline in productivity determined by a limited 
decline of headcounts relative to output. 
For the EU and the euro area, these developments 
have led to an evolution of relative unit labour 
costs consistent with a gradual improvement of the 
competitiveness of export-oriented sectors as also 
evident from the evolution of the competitiveness 
indicators (Graph I.1.13). The reduction in the 
relative wages in non-tradable sectors compared 
with tradable could also contribute to facilitate the 
inter-sectoral shift of resources to export industries 
necessary for countries having to correct current 
account deficits.  
Graph I.1.13: Euro area competitiveness indicators 
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1.5. LABOUR MARKET MATCHING AND LONG-
TERM UNEMPLOYMENT 
The effect of the financial crisis and of a severe 
recession has raised concerns about the capacity of 
the economy to get people back to work and on the 
risk of hysteresis during the recovery. The risk is 
that the increase in unemployment becomes 
entrenched in structural unemployment, i.e. the 
unemployment that cannot be reduced even after 
economic activity has returned to pre-recession 
 
Table I.1.4: Labour costs by sector 
Compensation per employee Value added          Total hours worked           Unit Labour Costs 
2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010
EU27 0.7 -1.1 3.3 1.2 -5.3 3.8 0.9 -3.3 0.3 3.9 4.2 -0.2
Euro-area 3.4 1.8 1.6 3.1 -2.2 2.4 0.7 -3.4 0.4 3.7 4.0 -0.6
US 3.1 2.2 2.9 -0.2 -2.6 2.9 -0.9 -4.9 : 2.4 -0.2 -0.5
Japan 0.0 -3.1 0.8 -1.3 -7.5 3.9 -1.1 -4.8 : 0.9 1.8 -3.6
Canada 2.5 1.7 2.5 1.0 -3.1 3.1 1.0 -3.0 : 3.5 2.6 0.7
EU27 1.7 -2.3 4.8 -1.0 -13.5 7.7 -0.4 -8.8 -0.2 3.7 5.3 -4.0
Euro-area 3.0 -1.8 3.4 0.1 -11.5 5.9 -0.7 -9.1 -0.4 5.7 8.7 -5.6
US 3.9 4.5 : -3.6 -5.5 : -3.0 -12.8 : 4.6 -2.0 -2.9
EU27 1.4 -2.4 4.7 -2.6 -14.6 7.5 -0.4 -9.2 -0.2 3.9 6.0 -4.7
Euro-area 3.0 -2.1 3.4 -1.4 -13.4 6.1 -0.7 -9.5 -0.4 6.4 9.2 -5.9
US 3.5 4.6 : -4.4 -9.2 : -0.5 -2.0 3.0 4.4 1.4 :
EU27 1.3 -1.2 3.8 1.7 -7.0 -1.7 0.6 -7.1 -2.1 2.7 0.5 2.7
Euro-area 5.0 1.5 1.5 3.2 -2.9 -3.7 -1.9 -8.4 -3.2 4.8 2.1 2.1
US 5.4 4.2 : -5.8 -15.8 : -0.5 -1.3 1.3 6.2 3.6 :
EU27 0.5 -1.1 3.3 1.6 -6.7 4.0 1.1 -3.0 0.6 0.8 2.5 0.3
Euro-area 2.7 0.8 1.6 3.9 -3.5 2.6 0.9 -2.9 0.3 2.6 5.8 -1.4
US 1.5 1.5 : -2.3 -2.9 : 0.1 -1.0 0.5 2.5 -2.1 :
EU27 -2.0 -1.5 3.0 1.5 -2.8 3.0 2.5 -2.5 1.5 -1.2 -0.9 3.2
Euro-area 2.4 0.6 1.5 3.6 0.3 1.5 2.3 -3.5 1.7 3.0 0.8 1.7
US 3.1 1.1 : 1.2 -1.2 : -0.3 -0.1 1.1 0.4 -4.0 :
Financial intermediation; real estate
Wholesale and retail trade
Construction
Manufacturing 
Industry (except construction)
Total Economy
(1)  Unit Labour Cost data by sector for the EU and EA are own calculations. 
Source: Eurostat, Ameco, OECD, Bureau of Labour Statistics. 
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levels. High structural unemployment implies that 
wage pressures can be kept in check only with a 
substantial slack in the labour market. 
In the wake of the weak recovery and of the 
sectoral adjustment triggered by the crisis, the 
presence of more pervasive labour market frictions 
that slow down or prevent the absorption of 
displaced workers implies higher unemployment 
duration and higher long-term unemployment. (9)  
Graph I.1.14 shows a measure of the job separation 
and job finding rates based on unemployment 
duration data. (10) Before the crisis both rates were 
trending upwards, implying an increase in workers' 
reallocation (the sum of the job finding and 
separation rates). With the economy entering into 
recession, the unemployment rate started to rise 
due to higher separation rates and lower job 
finding rates. 
Graph I.1.14: Job finding and job separation rates in the 
euro-area, 2000q2-2010q4 
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Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat data. 
After reaching a peak at the turning point quarter 
of GDP (2009Q2), the separation rate started to 
decline, while the job finding rate remained at a 
persistently low level. Although the flow into the 
pool of unemployed did not increase any further, it 
is mostly the low job finding rate that explains a 
persistently high unemployment rate and longer 
spells of unemployment. (11)  
                                                          
(9) Skills' or geographical mismatches and a decline in the 
efficiency of recruitment may be a cause of these frictions.  
(10) See Arpaia and Curci (2010) for methodology. 
(11) This is development is observed also for the U.S: the 
decline in the job finding rate explains more than 95% of 
the increase in the unemployment since the recession 
Compared to the United States, where the job 
finding rate have trended downward in the last 
decade (e.g. Tasci and Zaman, 2010), the worsening 
of employment prospects in the EU coincided with 
the crisis. Before 2008, the chances of finding a job 
were gradually improving over time.  
As suggested by Graph I.1.15, this led to an 
increasing share of short-term unemployed, an 
indication of a more dynamic labour market 
(unemployment was also falling). At the early 
stages of the recession, the pick up in the job 
destruction rate implied a higher share of workers 
displaced for less than a year; at the turning point 
of the GDP this share reached 68%. The weak 
labour market in 2009 and 2010 increased the 
number of jobless individuals with duration 
between 12 and 47 months. 
Graph I.1.15: Short-term and long-term unemployment in 
the EU, 1998-2010 
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Source: Commission Services, Eurostat. 
The increase in the unemployment spells is a 
distinctive feature of deep recessions (Elsby et al., 
2010). Graph I.1.16 reports for the EU and the 
United States the proportion of the labour force 
which is jobless for 52 weeks or longer, i.e. the 
long-term unemployment rate according to the EU 
statistics. In the EU, the percentage of 
unemployment spells lasting more than 12 months 
has increased, although less steeply than in the 
United States where the share in total 
unemployment of those jobless for more than a 
                                                                                   
(Murat Tasci, 2010);  the job finding rate has not followed 
the improvements in the separation rate, which in early 
2010 fell to pre-recession levels. 
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year jumped from 9.5% in the second quarter of 
2007 to 31% in the second quarter of 2010. (12) 
Graph I.1.16: Percentage of the labour force jobless for 1 
year or more, 2005Q1-2011Q1 
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Source: Eurostat and BLS. 
The Beveridge curve, the relationship between 
unemployment and job vacancies, delivers 
essential information about the labour market 
tightness and the impact of shocks on the 
efficiency of labour market matching (Box I.1.2). 
Graph I.1.17: Beveridge curve euro-area: 1995q1-2011q1 
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(1) The survey-based indicator is chosen due to data 
availability; the correlation between the this indicator and 
the vacancy rate over the period 2003Q3-2010Q4  is 0.8; 
seasonally adjusted data. 
Source: Commission Services. 
Visual inspection of the data reveals a negative 
relationship between unemployment and the job 
                                                          
(12) In the U.S. the share of unemployed for less than 5 weeks 
has followed a downward trend well before the crisis. The 
proportion in unemployment of jobless people for more 
than 26 weeks was 10% in the 1950s and 1960s, it reached 
20% between 2000 and 2007, but it rose to 40% in 2009 
(see Aaronson et al., 2010) 
vacancy rate, with two prominent inward shifts 
occurring in the late 1990s and mid-2000s, which 
are indicative of improvements in the efficiency of 
the matching process (Graph I.1.17).  
Until the second half of 2009, the curve did not 
exhibit a clear shift, which is consistent with a 
weak demand for labour. However, unemployment 
hovered around 10% in 2010 while vacancies kept 
rising, which hints to a possible deterioration of 
the matching.  
Graph I.1.18: Shifts in the euro-area Beveridge curve and 
NAIRU (cumulated changes since 1996) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Shifts in the Beveridge curve might be temporary 
or could signal more structural transformations in 
the labour market. Graph I.1.18 shows that the 
change in unemployment rate due to the 
deterioration in the match (i.e. the shift in the 
location of the curve, see Box I.1.2) and the 
evolution of the structural unemployment as 
defined by the NAIRU concept tend to co-move 
and that this co-movement is particularly evident 
in recent years. 
Between 1996 and 2007 the NAIRU declines and 
the Beveridge curve shifts leftward (i.e. the 
unemployment consistent with a fixed vacancy rate 
falls) and both series points toward declining 
structural unemployment. After 2008, both the 
NAIRU and the mismatch-related unemployment 
shot up considerably. This evidence suggests that, 
if not reversed, the worsening labour mismatch 
may imply that a higher share of unemployment 
becomes structural and that a given reduction of 
unemployment rates would require a stronger 
degree of wage adjustment. 
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Box I.1.2: The steady-state unemployment rate and the Beveridge curve
Linking the steady-state unemployment rate to the Beveridge curve 
The change in unemployment equals the excess of inflows into unemployment over outflows out of 
unemployment. In symbols, ( ) ttttt ufusu −−= 1&  
where 
ts  is the rate of inflows into unemployment, tf is the rate of unemployment outflows (i.e. the rate at 
which workers and jobs are matched); ( )tt us −1  is the number of people entering into unemployment, while  
ttuf the number of person exiting unemployment. The outflow rate tf  is higher the higher the ratio of 
vacancies per unemployed )/( tt uv . This relation is shaped by the matching function (e.g. Petrongolo-
Pissarides, 2001), which describes the process of allocation of unemployed to jobs. The steady-state 
unemployment rate is the unemployment rate that balances inflows and outflows 
tt
t
t fs
su +=
* . This 
expression provides a measure of stable frictionless unemployment. It increases with the job separation rate 
and when the job finding rate falls. As the value of these rates increases, unemployment converges rapidly to 
the steady-state (Elsby et al., 2009). 
The Beveridge curve relates the steady-state unemployment rate to the number of vacancies per 
unemployed. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas specification for the matching function ( )αµ ttt uvf = , where µ is 
a measure of the efficiency of the matching process, one obtains ( )αµ ttt
t
t uvs
su +=
* . For any level of the 
matching efficiency µ and of the separation rate s, the Beveridge curve implies a stable and convex negative 
relationship between the equilibrium unemployment and the vacancy rate. An increase in the efficiency of 
the matching improves the job finding rate tf and shifts the Beveridge curve leftward; similarly, a decrease in 
the job separation rate shifts the curve leftward.  
Cyclical and structural changes in the Beveridge curve 
The following version of the Beveridge curve has been estimated on euro area aggregate data: 
 
tttttt Dvvuu εβββα +++++= − 22110  , 
where 
tu  in the unemployment rate in year t, tv  is the job vacancy rate, and tD  are dummy variables used to 
identify shifts in the curve as in Valletta (2005). These shifts embed changing efficiency of the matching 
process over time. The lagged unemployment rate is introduced to capture the speed of adjustment of 
unemployment. 
The available time series for job vacancy statistics is short as data are available only from 2003Q1. 
Therefore, a survey based indicator of employers' perceptions on the spare capacity in the labour market is 
used to obtain the job vacancy rate for previous years. The estimates results are reported in the table below. 
As expected from the theoretical prediction, the relation between vacancies and unemployment is negative 
and convex, as revealed by the positive coefficient of the quadratic term. According to the estimates, a 1 
percentage point increase in the vacancy rate above the sample mean (1.8%) is associated with a decline in 
unemployment of 0.7 pps. 
Beveridge curve regressions for the euro area: 1996q1-2010q4 
 Constant Lagged unemployment Job vacancy rate Job vacancy rate squared 
 5.6 * 0.71 * -2.2 * 0.42 ** 
R2=0.98; * denotes significance at 99%; ** denotes significance at 95% 
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Different factors may have contributed to the 
increase in the long-term unemployment in the 
EU: 
• the preference of employers to hire people with 
short spells of unemployment, which became 
more relevant during the crisis;  
• the difficulty of screening a large number of 
job seekers because of incomplete knowledge 
about their characteristics (congestion effects) 
(13);  
• the deterioration of workers' skills during 
unemployment, implying a lengthening of 
unemployment spells; 
• displaced workers facing financial constraints 
may have found it difficult to move to locations 
where jobs are abundant, even when their skills 
are suitable for any of them; 
• worsened mismatch between labour demand 
and sector-specific skills. This factor could 
have played a relevant role in the context of the 
last recession in some countries, in light of the 
major labour demand drop in construction. 
These factors may have contributed, to a different 
extent in different countries, to a deterioration of 
matching in the labour market. Some effects could 
have been played also by policies put in place by 
governments. Notably, after the recession the 
coverage and generosity of unemployment benefits 
was raised in a number of EU countries. (14) By 
reducing the costs of being unemployed and the 
intensity of job search, these policies may have 
contributed to lengthen the duration of 
unemployment. These measures have been phased 
out or are in the process of being phased out in 
most of the countries that put them in place in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis (see next Chapter 
of this report). However, during the crisis many 
Member States have tightened the eligibility 
conditions to access benefits and the effect on the 
                                                          
(13) This is also related to an imperfect adjustment of wages 
and to the limited mobility of workers.  
(14) See European Comission (2010) for a review of policy 
responses to the crisis in the EU Member States. For the 
U.S. the effect on the unemployment rate of extended 
duration of unemployment benefits ranges from 0.7 to 1.7 
pps; however, the effect is much lower when one takes into 
account the different eligibility to benefits of displaced 
workers (Daly et al., 2011).  
intensity of job search of eligible unemployed is 
likely to be limited. 
1.6. CONCLUSIONS 
In 2010 the EU economy has been heading 
upward, while the adjustment in the labour market 
has been lagging behind. The unemployment rate 
remained stable at the same level of 2009, close to 
10%, both in the euro area and the EU. The 
unemployment rate is however expected to 
decrease only moderately starting from 2011.   
A series of reasons explain the delayed and timid 
employment recovery.  
First, the decline in hours worked per worker 
during the recession, a key factor in minimising 
the increase of unemployment, implies that firms 
have largely responded to the increase in economic 
activity via an expansion of hours worked. This 
translated into a strong productivity growth 
coupled with relatively muted employment 
dynamics in 2010. Latest quarterly figures indicate 
that the adjustment in hours worked is levelling 
off, and the headcount employment started 
growing again in the first quarter of 2011.  
Second, employment recovery may be held back 
by the remaining uncertainties concerning the 
sustainability of the economic recovery that may 
have induced a wait and see attitude on the part of 
employers. 
Third, during the recession the labour supply has 
behaved unexpectedly; in spite of a large fall in 
output participation rate has slightly increased. 
Older workers' participation rose partly because of 
reforms in retirement age and early retirement 
schemes, partly because of concerns about pension 
income following the losses of pension funds 
during the crisis. The labour supply of women 
seems to have responded in such a way to 
compensate higher income and employment risk of 
men.  
Fourth, although there was already evidence of 
adjustment in nominal compensations to the labour 
market slack already in 2009, bargained wages 
started adjusting only in 2010. This suggests that 
variable pay elements reacted more promptly, 
while collectively agreed wages are adjusting with 
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lags. Although real wage dynamics become more 
muted in the euro area since 2009, it appears that it 
is only in 2010 that real wage adjustment is 
becoming relevant in countries with worse 
unemployment problems.  
Fifth, the build-up of long-term unemployment 
may have influenced the shape and strength of the 
recovery. The evidence indicates that labour 
market matching has been worsening in the euro 
area, as there is more and more unemployment for 
the same number of vacancies. In spite of a 
considerable reduction in job separation rates after 
the recession, job finding rates remained low and 
unemployment duration has been on the rise. The 
increase in the frictional unemployment was 
accompanied by rising estimates of the NAIRU, 
the concept of structural unemployment consistent 
with stable prices. 
All in all, in spite of the positive effects that the 
output recovery is gradually having on job 
creation, there is substantial uncertainty on the 
speed at which unemployment will go back to pre-
crisis levels. This will depend not only on the 
economic outlook, but also on supportive policy 
frameworks, notably in terms of unemployment 
benefits systems and activation policies providing 
incentives for the unemployed to go back to work, 
policies and wage setting frameworks supporting 
wage adjustment, tax systems encouraging job 
creation, active labour market and training policies 
facilitating labour market transitions and the return 
to work for the long-term unemployed. 
2. EMPLOYMENT DEVELOPMENTS AT COUNTRY LEVEL 
 
Graph I.2.1: Unemployment rates in the EU Member States: 2008-2010 (as % of labour force) 
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(1) Countries are ranked in descending order of unemployment in 2010. 
Source: Eurostat, LFS. 
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2.1. INTRODUCTION 
By the first quarter of 2010, most Member States 
had emerged from recession. Yet, the recovery in 
the EU and the euro area remains uneven. A solid 
rebound in growth, with rates of 3% and higher, 
was registered only in Germany, Poland and few 
other export-oriented countries, while growth 
continued to be negative in Greece, Ireland and 
Romania. 
In spite of growth resuming in most EU countries, 
only in a minority employment grew. Labour 
market developments at country level largely 
followed the multi-speed recovery in place: 
employment growth was in general stronger in the 
countries with the best growth performance 
(Belgium, Germany, France, Luxemburg, Malta, 
Austria, Hungary, Poland and Sweden). The 
response of employment to growth was however 
quite uneven across Member States, in light of 
differences in economic structure and overall 
conditions (sectoral composition of employment, 
corporate profitability,…) and policy settings.  
This chapter digs deeper in the main features of 
employment developments at country level. It 
provides also an analysis of job market flows and a 
disaggregated overview of employment dynamics 
by age, gender, national origin, and type of 
contract (temporary versus permanent, part-time 
versus full-time). A special focus analyses the role 
played by migration in adjusting to unemployment 
differences across EU countries. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as 
follows. Section 2.2 describes the recent 
developments in the unemployment and the labour 
input. Section 2.3 provides country evidence on 
the risk of unemployment persistence and the 
build-up of long-term unemployment. The labour 
market outcomes for specific employment groups 
are presented in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 reviews 
the main policy interventions enacted since 2008 
and the reforms announced by the Member States 
in the context of the EU 2020 National Reform 
Programmes.  
2.2. EMPLOYMENT DEVELOPMENTS AND 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES 
The evolution of the aggregate unemployment rate 
conceals fairly wide differences across EU 
countries. In 2010, the unemployment rate 
remained persistently above the pre-crisis level in 
most of Member States, the recovery of output 
notwithstanding (Graph I.2.1). Unemployment 
started to fall in the first half of 2010 only in a few 
countries (Czech Republic, Germany, Belgium and 
Italy). 
In countries hit by the bust of the housing bubbles 
cycle and by the effects of the financial crisis the 
unemployment rate kept rising to reach new 
historical records. In spite of the significant decline 
in the second half of 2010, the unemployment rate 
remains among the highest in Latvia, Spain and 
Estonia.  
Overall, unemployment dispersion has increased 
markedly both within the euro area and the EU. A 
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Graph I.2.3: Changes in the unemployment rate (2008Q1-2010Q4, in pps): actual and Okun's Law prediction 
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(1) The bars represent changes in the unemployment rate from 2008Q1 to 2010Q4 (in pps). The predictions come from a 
panel estimation of the Okun's Law with dependent variable the change in the unemployment rate and the explanatory 
variables lagged unemployment and current and lagged GDP growth see footnote in the text. 
Source: Commission services. 
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large share of unemployment is concentrated in 
relatively few countries. Spain alone, with 2 
million more unemployed, accounted for 
respectively half and 1/3 of the increase in total 
unemployment in the euro area and the EU 
respectively. Before the recession, Spanish 
unemployed represented 12% of total EU 
unemployment, a proportion comparable to its 
share in total GDP. In 2010, this proportion 
reached 20% (Graph I.2.2), going well beyond the 
share of the largest Member States. An opposite 
evolution has been taking place for Germany, the 
country with the largest labour force in the EU: the 
German share in total EU unemployment declined 
from 20% in 2008 to 12% in 2010. 
Graph I.2.2: Unemployment in the euro area countries:   
percentage share of total euro area 
unemployment 
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Source: Eurostat, LFS. 
The rising dispersion in unemployment rates is 
attributable not only to the fact that the crisis hit 
national economies to a different extent, but also the 
additional economic, institutional, and policy-
related factors that explain a different response of 
unemployment to economic activity and different 
risks that unemployment could become entrenched.  
The Okun law predicts a relatively stable response 
of unemployment rates to GDP growth: each 
additional point of growth is expected to be 
associated with a less than proportional increase in 
the unemployment rate, according to most 
estimates close to 0.3%. Graph I.2.3 reports the 
observed change in the unemployment rate 
(2008Q1-2010Q4) and that predicted on the basis 
of country-level Okun's law estimates. (15) It 
appears that for most countries the increase in 
unemployment is lower than predicted by the Okun 
law. This evidence confirms the relevant role played 
by adjustment of working hours during the 
recession in a number of EU countries. However, in 
a few member States, notably Spain and Bulgaria, 
unemployment had a strong response to GDP.  
These different unemployment responses were to a 
large extent linked to the interplay between 
structural and institutional factors. The strong 
increase of unemployment in countries affected by 
the bust of housing bubbles was not only due to the 
severity of the recession but also to the fact that 
adjustment of working hours and labour hoarding 
was less present in the shrinking construction 
sector, while the dismissal of workers with 
temporary contracts more pervasive. 
                                                          
(15) The Okun's Law has been estimated with OLS and robust 
variances on a cross-section of the 27 Member States over 
the period 1983Q1-2008Q1 (2008Q1 is the peak quarter of 
GDP); the panel is unbalanced due to data availability.  
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Box I.2.1: Regional unemployment in Spain and Italy
Highly persistent regional disparities are a distinctive feature of the Italian and the Spanish labour market: 
regional unemployment disparities within these countries are at least of the same magnitude as that across 
EU countries. These disparities are also persistent, since the ranking of regions repeats unchanged over time. 
In spite of some improvements in the last decade, joblessness in Italy remains concentrated in the Southern 
regions, while Northern regions are close to full employment. A similar, pattern is observed in Spain, with 
Southern regions like Andalusia and Extremadura exhibiting the highest unemployment rates, and other 
regions like Navarra, La Rioja and Aragon with much lower unemployment. During the boom of the years 
of the 2000s, spatial disparities declined owing mainly to the fall in the jobless rate in high unemployment 
regions. However, the rate of employment creation was unsustainable and mainly related to a roaring 
housing sector. When the burst of the housing bubble hit at the end of 2007, regional differences in 
unemployment widened considerably, and in Murcia and Castilla la Mancha, where construction absorbed 
about 17% of total employment before the crisis, unemployment soared to record high levels.  
Large and persistent regional disparities can be explained by structural and institutional features related to i) 
differences in job creation linked to an unequal distribution in space of dynamic economic activities and 
declining sectors; ii) differences in the skill-composition of the workforce; iii) agglomeration externalities 
stemming from the concentration of specialised activities or from market size; iv) cultural, institutional, and 
policy factors that prevent mobility and the acquisition of the required skills.  
Among the latter group of factors a role might be played by public employment. These factors often 
reinforce each other. For example, a high wage premium for public jobs in Southern regions may induce the 
young of the South may not only prevent mobility to the North, but would tilt education choices to the 
public sector, which would in turn raise the dependency on public employment (e.g. Alesina et al., 1999; 
Dell'Aringa et al., 2005).  
The structure of collective bargaining can also foster unemployment disparities when the level at which 
bargaining occurs does not allow to take into account territorial difference in the levels of productivity. It is 
suggestive a comparison between Spain, where collective bargaining takes place mainly at provincial and 
industry level, and Italy where bargaining at the sectoral national level prevailed. Graph 1 suggests that in 
Spain regional disparities in unemployment rates are only weakly associated to differences in the real unit 
labour costs. This is not the case of Italy, where regions with unemployment rates higher than the national 
average have also unit labour costs higher than the average. Thus, the predominance of sectoral bargaining 
at the national level appears to be associated to a larger unemployment dispersion across regions. This 
phenomenon is not equally evident in Spain, possibly in light of the fact that bargaining is more 
decentralised, thereby allowing wages to better reflect productivity differentials between different regions. 
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Another factor that explains the heterogeneous 
unemployment response is the different degree of 
adjustment in wages. As reported in Chapter III, 
developments in nominal and real wages varied 
quite widely across the EU since the recession. 
Moreover, the adjustment of wages to the labour 
market slack has been taking place with lags. 
Graph I.2.4: GDP and employment growth in the EU 
(changes over the period 2008Q2-2010Q4) 
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Looking forward, unemployment disparities will 
be linked to a relevant extent also to the capacity 
of countries to absorb high unemployment rates 
and fight structural unemployment. Although 
structural elements will play a major role in this 
respect (in particular, unemployment will be 
harder to absorb where linked to a relevant process 
of sectoral reallocation), supportive policy 
frameworks will also play a role. Notably, 
adequate and effective Active Labour Market 
Policies would be needed to support the search 
activities and re-train the long-term unemployed. 
In some countries, however, an effective strategy 
for the reduction of unemployment may require 
more far reaching reforms. Box I.2.1 discusses the 
cases of Spain and Italy, two countries where 
unemployment was endemically comparatively 
high for decades and highly concentrated in a few 
regions. 
 
Box (continued) 
 
What appears to be a distinguishing feature of regional unemployment disparities in Spain is their strong 
association with the use of temporary contracts. As shown in Graph 2, the larger the share of temporary 
employment, the higher is unemployment. A possible interpretation of this relation is that when employment 
is mostly temporary, real wages are less reactive to local unemployment rates. In spite of being decentralised 
at the provincial level, collective agreements are automatically extended erga omnes to all workers in the 
province and branch of industry to which the agreement refers. As the unionised workers that participate in 
collective bargaining are mostly permanent workers ("the insiders"), they will hardly accept low real wages 
in exchange of higher employment opportunities for temporary workers. Thus, stronger real rigidities and 
higher unemployment is expected in geographical areas with widespread temporary employment. 
Graph 2: Regional unemployment and temporary employment in Spain (2005-2009) 
 
Source: Commission services, Eurostat. 
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2.3. EMPLOYMENT, PARTICIPATION, HOURS 
WORKED 
2.3.1. Employment and participation rates 
Graph I.2.5 shows the employment and 
participation rates since 2008Q1. For the EU as a 
whole, a moderate drop in employment was 
accompanied by an increase in participation. In 
almost all countries, the participation rate has 
remained above or at its pre-crisis level, implying 
so far no discouragement of the labour force. As 
discussed in Chapter I, this outcome could be 
related to higher unemployment risks of the main 
earner when a reduction of households' financial 
wealth or credit constraints limit the possibility of 
consumption smoothing against a temporary 
reduction in households' income.  
In countries with the highest increase in 
unemployment, the increase in the number of 
jobless people was offset by a decline in 
participation only in Latvia and Ireland. 
Graph I.2.5: Cumulative change in employment and participation rates (2008Q1 to 2010Q4) 
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(1) Countries are ranked in descending order according to the change in the unemployment rate since 2008Q1. 
Source: Eurostat, LFS. 
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Conversely, the unemployment rate could have 
been lower in Spain and Greece had the 
participation rate not increased. There is also a 
group of countries where changes in participation 
and employment since 2008Q1, although smaller, 
are still substantial. In Denmark, Portugal and 
Slovakia, the drop in the employment rate was 
associated with a flat participation rate. In the 
largest group of countries, the increase in 
unemployment was more moderate. 
Looking forward, past trends may not continue. 
With unemployment stabilised at high levels in a 
number of EU countries, jobless people, especially 
those with low labour market attachment, may give 
up searching because of deterioration in their job 
prospects and leave the labour force. Hence, there 
is the risk that persistent reduction in employment 
could follow major unemployment surges because 
of a persistent reduction in participation rates.  
2.3.2. The adjustment of hours worked  
Graph I.2.6 displays the change in the hours 
worked per employee and in the number of 
employees since the onset the crisis. In several 
countries, a large part of the reduction in total 
hours worked during the crisis occurred through a 
decline in the hours worked per person rather than 
in headcount employment, in particular in 
countries where the impact of the crisis was 
perceived as transitory. Since the recession, only 
four countries (Belgium, Germany, Austria and 
Poland) have recorded an increase in the number 
of employees larger than that in hours worked per 
employee (in 2010Q4 compared to 2008Q1). 
The behaviour of total labour input in Germany is 
telling of the rapid recovery of its economy, with a 
rapid return of the average hours to their pre-crisis 
level and steep increase of employment at the end 
of 2010. At the current stage of the recovery, the 
average hours worked are increasing in parallel 
with the number of total employees with the risk 
that the labour market becomes potentially tight. 
This is also the case of Poland, where, however, 
GDP did not decline during the recession.  
Graph I.2.6: Change in total hours worked (cumulative changes since 2008Q1) 
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2.3.3. Employment developments at sectoral  
level 
At the EU aggregate level, the sectors hit the 
hardest by the economic downturn were 
construction, followed by manufacturing (Table 
I.2.1). The critical employment performance of the 
construction sector is related first and foremost to 
the inevitable adjustment after years of 
unsustainable employment growth. Moreover, the 
needs of fiscal consolidation and consequent 
reduction in public works may have also played a 
role. 
 
Table I.2.1: Employment growth in different sectors: 
2008Q1-2010Q4 (in %) 
Employment 
(growth) Total Agriculture Industry Construction Services
EU27 -2.2 -6.6 -8.7 -10.0 -1.4
EA -2.3 -4.1 -8.9 -12.9 -1.7
BE 1.2 -1.3 -8.0 0.8 1.6
BG -9.3 -4.5 -16.3 -26.5 -3.5
CZ -1.3 -5.0 -7.5 3.0 1.3
DK -5.4 -6.1 -16.2 -16.6 -6.0
DE 1.3 -1.5 -3.8 1.8 1.8
EE -14.0 -14.0 -12.3 -48.6 -8.1
IE -14.5 -27.3 -17.5 -55.0 -10.6
EL -4.3 0.8 -11.0 -21.3 -3.7
ES -10.5 -1.8 -21.3 -40.4 -7.7
FR -0.8 -6.4 -8.1 -2.3 -0.8
IT -2.3 -2.9 -8.6 -2.8 -2.3
CY -1.0 7.7 -1.7 -7.3 -3.9
LV -17.9 2.4 -17.6 -48.5 -16.8
LT -12.1 -1.2 -23.0 -42.1 -1.6
LU 4.4 8.2 -2.4 1.6 5.1
HU -2.6 -6.3 -8.8 -5.3 -3.0
MT 1.8 2.5 -5.2 -0.9 3.4
NL -1.1 -6.6 -5.5 -2.2 -4.3
AT 1.3 -1.8 -5.1 0.8 1.4
PL 2.0 -7.1 -6.2 6.5 6.9
PT -5.0 -9.7 -6.7 -11.9 -2.9
RO -3.5 -16.9 -2.7 10.2 5.3
SI -3.9 -4.9 -15.7 -13.2 1.1
SK -3.0 -20.8 -12.6 6.3 1.6
FI -2.6 -5.0 -14.4 -6.1 -1.8
SE -0.9 0.9 -10.1 4.0 1.7
UK -1.3 : : : :
Source: Eurostat, quarterly national accounts for most of the 
countries and national accounts for CY, MT, HU, RO and SE, 
no employment breakdown by branch available for the UK. 
 
The number of people employed in the 
construction sector almost halved in the Baltic 
countries, Spain and Ireland since the onset of the 
recession. In a number of countries, however, 
employment in the construction sector rose, in 
parallel with a decline in industry (among these 
Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and 
Austria). In 2010, job losses in construction were 
moderate compared to one year earlier and, at the 
end of the year, employment losses were relevant 
in five countries only (Greece, Spain, Italy, 
Portugal and Slovenia).  
In all countries the job losses in services were 
relatively limited. At the end of 2010, employment 
in services started to recover from the trough 
reached in the first half of the year. 
2.4. JOB MARKET FLOWS AND LONG-TERM 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
After having temporarily fallen at the early stages 
of the recession, due to new displaced workers 
joining the existing stock of unemployed, the 
proportion of unemployment spells lasting for 
more than a year has rapidly increased. At the end 
of 2010, the share of long-term unemployed in the 
EU reached 42%, 4 pps higher than at the 
beginning of the crisis, with large differences 
across country – from 20% in Sweden to 68% in 
Slovakia. It increased by more than 20 pps in 
Lithuania, Latvia, Ireland and Spain. The long-
term unemployment decreased in few countries, 
most notably in Slovakia, where, however, the 
starting level was very high. 
Graph I.2.7: Unemployment duration in months before, 
during and after the recession 
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The evidence on unemployment duration might be 
linked to a series of factors, notably a persistently 
low rate of job creation.  
The analysis of job market flows could provide 
indications on the source of unemployment 
fluctuations, notably whether changes in 
unemployment rates are mostly related to 
fluctuations in the separation, the job finding rates 
or both.  
As suggested by Graph I.2.8 and by Graph I.2.9, 
both higher inflow rates into unemployment and 
lower outflow rates out of unemployment 
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contributed to the increase in the unemployment 
during the recession. (16) The recession was 
characterised by a substantial increase in the 
separation rate, in particular in countries hit hard 
by the bust of the housing bubble and by sharp 
adjustment of current account.  
Graph I.2.8: Job finding rates – the probability of leaving 
unemployment has fallen during the crisis and 
remains low 
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Separation rates also increased considerably in 
Denmark, Finland and Bulgaria. In contrast, they 
remained mainly unchanged in Belgium, Italy, 
France, Austria and Malta. Germany is the only 
country where separations declined during the 
recession. Similarly, the job finding rate declined 
in several countries, in particular in the Baltics, 
Ireland, Spain and the UK. The graphs also show 
that at the end of 2010, the separation rates had 
fallen in almost all countries, while the job finding 
rates remained generally below the crisis average.  
The low probability of exiting from unemployment 
implies a steady lengthening of the average 
unemployment duration. The job destruction 
process is not followed by sufficient job creation 
and unemployment becomes persistent. This 
suggests that the sharp rise in unemployment 
suffered in countries such as Spain and Ireland 
risks becoming entrenched (higher structural 
unemployment) without a substantial recovery in 
job creation. In contrast, the persistency of 
unemployment is expected to fall in countries such 
                                                          
(16) The graphs show the hazard rates obtained using the 
methodology developed in Arpaia and Curci (2010); they 
represent the probability for an employed to enter 
unemployment and for an unemployed to exit 
unemployment. 
as the Netherlands, Finland, and Germany where 
job finding rates are recovering in 2010.  
Graph I.2.9: Job separation rates – the probability of losing 
a job remains high in many Member States 
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2.5. LABOUR MARKET STATUS OF DIFFERENT 
GROUPS 
2.5.1. Gender 
In 2010, women continued to have a better 
employment performance than men. Yet, the 
smaller contraction of employment in male-
dominated sectors implied a smaller gap between 
male and female employment growth (Graphs 
I.2.10 and I.2.11) than in 2009.  
Graph I.2.10: Male employment, participation and 
unemployment rates in the EU 
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Source: Eurostat LFS, age 20-64. 
The gender gap in employment rates narrowed in 
almost all countries (Table I.2.2), in particular in 
Bulgaria and Slovakia owing to the strong decline 
in men's employment rate (-4.7 pps and -2.7 pps 
respectively); only in four countries (Germany, 
Finland, Romania, Sweden) men did better than 
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women. In spite of these developments, in some 
Member States the gender gap in employment rate 
remains substantial. 
Graph I.2.11: Female employment, participation and 
unemployment rates in the EU 
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Source: Eurostat, LFS 20-64.  
 
 
Table I.2.2: Employment rates by country and gender 
2010 2009-10 2010 2009-10
MT 77.7 0.8 41.4 1.6
EL 76.2 -2.6 51.7 -1.0
IT 72.8 -1.0 49.5 -0.2
CZ 79.6 -0.6 60.9 -0.5
LU 79.2 0.2 62.0 0.5
RO 70.8 0.1 55.9 -0.4
SK 71.9 -2.7 57.4 -0.8
CY 82.5 -1.0 68.5 0.4
PL 71.6 -1.0 57.7 0.1
EA 17 75.2 -0.7 61.7 -0.4
ES 69.1 -1.9 55.8 -0.5
EU 27 75.1 -0.7 62.1 -0.4
NL 82.8 -2.1 70.8 -1.9
BE 73.5 0.3 61.6 0.6
UK 79.3 -0.3 67.9 -0.3
HU 66.0 -1.0 55.0 0.6
AT 80.2 0.1 69.6 0.2
DE 80.1 0.4 69.6 -0.2
PT 75.4 -1.1 65.6 -0.5
IE 69.4 -2.4 60.4 -1.3
FR 73.8 -0.4 64.9 -0.1
SI 74.0 -1.6 66.5 -1.4
BG 69.1 -4.7 61.7 -2.3
SE 81.7 0.8 75.7 0.0
DK 79.0 -1.8 73.1 -1.7
FI 74.5 -0.2 71.5 -0.9
EE 67.7 -3.3 65.7 -3.1
LV 65.1 -2.3 64.9 -1.9
LT 63.6 -3.3 65.1 -2.4
Men Women
(1) Countries are ranked in descending order of the gap 
between male and female employment rates 
Source: Eurostat LFS, age 20-64.  
 
Turning to labour force participation rates, in 2010 
participation of women increased only slightly, 
while that of men remained mainly unchanged. 
The peculiar feature observed during the recession 
of no withdrawal from the labour market is 
confirmed also in 2010.  As a consequence of the 
worse employment performance of men during the 
recession, the gender gap in unemployment rates 
has become insignificant.  
2.5.2. Age 
The employment situation developed more 
favourably for the old than for the young (Table 
I.2.3). In 2010, the employment rate of the young 
and the middle-aged declined by 1 pp and 0.6 pps.  
 
Table I.2.3: Employment, participation and 
unemployment rates by age EU 27 
Age 15-24 25-54 55-64
Employment rate 2010 34.1 77.6 46.3
change 2009-2010 -1.0 -0.6 0.3
Participation rate 2010 43.1 84.9 49.7
change 2009-2010 -0.7 0.0 0.6
Unemployment rate 2010 20.8 8.6 6.9
change 2009-2010 1.0 0.7 0.6
Source: Eurostat LFS. 
 
Conversely, the older workers' employment rate 
kept rising to reach 46.3%, mainly owing to the 
more dynamic female component.  Although 
unemployment increased for all age groups, the 
young saw their rates to reach unprecedented high 
levels (1 pp both in the EU and the euro area); in 
2010 one in five 15- to 24- years old is jobless.  
Graph I.2.13: Employment rates changes by age group in 
the EU 
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Graph I.2.13 shows the change in employment 
rates by age groups before, during and after the 
crisis. There is a positive relationship between age 
and the employment rate developments; older 
cohorts do tend to perform better than younger 
generations. During the crisis, those aged below 30 
were hit harder than other groups. However, a 
decline of about 1 pp was also observed for those 
aged between 40 and 49. In 2010, the employment 
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rate continued to decline although by less than the 
previous year and only for those aged below 45. 
The young are a vulnerable group for several 
reasons. They have little or no work experience, 
are more likely to be hired with an uncertain 
contractual relationship and their short-tenure 
usually implies limited access to unemployment 
benefits; the transition from education to work is 
often difficult. All this is reflected in an 
unemployment rate which has reached 20.8% in 
the EU, although the increase in 2010 has been 
more moderate than in 2009 (1 pp compared to 4.3 
pps of the year before). The situation differs 
starkly between countries. Youth unemployment 
has increased remarkably in countries with the 
highest increase in aggregate unemployment such 
as Spain, Ireland, and the Baltics (Graph I.2.12).  
Traditionally, the age of entry in the labour force 
differs strongly between Member States. The 
employment rate has declined mainly in the 
countries with high participation rates, such as 
Denmark, (-4.3%), Ireland (-4.7%) and the 
Netherlands (-3.8%). As an exception to this 
pattern, employment rates declined also 
remarkably in countries such as Spain and 
Portugal, where respectively more than 60% and 
50% of all young in employment had a temporary 
contract, or in Luxembourg where less than 1/3 of 
the young are in the labour force. 
2.5.3. Education  
In 2010, employment rates for different levels of 
education declined by less than in 2009; the low 
skilled continued to be hit more than the medium 
and high skilled, although to a less extent than one 
year before. The participation rate declined only 
slightly with no major differences across different 
skill levels. These patterns resulted in an increase 
of the unemployment rate larger for the low-skilled 
(1.3 pps) than for the medium (0.6 pps) and the 
high-skilled (0.4 pps).  
 
Table I.2.4: Employment, participation and 
unemployment rates by education EU-27 
Education Low Medium High
ISCO 1-2 3-4 5-6
Employment rate 2010 53.4 69.9 82.4
change 2009-2010 -1.0 -0.6 -0.6
change 2008-2009 -2.1 -1.5 -1.0
Participation rate 2010 63.1 76.5 87.1
change 2009-2010 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3
change 2008-2009 0.0 -0.1 0.1
Unemployment rate 2010 15.4 8.7 5.4
change 2009-2010 1.3 0.6 0.4
change 2008-2009 3.3 1.9 1.2
Source: Eurostat LFS, age 20-64. 
 
There are remarkable cross-countries differences 
in the labour market outcomes for the low-skilled 
(Table I.2.5). Four countries have unemployment 
rates above 30% (the Baltics and Slovakia). In 
about six, low-skilled unemployment rates rose 
faster than the year before, in particular in 
Lithuania where it jumped by 11 pps to reach 
almost 40%. On the other hand, in seven countries 
Graph I.2.12: Youth unemployment rates by country (age 15-24) 
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(1)  Countries sorted by youth unemployment rate in 2010. 
Source: Eurostat LFS. 
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the unemployment rate is below 10%. Looking at 
the EU as a whole, the increase in the low-skilled 
unemployment rate of 1.3 pps was much lower 
than the increase of the year before (3.3 pps).  
 
Table I.2.5: Unemployment rates of the low skilled by 
country 
2010 09-10 08-09 2010 09-10 08-09
LU 5.3 -1.9 1.2 BE 14.7 1.5 1.2
NL 6.2 1.7 0.8 EU 27 15.4 1.3 3.3
RO 6.7 -1.3 0.3 EA 17 16.0 1.4 3.5
CY 7.3 0.9 1.4 DE 16.0 -0.8 0.2
MT 8.0 0.4 0.7 PL 18.2 3.0 2.6
AT 8.2 -1.2 2.2 IE 21.1 4.2 7.6
DK 9.2 1.4 3.7 BG 22.7 7.5 0.9
IT 10.0 0.9 1.1 CZ 24.0 0.7 4.9
UK 12.0 1.0 2.9 HU 24.7 2.1 4.3
PT 12.2 1.6 2.6 ES 26.3 2.8 9.2
EL 12.6 3.2 2 EE 30.2 3.4 16.7
SI 12.6 3.6 2.4 LV 30.2 1.2 15.8
FI 13.0 1.8 2.2 LT 39.8 10.8 16.3
SE 13.5 1.0 3.9 SK 43.0 2.9 1.9
FR 14.6 1.1 2.3
(1) Countries are ordered in ascending order of the 
unemployment rate in 2010. 
Source: Eurostat LFS, age 20-64.  
 
2.5.4. Nationality 
In 2009 the employment rate has declined 
irrespectively of the nationality. However, while 
employment of nationals (EU citizens working in 
their home country) and Non-EU-foreigners (who 
hold no EU citizenship) declined, that of EU-
foreigners (EU citizens working in a country other 
than their home country) continued to grow 
although by less than previous years (Graph 
I.2.14). Employment growth of Non-EU-
foreigners, which was strong between 2006 and 
2008 (more than 8% per year), mainly due to 
immigration to the EU, immediately turned 
negative in 2009 and remained so in 2010. The 
employment adjustment of foreign workers was 
remarkable in Ireland, where it fell by about 15% 
against a decline of 2% for the native workers. 
In recent years, the European labour markets 
became more integrated by rising employment of 
EU-foreigners. Migration to booming countries 
like Spain and Ireland has been an important 
labour market development. The question is 
whether at the current juncture out-migration from 
countries with high unemployment can help 
equalising differences across countries in the 
unemployment rates. Regression based evidence in 
Box I.2.2, suggests that outward migration can 
give a small contribution to the labour market 
adjustment. Nevertheless, migration flow seems to 
respond to contemporaneous differences in 
unemployment across countries, in particular in 
Ireland and Spain.  
Graph I.2.14: Employment growth by nationality EU-27 
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Source: Eurostat LFS, age 15-64. 
2.5.5. Contract type 
Flexible work contracts (the fixed-term and the 
self employed) took much of the brunt of the 
recession (Graph I.2.15). The young were the most 
involved by the decline in temporary employment 
(Table I.2.6); about 42% of young employees have 
a fixed-term contract, up by 1.7 pps compared to 
last year, against 12% for those aged between 25 
and 49 and less than 7% for those in the 50-64 age 
bracket.  
Graph I.2.15: Employment growth by contract type EU-27 
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Source: Eurostat LFS, age 15-64. 
In an uncertain environment, temporary contracts 
are more rapidly reacting to the recovery in the 
economic activity. During 2010 self-and fixed-
term employment contracts started to grow again. 
In most countries, people aged below 39 accounts 
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for a high share of the change in the fixed term 
contracts in 2010.  
 
 
 
Table I.2.6: Share of temporary employees by age EU-27 
Age 2005-2008 2009 2010
15-24 40.7 40.5 42.2
25-49 12.2 11.6 12.1
50-64 6.7 6.6 6.8
Source: Eurostat LFS. 
 
 
 
Table I.2.7: Distribution of contract types among the 
employed in % by country 
2010 chg 2010 chg 2010 chg
EU 27 73.8 -0.5 11.7 0.3 14.5 0.2
EA 17 72.3 -0.4 13.2 0.2 14.5 0.2
LT 88.8 0.9 2.2 0.2 9.1 -1.1
EE 88.7 -1.1 3.4 1.1 7.9 0.0
LU 86.3 0.3 6.5 -0.1 7.2 -0.2
BG 84.6 -0.2 3.9 -0.2 11.5 0.4
LV 84.1 -2.4 6.1 2.2 9.9 0.2
DK 84.0 0.6 7.9 -0.3 8.1 -0.3
UK 81.9 -0.6 5.1 0.4 13.0 0.2
MT 81.5 -1.0 4.8 0.7 13.7 0.4
AT 80.6 -0.5 8.2 0.2 11.3 0.3
BE 80.0 0.2 7.0 -0.1 13.0 -0.2
HU 79.8 -1.0 8.5 1.1 11.7 -0.1
RO 79.7 -1.1 0.8 0.1 19.5 1.1
SK 79.5 -1.5 4.7 1.1 15.8 0.3
IE 77.0 -0.3 7.8 0.7 15.3 -0.4
CZ 76.5 -1.4 6.7 0.4 16.8 0.9
DE 76.4 -0.3 13.1 0.2 10.5 0.1
SE 76.3 -0.6 13.8 0.3 9.8 0.2
FR 75.9 -1.0 13.4 0.5 10.7 0.5
FI 74.3 -0.5 13.4 0.8 12.2 -0.3
SI 73.9 -2.1 14.5 0.6 11.6 1.5
CY 73.2 0.8 11.3 0.3 15.5 -1.1
NL 70.7 -1.4 15.6 0.0 13.8 1.4
IT 67.6 -0.4 9.7 0.2 22.7 0.2
PT 63.7 0.0 18.8 1.0 17.5 -1.0
ES 63.5 0.4 20.8 -0.4 15.7 0.0
EL 62.3 -0.6 8.1 0.2 29.6 0.4
PL 60.4 -0.8 21.2 0.6 18.5 0.2
Permanent Temporary  Self   
contract contract employed
Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat LFS. Countries 
are ranked by share of permanent contracts. 
 
Part-time and full-time 
Part-time employment has increased since 2002. In 
2010 it increased by 1.6% against the overall fall 
in employment (Table I.2.8). This increase 
contributed to the decline in the average hours 
worked; full-time employment on the other hand 
declined by 1.2%. Women contributed the most to 
this increase. Since the share of part-time is 
counter-cyclical, growing faster when 
unemployment is high and slower when 
unemployment is low, in 2010 it increased by 
more than the historical average since 2000; this is 
also an indication of the uncertainty around the 
labour market recovery. 
 
Table I.2.8: Part-time and full-time employment EU 27 
2009 2010
Full-time employment (Millions) 175.0 173.0
Part-time employment (Millions) 38.8 39.4
Share part-time men 7.4 7.8
Share part-time women 31.0 31.4
Source: Eurostat LFS, age 15-64. 
 
By country, the largest increase in the share of 
part-time employment was observed in countries 
with high unemployment, in particular Ireland and, 
Latvia (+1.3 pps to 21%), which together with 
Estonia had the highest increase also in 2009. 
All, in all, the main stylised facts regarding 
employment developments since the crisis for 
different groups can be summarised as follows:  
• Female employment rates declined less than 
male employment; 
• The employment rates of the young and middle 
aged fell comparatively more; those of the old 
grew; 
• Employment rates fell regardless of education, 
employment rates fell relatelvely more for the 
low skilled; 
• Compared to 2009, more EU-citizens were 
employed in countries other than their home 
country. Employment of nationals and non-EU 
citizens fell.  
• Flexible contractual arrangements were those 
mostly concerned by labour shedding during 
the crisis, and were those that grow more 
during the recovery. Permanent employment 
continued to fall also during the recovery. 
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Box I.2.2: Unemployment and migration
Rising differences in unemployment rates between Member States motivate the question whether migration can 
help equalising unemployment differences. In the US, migration is a major factor in adjusting to region-specific 
shocks. In an influential paper Blanchard and Katz (1992) find that in the US shocks to unemployment at state 
level last about half a decade and are overcome mainly via migration. In Europe labour mobility is lower and 
unemployment rate differentials persist longer. Despite the relatively low degree of mobility of workers so far, 
mobility among European countries might play a bigger role in the future due to a number of reasons, including 
falling transport costs, the elimination of remaining restrictions to within-EU labour mobility, and the fact that a 
larger stock of EU residents are recent migrants, who typically exhibit a high degree of mobility.  
Migration has played a big role in some countries during the 2000s. Net inward migration as a share of the
original population between 2000 and 2009 was highest in Spain, with a gain of 12% (Graph 1). Luxembourg 
and Cyprus follow with gains of about 11% and Ireland with 8%. The biggest population losses from migration 
were in Bulgaria and Romania which lost around 3% of population each. Losses were also recorded in 
Lithuania, Latvia and Poland. The financial crisis contributed to contain or even reverse these trends. In Spain, 
net inward migration declined drastically but remained positive until 2009 (last available data). Net migration 
flows in Ireland moved from positive to negative territory.  
Graph 1: Net Migration 2000-2009 in % of population 
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Source: Eurostat crude migration rates including corrections. 
As expected on the ground of economic theory, the recent developments in Spain and Ireland are linked to 
widening unemployment rate differences with the remainder of the EU. Graph 2 shows that the negative co-
movement in these two countries between net migration (per 1000 inhabitants) and the unemployment gap 
with the rest of the EU (the population- weighted unemployment rate in the other 26 Member States).  
Graph 2: The net migration rate and the unemployment rate difference with the EU-26 for Spain and Ireland 
Source: Eurostat and own calculations. 
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Box (continued) 
 
In order to investigate to what extent the increased unemployment dispersion within Europe is expected to 
induce a correction in net migration flows, a migration equation is estimated, and the predictions from the 
estimated equation used as benchmark. The equation is estimated on an unbalanced panel of 22 EU countries 
(all EU, with the exception of Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Estonia and Czech Republic) over the 1991-2009 
period. Net migration rates are regressed on the difference in the unemployment rate and in the real wage to 
the remainder of the EU. Year fixed effects are introduced to control for factors that affect net migration over 
time. The regression therefore exploits the cross-sectional dimension of the data. The prediction from the 
estimated equation can be interpreted as the net migration rate prevailing over the long term (i.e. abstracting 
from short-term adjustment costs) on the basis of the unemployment and the wage gap. The regression results 
(Table 1) show a relationship between net migration and the unemployment and wage gap which is 
significant and with the expected sign.  
Table 1: Estimation of a migration equation 
Dependent variable  Net migration rate  
Explanatory variables Coefficient Robust Standard Error 
Unemployment rate difference with EU -0.25 *** (0.07) 
Real wage difference with EU 0.07 *** (0.02) 
Year dummies not shown  
Observations 340  
Number of countries 22  
R- squared 0.21  
Source: Commission services. 
The regression results can be used to predict net migration rates for 2009 and 2010 and compare them to the 
actual net migration rates in 2009. Graph 3 shows that in Ireland, where net migration turned negative in 
2009, the migration equation predicts still positive net migration in 2009 and 2010 albeit with a negative 
trend. This suggests that the labour market adjustment via net migration in Ireland was relatively quick, and 
stronger than expected on the basis of economic fundamentals. A relatively fast outward migration 
adjustment is recorded also for Latvia. Conversely, a comparatively strong inward migration adjustment 
seems to have taken place in Luxemburg, Belgium, Slovenia and Sweden. In other countries, net migration 
appears instead to be lagging behind. In Spain net migration was positive in 2009 while the prediction is 
negative. The net outward migration adjustment is also below what predicted in Greece. In Germany and the 
Netherlands inward migration is below what expected on the basis of fundamentals.  
Graph 3: Actual net migration rate 2009, predicted net migration rate 2009 and 2010 
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Source: Commission services.  
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2.6. POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
2.6.1. Labour market reforms after the 
financial crisis  
After the crisis, following the recommendations in 
the European Economic Recovery Plan of 
December 2008, reform activity focused on 
supporting aggregate demand, employment, and 
income support to reduce social distress caused by 
the crisis whilst at the same time on easing 
transition to new jobs. 
Measures encouraging flexible working time 
arrangements have emerged as a new feature of the 
policy response to contain the impact of the crisis 
on employment. Short time working schemes were 
widely used across the EU to maintain existing 
jobs. Their generosity was scaled up in countries 
with an already existing scheme, while other 
countries introduced the scheme from the scratch. 
Apart from short time working schemes, 
employment and labour demand was supported by 
significant reductions of employers' social security 
contributions and labour income taxation. 
Unemployment benefit systems played an essential 
role in income stabilisation. A majority of 
measures expanded the coverage, notably to 
workers with shorter employment histories and 
young, often on a permanent basis. Some 
countries, in particular those with less generous 
benefits, provided additional generosity for 
example by extending benefit duration and raising 
the replacement rate. A majority of EU countries 
also beefed up social assistance and other income 
support mechanisms, normally on a temporary 
basis.   
Activation and assistance policies were reinforced 
in many countries to provide effective services to 
an increasing number of the unemployed and 
prevent immediate job losses from turning into 
long-term unemployment. The focus was on 
enhancing employability of those hit by the crisis, 
by improving the job placement mechanism and 
expanding training and lifelong learning 
opportunities. Employment of the most difficult to 
employ was widely supported by scaled-up 
existing or newly introduced wage and 
employment subsidies as well as job creation 
schemes.  
A few countries revised the legislation on hiring 
and firing to reduce labour market segmentation 
and allow for smooth labour reallocation from 
contracting to expanding sectors. 
2.6.2. Labour market reforms in 2010 
As growth resumed, the European Council of 
March 2010 called for phasing-out the temporary 
crisis-related measures and putting in place a 
credible long-term structural reform agenda to 
raise growth and employment potential. The 
policies put in place in EU countries in 2010 
broadly reflect this shift in policy priorities.  
While policies to sustain labour supply and 
facilitate transitions to work remained a focal 
strategy to fight structural unemployment, new 
measures were introduced to support labour market 
dynamics and reduce labour market segmentation. 
Short-time working schemes remained in use in 
2010 in several countries, although companies 
could normally apply to benefit from these 
schemes at latest until the end of 2010. In contrast 
to the crisis period, hardly any measures 
strengthened the income stabilisation role of 
unemployment benefit systems in 2010. Only few 
measures adapted the benefit system to the revival 
of economic activity. 
Long-term structural reforms came to the forefront 
and reform priorities shifted towards those 
measures that facilitate labour reallocation and 
reduce labour market segmentation (measures to 
reduce hiring and firing costs). 
Activation and assistance policies 
Activation and assistance policies, often built upon 
reform strategies set in place before the crisis, 
remained one of the most widely used instruments 
to fight unemployment to become entrenched 
(Graph I.2.16). The institutional network was 
adapted to provide more efficient services, by 
reorganising public employment services 
(Lithuania, Luxembourg, Ireland), decentralising 
activation (Lithuania, Luxembourg) and increasing 
staff capacity (Spain, Sweden). New strategies 
were devised to improve matching and provide 
high quality assistance and activation, in particular 
by improving assessment of services and tailoring 
them to specific clients (e.g. the young, the older 
and long-term unemployed).  
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For the most difficult to employ, transition to work 
was supported by newly introduced or scaled-up 
wage and employment subsidies, often targeted to 
non-profit organisations (e.g. Austria, Lithuania). 
Conversely, direct job creation schemes became 
less important. Targeted measures were also 
introduced to keep older persons either employed, 
by supporting their transition within a firm to jobs 
with lighter duties, or attached to the labour market 
(Belgium, Luxembourg). In addition, re-
integration measures were devised for those who 
lost their jobs in a specific sector such as the 
construction sector and the financial sector 
(Ireland, Luxembourg). Finally, measures were 
taken to bring the disabled back work (e.g. the 
Netherlands, Sweden). 
Unemployment benefits 
The simple count of reforms in the unemployment 
benefit system reveals that roughly the same 
number of measures as in 2008 and 2009 were 
taken in 2010 (Graph I.2.16). Reforms were aimed 
at encouraging the unemployed to take up work 
without losing unemployment benefits. Such 
measures were often targeted to long-term 
unemployed and the unemployed who either set up 
their own business with low income or take up 
part-time jobs (Slovakia, Portugal, Germany, 
Slovenia).  
Graph I.2.16: Number of reforms taken since the outbreak 
of the crisis 
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validated by the members of the Economic Policy 
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of ALMPs include reforms of direct job creation and 
employment subsidies, public employment services and 
other schemes. 
Source: Commission services, LABREF database.  
A relatively few countries adapted unemployment 
benefit systems to provide either additional income 
stabilisation or to adjust their generosity to 
circumstances of economic recovery. Incentive-
friendly reforms took place in countries with the 
most generous unemployment benefits (e.g. 
Denmark, Portugal). Denmark substantially cut its 
generosity by introducing a cap on the maximum 
period available for drawing benefits, thus 
effectively halving the maximum benefit duration 
from 4 to 2 years; the eligibility criteria to re-
qualify for benefits became stricter, while the base 
to calculate the amount of benefits was made less 
generous. 
Conversely, a few measures were taken to make 
unemployment benefit system more generous and 
inclusive in some countries with less generous 
initial position (Slovenia, Italy). A few measures 
also tightened the conditions for receiving and 
keeping benefits.  
Job protection 
New measures to reform job protection were taken 
in some countries in 2010, notably in those with 
the most rigid employment protection in the EU 
(e.g. Spain, Portugal and Greece) – Graph I.2.16.  
Under the pressure of mass unemployment and a 
highly segmented labour market, a relevant reform 
of the employment protection was initiated in 
Spain. The groups that can be hired with open-
ended contracts with reduced severance payments 
(33 rather than 45 days of years of service) were 
expanded to include almost all unemployed and 
vulnerable groups such as women returning to the 
labour market after child birth or longer period of 
inactivity and temporary workers. The causes for 
justified dismissals were also clarified and 
broadened allowing the economic, technical and 
organisational reasons, among the admissible cases 
for dismissal.  
Steps to deregulate further temporary contracts 
injected an additional flexibility to the labour 
market, in particular as regards work provided by 
temporary work agencies. Typical measures 
broadened the scope of activity of temporary 
agencies to include the public sector (Greece, 
Spain) and loosened restrictions on the extension 
of fixed term contracts (Finland, the Netherlands). 
European Commission 
Labour Market Developments in Europe, 2011 
 
36 
Training and life-long learning 
Enhancing employability of workforce to reduce 
skills mismatches and skills shortages remained 
relevant for supporting transitions to work, though 
intensity of these reforms declined (Graph I.2.16). 
A majority of measures expanded training 
opportunities, usually to certain target groups such 
as the unemployed and young, while some 
measures encouraged taking up training with 
financial incentives.  
Conversely, to reduce costs, some countries 
restricted financing of training, by making it 
conditional upon subsequent employment or taking 
an exam. Some measures also aimed at up-skilling 
employees, by strengthening their rights to training 
at work and taking leave from work for training 
purposes. 
Hiring tax incentives, child care facilities 
A number of measures aimed at making hiring for 
employers and work for employees more 
attractive. Tax incentives were usually conditional 
upon new hires of specific and less employable 
demographic groups (e.g. Italy, Greece, Spain and 
Portugal). In addition, they were widely used to 
complement job assistance and activation 
strategies with the aim to facilitate transition of the 
unemployed back to work. At the same time, a 
variety of measures addressed bottlenecks for 
women to participate on the labour market, by 
providing tax incentives on income from work and 
making childcare facilities more available. 
2.6.3. Policy priorities looking forward 
The 2011 Annual Growth Survey outlines an 
integrated approach to economic reforms that 
would accompany the recovery in the short term 
and ensure a full use of the labour potential. The 
main priority concerning labour market are: 
• Employment friendly tax and benefit systems 
(e.g. shift of taxes away from labour, 
incentives-supporting tax and benefit systems, 
flexible work arrangements and childcare 
facilities that support labour market 
participation of second earners, reduction of 
undeclared labour); 
• pension reforms (retirement age, early 
retirement) and life long learning strategies 
strengthening incentives and potential for older 
workers to stay active; 
• unemployment benefit systems and activation 
policies that reward the unemployed going 
back to work (benefit design tackling benefit 
dependence and unemployment traps; better 
adapting unemployment benefit systems to the 
cycle) ;  
• reforms in labour legislation aimed at better 
balancing security and flexibility.  
Member States have announced in their 2011 
National Reform Programmes (NRPs) measures 
that are broadly consistent with the priorities set 
out in the Annual Growth Survey. 
On the basis of the NRPs (Graph I.2.17), it appears 
that assistance and activation policies will remain a 
widely used instrument to fight long-term 
unemployment. Labour market reforms in many 
Member States will focus on bringing the 
unemployed back to work and avoid the build up 
of long-term unemployment.  
Graph I.2.17: Number of countries announcing reforms 
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Ireland, Greece and Portugal are not taken into account. 
Measures that improve the organisation of 
placement and matching services have been 
announced in several countries (e.g. Spain, Italy, 
Germany, Luxembourg and Romania). Measures 
will be tailored to specific demographic groups 
such as young, women, older, migrants and long-
term unemployed. In this context policy 
interventions will aim at enhancing occupational 
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and regional mobility (e.g. Finland, Belgium) and 
promoting with wage subsidies employment of 
specific groups (e.g. Slovakia, Cyprus, Finland, 
Slovenia, Bulgaria, Lithuania). In addition, effort 
to integrate persons will disabilities and long-term 
illness will continue (e.g. the Netherlands, 
Sweden). 
To complement assistance and activation policies 
most of Member States are introducing measures 
to enhance the employability of workers and 
facilitate transition from school to work. 
Announced measures target young, older, migrants 
and unemployed, and include wider training and 
lifelong learning opportunities, as well as better 
quality of education.  
Reforms of the employment protection legislation 
will continue in the future with the aim to fight 
labour market segmentation and make labour 
markets more dynamic. Several countries 
announced measures that aim at loosening 
employment protection legislation for permanent 
contracts (e.g. Spain, Slovenia, Slovakia, Italy, 
Lithuania, Czech Republic, Poland, Bulgaria), also 
in view to align it with protection of temporary 
contracts, and further deregulating temporary 
contracts.  
Conversely, unemployment benefit systems will 
receive relatively little attention in the years ahead. 
To balance work and family life, reforms will 
continue to make child care facilities more 
accessible and effective. On the agenda of some 
countries will also be fight against illegal work. 
2.7. CONCLUSIONS 
In 2010, the EU labour market has started to move 
forward; yet, improvements have been uneven. 
Some countries are moving slowly to pre-crisis 
employment levels amid a modest pick up in the 
economic activity. In countries constrained in their 
policy manoeuvre by external and fiscal 
imbalances, unemployment is rapidly increasing. 
For others, the initial conditions prior to the crisis 
are influencing the nature of the labour market 
adjustment at the early stages of the recovery.  
For example, a very high weight of employment in 
construction in Spain turned out to be a serious 
constrain to a rapid employment recovery after the 
bust of the housing bubble; in addition, the duality 
of its labour market entailed substantial job losses 
among workers with fixed term contracts. 
Conversely, Germany entered into the crisis with 
the allocation of resources not distorted towards 
non-tradable sectors, no much indebted households 
and firms in a healthy financial position. The fiscal 
space allowed implementing a policy response that 
contributed to minimise the impact of the crisis.  
These factors contributed to a rapid economic 
recovery and even accompanied a small decline of 
unemployment.  
The diversity in the labour market response across 
countries concerns also the composition of 
unemployment. The job separation rate is in many 
countries back to the level prevailing before the 
crisis. In contrast, the hiring patterns differ quite 
substantially across countries. In some, the hiring 
rate is back or even higher than the pre-crisis 
levels; in other it remains very low. Where the job 
finding rate is sluggish, the spells of 
unemployment are increasing. These developments 
are posing different challenges for policies.  
The Annual Growth Survey outlined priority 
actions to strengthen recovery in the short-term 
and Member States presented their reform 
strategies in the National Reform programmes. 
Reforms will have to support reallocation across 
firms and sectors, inter-alia with appropriate wage 
policies. In the context of extremely constrained 
public finances in many countries, labour market 
policies will have to target the most vulnerable 
groups.  
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3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Compensation per employee in the EU grew at a 
moderate rate in 2010, reflecting the weak labour 
market conditions. Developments were very 
heterogeneous across Member States. In the non-
euro area countries, wages grew at a robust rate in 
Bulgaria, Poland and the United Kingdom and 
continued to decline, though at a much slower rate, 
in Latvia and Lithuania. In the euro area, 
compensation per employee remained close to the 
record low of 2009, but it varied considerably across 
euro area members. 
Heterogeneous developments in the growth rate in 
compensation per employee are the result of 
different conditions and exposures to the recession, 
need of rebalancing in some countries and 
underlying labour market institutions. This led to 
different speeds of adjustment in wages. 
Real compensation per employee declined in about 
half of the EU Member States in 2010. The average 
growth was much below that of productivity, 
leading to a decline in the wage share. This 
represents a correction to the developments 
occurred in 2009, when real wages continued 
increasing while productivity was declining sharply. 
While in some countries the variation in real wage 
helps absorbing unemployment, in other countries 
real wage growth appears not in line with the need 
to reduce unemployment. 
The growth rate in compensation per employee 
was on average stronger in the industry excluding 
construction sector. It was followed by the trade 
transport and communication (which only halved 
that of industry) construction, and finance and 
business services sectors. On aggregate, the growth 
rate in compensation per employee increased at a 
higher rate in the tradable than non-tradable sectors. 
Compensation per employee in the public sector 
was on average lower than in private sector. A 
number of governments imposed wage cuts and 
wage freezes in the public sector with a view to 
reduce their fiscal deficits. This led to a reduction 
in compensation per employee in the public sector 
in Ireland, Hungary, Spain and Estonia and a sharp 
deceleration in Italy and Portugal. 
The growth rate in nominal unit labour costs 
registered a record low in 2010. Nominal unit 
labour costs declined both in the euro area and the 
EU. This occurred for the first time since 1996. 
The negative growth rate in 2010 follows the 
record highs registered in 2009, when productivity 
per person employed declined sharply in 
consequence of the economic downturn and the 
reduction in the number of hours worked per 
employee. In this year most EU Member States 
experienced a reduction in the number of hours 
worked per employee. The number of hours 
worked per employee increased again in 2010 with 
the economic recovery, which explains a large part 
of the pick up in productivity and the deceleration 
or reduction in unemployment. 
As a result of the dynamics in unit labour costs, 
cost competitiveness relative to a group of 35 
industrialised nations improved in most of the EU 
Member States. There were also some signs of 
adjustment within the EU. Real effective exchange 
rates (REERs) appreciated in countries with 
depreciated REERs and depreciated in countries 
with appreciated REERs. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as 
follows. The next section describes the main trends 
in wage developments and assesses them against 
the need of adjustment in unemployment. Section 
3.3 summarises developments in unit labour costs. 
Section 3.4 looks at the evolution of the REERs 
and external adjustment. Section 3.5 describes the 
main policy developments, including collective 
bargaining, minimum wage and tax wedge. Section 
3.6 concludes. 
3.2. TRENDS IN WAGES 
Compensation per employee in the EU grew at a 
moderate rate in 2010, reflecting the weak labour 
market conditions. The aggregate picture masks 
very uneven developments in compensation per 
employee across Member States. In the non-euro 
area countries, wages grew at a robust rate in 
Bulgaria, Poland and the United Kingdom and 
continued to decline, though at a much slower rate, 
in Latvia Lithuania and Hungary (see Graph I.3.1). 
In the euro area, the growth rate in compensation 
per employee was moderate, close to the record 
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low registered in 2009. Compensation per 
employee declined in Greece, Ireland, Malta and 
Estonia while Spain recorded a growth rate below 
1%. By contrast, Slovakia, Cyprus and Slovenia 
recorded a growth rate in the compensation per 
employee well above the euro area average. These 
uneven developments reflect different exposures to 
the recession, need of rebalancing in some countries 
and underlying labour market institutions. 
The deceleration in the growth rate in 
compensation per employee led to a decline in the 
real compensation in about half of the Member 
States, which is in line with the need to absorb the 
high unemployment. These results suggest signs of 
adjustment in 2010. Real wages on average adjusted 
more in countries with higher unemployment, which 
contrasts with developments in 2009.  
Developments across countries are, however, only 
to some extent consistent with the need to reduce 
unemployment and unemployment disparities 
among the Member States. In the euro area, 
although improvements were registered in 
comparison with 2009, wage developments are 
only moderately consistent with the need to absorb 
unemployment and reduce unemployment 
divergences. Adjustment is expected to continue in 
2011 both in the euro area and the EU. In 2010, 
productivity was at the same level as in 2008 but 
real wages were 2 pps higher. 
The deceleration in compensation and the rebound 
in productivity led to a decline in nominal unit 
labour costs. This helped EU Member States to 
regain competitiveness in relation to a group of 35 
industrialised countries. Similarly, within the euro 
area there were some signs of adjustment. The 
correlation between variations in REERs and the 
current account is negative, suggesting that in 
general REERs are helping the external 
rebalancing of the euro area economies. The 
adjustment in current account balance was stronger 
in 2009. But some signs of convergence continued 
in 2010. 
Graph I.3.2: Compensation per employee, y-o-y % 
change vs level of compensation in PPS, 2010 
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Graph I.3.2 shows the relation between the 
variation in compensation per employee and its 
level measured in Purchasing Power Standards. It 
could be expected that catching-up countries 
would on average display higher growth rates in 
compensation per employee. However, the 
correlation points to the opposite result. In 2010, 
Graph I.3.1: Nominal compensation per employee, y-o-y % change 
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Source: AMECO. 
European Commission 
Labour Market Developments in Europe, 2011 
 
40 
the growth rate in compensation per employee was 
on average higher in countries with higher levels 
of compensation per employee. This result is 
mostly driven by Latvia, Lithuania and Romania. 
But even not considering these countries, together 
with Bulgaria that recorded a robust growth rate in 
compensation per employee, no clear relation 
would emerge. 
Turning to the quarterly profile of wage 
developments, it appears that the sharpest 
deceleration in the average growth rate occurred 
between the fourth quarter of 2008 and the second 
quarter of 2009 (see Graph I.3.3). This lags by two 
quarters the decline in GDP, which recorded 
negative quarter-on-quarter growth between the 
second quarter of 2008 until the second quarter of 
2009. The average growth rate in compensation 
Graph I.3.3: Compensation per employee, y-o-y % change 
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per employee continued to decline until the fourth 
quarter of 2009 and recovered thereafter. 
In Germany, France and Italy, after a relatively 
strong deceleration in 2009, compensation per 
employee grew above 2% in 2010. The on-going 
adjustment in wages is stronger in countries facing 
stronger adjustment and rebalancing needs. Greece 
and Ireland recorded in 2010 negative growth rates 
in compensation per employee and in Portugal the 
growth rate in compensation per employee 
decreased strongly to near stabilising in the fourth 
quarter of 2010. 
In the non-euro area countries, the Baltics 
experienced the sharpest falls in compensation per 
employee in consequence of the strong fall in 
GDP. The Czech Republic and Hungary also 
recorded a strong deceleration, with the growth 
rate in compensation per employee turning 
negative over 2009. In Romania and Bulgaria the 
growth rate in compensation per employee 
decelerated strongly. By 2010, the growth rate in 
compensation per employee accelerated in most 
non-euro area countries. 
Wage dynamics during the last three years were 
strongly influenced by the adjustment in the number 
of hours worked per employee. During 2009 most of 
the EU Member States experienced a reduction in the 
number of hours worked per employee. The number 
of hours worked per employee increased again in 
2010 with the economic recovery. 
The decline or deceleration in compensation per 
employee in 2009 reflects both cuts in the nominal 
compensation per employee and decline in the 
number of hours worked per employee. In the non-
euro area countries, Latvia, Lithuania, and Hungary 
experienced outright cuts in compensation per hour 
worked in 2009 and 2010 (see Table I.3.1). 
In the euro area, the deceleration in the growth rate in 
compensation per hour worked was more protracted. 
In 2009, there was no deceleration. This contrasts 
with the record low in the growth rate in the 
compensation per employee. For some countries, the 
deceleration in the compensation per employee was 
mostly a consequence of a reduction in the number of 
hours worked. In other countries, like Luxembourg, 
Greece, Germany and Austria, compensation per 
hour worked even increased. This suggests a 
reduction in compensation less than proportional to 
the reduction in number of hours worked. 
 
Table I.3.1: Compensation per hour worked, y-o-y % 
change 
2008 2009 2010
BE 4.0 3.5 0.9
BG 16.2 9.5 7.8
CZ 6.1 3.6 :
DK 3.5 3.0 2.7
DE 2.2 3.4 -0.1
EE 11.8 3.8 -2.7
IE 5.0 2.3 -2.7
EL 6.8 8.3 -7.3
ES 5.5 3.8 :
FR 2.1 1.6 :
IT 3.1 1.8 1.7
CY 3.3 2.8 2.2
LV 20.8 -9.7 -5.9
LT 12.9 -8.9 -2.6
LU 2.4 6.4 :
HU 6.9 -1.3 -0.1
NL 3.9 2.8 1.4
AT 3.1 3.9 1.2
PL 9.6 5.6 2.2
PT 3.6 3.6 0.5
RO 32.1 -6.6 1.4
SI 5.2 1.2 :
SK 7.8 7.3 1.2
FI 5.0 3.4 0.0
SE 1.3 2.3 1.1
EA 3.3 3.2 0.9
Source: Commission services based on Eurostat data. 
 
In 2010, as the number of hours worked increased, 
the growth rate in compensation per hour worked 
decreased more abruptly and even became negative 
in some countries. In the countries that relied more 
on the internal margin of the employment 
adjustment during 2009, e.g. Germany, the analysis 
of the evolution of compensation per employee and 
compensation per hour worked gives opposite 
results in 2009 and 2010.  
3.2.1. Real consumption and production 
wages 
The harmonised consumer price inflation (HCPI) 
grew by 1.6% in the euro area and by 2.1% in the 
EU in 2010. These figures are higher than those 
recorded by the GDP deflator, which grew by 0.8% 
in the euro area and by 1.2% in the EU. These 
differences are related with import prices. The 
lowest HICP rate was recorded in Ireland and the 
highest in Romania. In the euro area Greece 
recorded the highest HICP. Ireland recorded the 
lowest GDP deflator, which declined by 2.5%. The 
highest GDP deflator was recorded in Luxembourg, 
which also registered the largest difference between 
the GDP deflator and the HICP (see Graph I.3.4). 
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Developments in the GDP deflator and the HICP 
influence the growth rate of real product wages 
and real consumption wages. The relevant wage 
variable for firms is the real product wage, which 
is the price of labour relative to the value added 
deflator. For consumers, the variable of interest is 
the real consumption wage, which is their 
take-home pay relative to the price of goods and 
services they purchase.  
Real product wages declined in about half of the 
Member States. Greek employers' benefited from 
the sharpest decline in the cost of labour, with the 
real product wage declining by 5.9%. By contrast, 
real product wages increased at a rate above 3% in 
Slovenia, Poland, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria. 
Real consumption wages declined in 14 Member 
Sates in 2010. Greek workers' suffered the sharpest 
decline in purchasing power following a drop in 
real consumption wages near 8%. In Latvia, 
Hungary and Malta the decline in purchasing 
power was above 4%. By contrast, in Bulgaria real 
consumption wages grew above 6%. 
3.2.2. Real compensation per employee, 
productivity and unemployment 
Real wage dynamics aligned with productivity are 
a condition for wage growth consistent with labour 
demand. Graph I.3.5 shows the average growth 
rate in real compensation per employee and 
average growth rate in productivity over the period 
2008-2010. During this period, the average growth 
rate in real compensation per employee increased 
at a significantly faster pace than the average 
growth. Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, 
France, Italy, Austria and Finland recorded 
average positive growth in compensation and 
average negative growth in productivity. In spite of 
the differences in the order of magnitude between 
average growth rates in these two variables, there 
is a clear positive correlation between the average 
growth rates in real compensation per employee 
and average growth rates in labour productivity 
over the past three years. 
Graph I.3.5: Real compensation per employee and 
productivity, average growth rates 2008-2010 
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Graph I.3.6 plots the growth rate in real 
compensation per employee in 2010 against the 
unemployment rate in 2009. Real wage adjustment 
in 2010 appears in general only partial conductive 
to convergence in unemployment rates. While in 
the Baltic countries, Hungary and Greece real 
wages adjusted in line with the need to reduce the 
high unemployment rates, in France, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Ireland and particularly in Spain the 
Graph I.3.4: Compensation per employee, HICP and GDP deflator, y-o-y % change, 2010 
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adjustment in real wages looks insufficient in view 
of the high level of unemployment. The adjustment 
in Spain is particularly slow when compared with 
countries with much lower unemployment rates, 
such as the Netherlands, Austria, Luxembourg, 
Denmark, Romania and Malta. 
Graph I.3.6: Real compensation per employee, y-o-y % 
change 2010 and unemployment rate 2009 
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Graph I.3.7 plots the growth rate in real unit labour 
costs in 2010 against the unemployment rate in 
2009. It complements Graph I.3.6 by taking into 
account labour productivity developments. The 
main message remains broadly consistent with the 
results for real compensation.  
Graph I.3.7: RULC, y-o-y % change 2010 and 
unemployment rate in 2009 
BE
BG
CZ
DK
DE
EE
IE
EL
ES
FRITCY
LV
LT
LU
HU
MT
NL
AT
PL
PT
RO
SI
SK
FI
SE
UK
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
0 5 10 15 20
R
U
LC
UR 2009
Source: AMECO. 
The negative relation is stronger. The same group 
of countries can be depicted a having an 
insufficient adjustment in compensation, which 
suggest that productivity growth was not robust 
enough to compensate for the relatively slow 
adjustment in compensation, in view of the need to 
absorb unemployment.  
3.2.3. Compensation per employee at sectoral 
level 
The sectoral breakdown of the compensation per 
employee shows heterogeneous developments 
across sectors. The growth rate in compensation 
per employee was on average stronger in the 
industry excluding the construction sector. It was 
followed by the growth rate in the compensation in 
the trade transport and communication (which only 
halved that of industry) construction and finance 
and business services sectors (see Graph I.3.8). 
Overall the growth rate in compensation per 
employee increased at a higher rate in tradable 
than non-tradable sectors. 
The relative robust growth rate in compensation in 
the industry sector can be largely explained by the 
developments in hours worked. During 2009, faced 
with the reduction in global demand, firms 
introduced schemes to reduce the number of hours 
worked of their employees. The reduction in the 
number of hours worked was broad-based across 
sectors, but it was more pronounced in the industry 
sector. As the global demand recovered, firms 
gradually increased the number of hours worked of 
their employees. For instance, Germany was one 
of the euro area countries that reduced more the 
number of hours worked per employee in 2009. As 
a consequence, the compensation per employee in 
2009 declined. In 2010, the number of hours 
worked per employed recovered to almost the pre-
crisis level, and the growth rate in compensation 
per employee is just a consequence of the increase 
in the number of hours worked. 
Compensation per employee in the construction 
sector recovered in 2010, but developments were 
very uneven across countries. Bulgaria, Greece and 
Estonia recorded two-digit growth rates. In Bulgaria 
and Estonia the growth rate in compensation per 
employee followed strong productivity growth. In 
Greece, it followed a decline of about same size in 
the previous year. By contrast, compensation per 
employee in construction declined in Slovakia, 
Romania, Latvia and Ireland. 
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The growth rate in the compensation per employee 
in trade, transport and communication had the least 
heterogeneous developments across countries. 
Exceptions are the strong growth in Romania and 
the relatively strong decline in Ireland. The 
financial services and business activities sector 
recorded the most moderate growth in the 
compensation per employee. The negative 
adjustment continued in the Baltic countries and 
Hungary and Belgium recorded also a negative 
growth rate, helped by a further decrease in the 
number of hours worked per employee in this 
sector. In Slovakia and Bulgaria compensation per 
employee continued to grow at a fast pace in this 
sector, while in Ireland a robust growth was 
recorded after a decline in 2009. 
3.2.4. Compensation per employee in private 
and public sector 
Compensation per employee in the public sector 
was on average lower than in the private sector in 
2010 (see Graph I.3.9). Ireland, Hungary, Spain 
and Estonia recorded a contraction in nominal 
compensation per employee in the public sector. 
This was a consequence of decisive measures 
taken by respective governments with a view to 
reduce their fiscal deficits. In Ireland, the 
government imposed a pension levy that came into 
effect in 2009, followed by further pay cuts in the 
general public sector (inversely related to income 
levels) between 5 and 8% in 2010. In Hungary, the 
pay freeze agreed by the social partners together 
with further measures to reduce the public wage 
bill, such as income ceiling and revision of 
bonuses, caused a contraction in the public sector 
wage for the second consecutive year. In Estonia, 
the wage freeze imposed in 2009 continued in 
2010 with further cuts in bonuses. In Spain, the 
government imposed a 5% cut in civil servants’ 
wages in 2010. Pay freezes were also imposed by 
governments in Italy, Portugal, Luxembourg and the 
United Kingdom. Public sector wages continued to 
grow in these countries, albeit at a much more 
moderate pace than in previous years in Portugal 
and Italy. 
Public sector wages grew above private sector 
wages in Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Slovakia, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. In Luxembourg and the United 
Kingdom the increase occurred even after the 
imposition of a wage freeze. And in Slovakia after 
a 1% wage cut. Possible explanations are related 
with wage drift, sectors in public administration 
not affected by the wage cut or freeze and 
composition effects, in cases of large employment 
losses. In Finland the government initially 
proposed a pay freeze. After negotiations with 
unions, a marginal pay increase was agreed. And 
in the Netherlands a 1.5% pay increase was settled 
in the municipal sector after several months of 
targeted industrial action by unions. 
Graph I.3.8: Compensation per employee by sector, y-o-y % change, 2010 
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3.3. TRENDS IN UNIT LABOUR COSTS 
Nominal unit labour costs declined both in the euro 
area and the EU. This represents a record low. The 
negative growth rate in 2010 follows the record 
highs registered in 2009, when productivity per 
person employed declined sharply in consequence 
of the economic downturn and the reduction in the 
number of hours worked per employee. The 
nominal unit labour costs decreased the most in the 
Baltic countries and Ireland. 
The decline in nominal unit labour costs was a 
consequence of both developments in 
compensation per employee and labour 
productivity. On the one hand, compensations per 
employee were relatively moderate in most 
countries. On the other hand, labour productivity 
growth was relatively robust. This resulted in an 
increase in nominal compensation per employee 
below that of productivity, which led to a decline 
in unit labour costs. 
Latvia registered the sharpest decline in nominal 
unit labour cost, on the back of the strongest 
reduction in nominal compensation per employee, 
which was complemented with relatively strong 
productivity growth. In Lithuania it was the strong 
rebound in productivity that contributed the most 
for the decline in unit labour costs. Sweden and 
Denmark also recorded substantial declines in 
nominal unit labour costs in consequence of strong 
productivity growth. By contrast, unit labour costs 
in non-euro area countries grew in the United 
Kingdom, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. In the 
United Kingdom and Romania, productivity 
growth was relatively low. In Bulgaria and Poland 
productivity growth was strong but more so was 
the growth rate in compensation per employee, the 
highest and the second highest in the EU 
respectively (see Table I.3.2). 
 
Table I.3.2: Decomposition of unit labour costs, y-o-y % 
change, 2010 
NULC Compensation per employee
Labour 
productivity
GDP 
deflator RULC
BE -0.4 1.1 1.5 1.8 -2.2
BG 0.8 7.2 6.4 3.0 -2.1
CZ -0.2 2.9 3.1 -1.1 0.9
DK -1.5 2.7 4.2 3.3 -4.6
DE -0.9 2.2 3.1 0.6 -1.5
EE -7.9 -0.2 8.3 1.5 -9.2
IE -4.9 -1.9 3.2 -2.6 -2.4
EL -1.1 -3.5 -2.4 2.5 -3.5
ES -1.5 0.7 2.3 1.0 -2.5
FR 0.7 2.1 1.4 0.8 -0.1
IT 0.0 2.0 2.0 0.6 -0.6
CY 1.5 2.8 1.3 2.0 -0.5
LV -10.6 -6.5 4.6 -2.3 -8.5
LT -7.6 -1.3 6.8 2.1 -9.4
LU -0.3 1.6 1.9 5.5 -5.5
HU -1.1 -0.2 1.0 2.9 -3.9
MT -3.1 -1.7 1.4 3.0 -5.9
NL -1.2 1.1 2.4 1.6 -2.8
AT 0.6 1.6 1.0 1.5 -0.9
PL 1.3 4.7 3.4 1.3 0.0
PT -1.4 1.5 2.9 1.0 -2.3
RO 0.8 1.3 0.5 4.5 -3.5
SI 0.6 4.1 3.4 0.7 -0.1
SK -2.7 2.7 5.5 0.5 -3.1
FI -1.5 2.0 3.5 2.1 -3.5
SE -1.6 2.7 4.4 1.3 -2.8
UK 2.1 3.2 1.0 2.9 -0.8
Source: AMECO. 
 
In the euro area, productivity grew at the fastest 
rate since the inception of the EMU. Estonia, 
Ireland, Malta and Slovakia are among the euro 
area countries with sharpest declines in nominal 
unit labour costs. Estonia benefited from negative 
growth in nominal compensation per employee and 
the highest growth rate in productivity. Ireland and 
Graph I.3.9: Compensation per employee in private and public sector, y-o-y % change, 2010 
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(1) Remaining EU countries not included because of missing data. 
Source: OECD. 
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Malta benefited from decrease in nominal 
compensation per employee and productivity 
growth. And Slovakia, in spite of recording a 
growth rate in nominal compensation per 
employee substantially above the euro area 
average, benefited from a strong growth in 
productivity to record a sharp contraction in 
nominal unit labour costs. By contrast, Greece, 
suffered the sharpest contraction in nominal 
compensation per employee of the euro area 
countries, coupled however with a fall in 
productivity, which limited the decline in nominal 
unit labour costs. Productivity developments 
explain the evolution of nominal unit labour costs 
in France, Germany and Italy. While the growth 
rate in compensation per employee was similar in 
these countries, productivity developments made 
nominal unit labour costs follow different 
trajectories, decreasing in Germany, increasing in 
France and stabilising in Italy. 
Real unit labour costs decreased in all countries 
but Poland and the Czech Republic. The decrease 
in real unit labour costs was brought about by a 
rise in real product wage below that of 
productivity. The Baltic countries and Malta 
recorded the sharpest declines, in accordance with 
the decline in nominal unit labour costs. 
Luxembourg also recorded a sharp decline in real 
unit labour cost in consequence of the highest GDP 
deflator in the EU in 2010. In contrast, Ireland 
recorded the lowest GDP deflator in the EU, which 
made the contraction in real unit labour costs less 
pronounced than that in nominal unit labour costs.  
The decline in real unit labour costs in 2010 
determined a decline in the labour share. This 
occurs after two consecutive years of relatively 
robust growth, as a consequence of the fall in 
economic activity and sluggish labour market 
adjustment. The wage share reached recorded lows 
in 2007 in both the euro area and the EU, when it 
reached 55.4% and 56.5% respectively. It 
increased to 57.9% in the euro area in 2009 and to 
58.6% in the EU. In 2010, it declined to 57% in the 
euro area and to 57.8% in the EU. (17) 
                                                          
(17) The declining trend in the labour share in the past was 
governed by capital deepening in conjunction with capital-
augmenting technical progress and labour substitution 
across labour skill categories. 
3.3.1. Contributions to the final demand 
deflator 
The contribution of unit labour costs to the overall 
domestic inflationary pressures is presented in 
Table I.3.3. As seen above, in the euro area only 
Austria, Slovenia, France and Cyprus registered 
positive growth in nominal unit labour costs. 
Therefore, it is only in these countries that nominal 
unit labour costs contributed to the increase in the 
final demand deflator. The same holds for 
Bulgaria, Romania, Poland and the United 
Kingdom, which were the only countries outside 
the euro area where nominal unit labour costs 
contributed to the increase in the final demand 
deflator. In all other Member States developments 
in nominal unit labour costs limited the increase of 
the final demand deflator or contributed to 
negative developments in the final demand 
deflator. These developments are markedly 
different from the historic average where nominal 
unit labour costs were the main component of the 
overall domestic inflationary pressures. 
 
Table I.3.3: Contributions to the final demand deflator, 
y-o-y % change, 2010 
BE 2.8 -0.1 0.2 1.1 4.0
BG 1.6 0.3 0.0 1.6 3.6
CZ 0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.7 -0.4
DK 1.3 -0.6 0.3 2.6 3.6
DE 1.3 -0.4 -0.1 0.9 1.5
EE 2.1 -2.8 -0.9 4.7 1.7
IE 0.3 -1.6 0.4 -0.3 -0.8
EL 0.5 -0.5 1.1 1.4 2.5
ES 1.3 -0.7 1.2 0.3 2.1
FR 0.8 0.3 -0.1 0.4 1.4
IT 1.7 0.0 0.5 0.0 2.3
CY 0.7 0.6 0.0 0.8 2.0
LV 2.2 -3.9 0.1 2.2 0.6
LT 3.3 -2.5 0.4 3.4 4.9
LU 4.4 -0.1 0.1 2.3 7.3
HU 0.8 -0.3 0.7 1.3 2.4
MT 0.0 -0.9 -0.1 2.7 1.4
NL 2.4 -0.5 0.3 1.1 3.1
AT 1.3 0.2 -0.2 1.0 2.1
PL 0.6 0.4 0.7 -0.2 1.5
PT 1.2 -0.6 0.6 0.8 1.9
RO 0.9 0.3 2.0 1.0 4.1
SI 2.1 0.3 0.0 0.2 2.6
SK 2.0 -0.7 -0.4 1.4 2.3
FI 1.5 -0.7 0.1 2.1 2.3
SE -0.1 -0.7 -0.3 1.9 0.8
UK 1.0 1.1 1.2 0.0 3.4
F. demand 
deflator
Import 
prices NULC
Indirect 
taxes
G. oper. 
surplus
Source: AMECO. 
 
The other components of the final demand deflator 
show that import prices contributed the most to the 
overall domestic inflationary pressures in 2010. In 
the euro area the contribution of import prices was 
more significant in Luxembourg, followed by 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Estonia, Slovenia and 
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Slovakia. Of the non-euro area countries the 
contribution of import prices for domestic 
inflationary pressures was stronger in Lithuania 
and Latvia. The high contribution of import prices 
for the overall domestic inflationary pressures in 
2010 occurred on the back of soaring commodity 
prices that have increased markedly over 2010. 
The contribution of gross operating surplus was 
particularly high in Estonia. Finally, net indirect 
taxes were the lowest contributor to the increase in 
the final demand deflator in most member states, 
though its size is relatively large in Romania, the 
United Kingdom, Spain and Greece. 
3.3.2. Unit labour costs and the tax wedge 
Taxes and social security contributions drive a 
wedge between the cost for the employer and the 
net compensation received by the employee. Table 
I.3.4 shows the breakdown of the total tax wedge 
and its evolution over the period 2001-2010. 
Belgium, France and Germany display the highest 
tax wedge. Belgium has the second highest rate on 
personal income tax, Germany has the second 
highest rate on employees' social security 
contributions and France has the second highest 
rate on employer's social security contributions. 
Over the period 2001-2010, the tax wedge 
decreased in most countries. Hungary, Cyprus, 
Bulgaria, Sweden, Denmark and Lithuania 
recorded the sharpest reductions. In the euro area, 
the tax wedge decreased the most in Finland and 
Slovenia and Germany. Between 2009 and 2010, 
Hungary recorded the sharpest reduction on the 
back of reduction in employers' social security 
contribution and personal income tax. Germany 
and Greece also recorded substantial reduction in 
the tax wedge owing to the reduction of the wedge 
related to personal income tax. 
3.4. PRICE COMPETITIVENESS DEVELOPMENTS 
Cost competitiveness relative to a group of 35 
industrialised nations improved in most of the EU 
Member States over the 2008-2010 period. 
Developments were uneven. REERs based on 
ULC appreciated during 2008 and 2009 before 
depreciating in most countries in 2010. In the EU, 
 
Table I.3.4: Decomposition of the tax wedge 
Personal 
Income 
Tax
Social 
Security 
Contributions 
Employee
Social 
Security 
Contribution 
Employer
Total Tax 
Wedge
Personal 
Income 
Tax
Social 
Security 
Contribution 
Employee
Social 
Security 
Contribution 
Employer
Total Tax 
Wedge
Personal 
Income 
Tax
Social 
Security 
Contribution 
Employee
Social 
Security 
Contribution 
Employer
AT 47.9 11.4 14.0 22.6 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 -0.1
BE 55.4 21.6 10.8 23.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -1.3 -0.4 0.2 -1.1
BG* 33.8 7.4 11.0 15.5 -1.3 0.1 0.2 -1.6 -6.6 -1.2 4.7 -10.1
CY** 13.9 2.1 5.9 5.9 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -6.9 -2.3 0.3 -5.0
CZ 42.2 8.6 8.2 25.4 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.4 1.2 -1.1 -0.6
DE 49.1 15.7 17.2 16.2 -1.8 -1.6 -0.1 -0.1 -2.9 -2.1 0.1 -0.9
DK 38.3 27.9 10.7 0.0 -1.2 -0.9 0.0 0.0 -5.1 -4.6 -0.1 0.0
EL 36.6 2.2 12.5 21.9 -1.6 -1.6 0.0 0.0 1.9 1.7 0.1 0.1
EE 40.0 12.3 2.1 25.6 0.8 -0.2 0.8 0.3 -1.0 -3.8 2.1 0.8
ES 39.6 11.7 4.9 23.0 1.4 0.1 0.0 1.3 0.8 1.2 0.0 -0.4
FI 42.0 18.0 5.8 18.2 -0.3 -0.5 0.7 -0.5 -4.4 -3.2 0.6 -1.8
FR 49.3 9.9 9.6 29.7 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -1.1 0.1 0.5
HU 46.4 11.0 13.2 22.2 -6.6 -4.6 0.4 -2.5 -9.4 -7.5 4.3 -6.1
IE 29.3 13.0 6.6 9.7 0.4 -0.2 0.6 0.0 -1.9 -3.0 2.0 -1.0
IT 46.9 15.4 7.2 24.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.1 0.3 -1.0
LT* 40.7 10.1 6.9 23.8 -0.9 -5.5 4.6 0.0 -5.0 -9.6 4.6 0.0
LU 34.0 12.7 10.9 10.3 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 -1.8 -1.0 0.6 -1.4
LV* 64.1 9.6 4.5 50.0 22.5 -5.3 -2.8 30.6 20.9 -5.8 -2.6 29.3
MT* 22.3 8.5 6.9 6.9 -0.5 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -1.1 -0.9 -0.1 -0.1
NL 39.2 14.5 15.3 9.4 1.2 -0.5 1.4 0.3 1.9 5.0 -2.8 -0.2
PL 34.3 5.9 15.5 12.9 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 -3.8 0.5 -2.8 -1.5
PT 37.7 9.7 8.9 19.2 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 1.3 1.3 0.0 0.0
RO* 44.4 9.3 12.8 22.3 2.0 -0.2 0.5 1.7 -3.5 1.1 3.8 -8.4
SE 42.7 13.5 5.3 23.9 -0.5 -0.5 0.0 0.0 -6.4 -5.6 0.0 -0.8
SI 42.4 9.5 19.0 13.9 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 -3.8 -1.7 0.6 -2.7
SK 37.8 6.4 10.6 20.8 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 -4.7 0.7 1.3 -6.8
UK 32.7 14.7 8.3 9.7 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6 -1.0 0.8 0.7
Difference 2001 - 2010
Total Tax 
Wedge 2010
Of which Difference 2009 - 2010
(1) Single person without children, 100% of AW 
Source: OECD, Taxing wages report. **2007 data *2009 data. 
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the level of REERs decreased by 15 points from 
the first quarter of 2008 to the fourth quarter of 
2010. In the euro area, REERs decreased by 4 
points over the same three-year period. 
Adjustments in competitiveness positions also 
occurred within the euro area and the EU, as 
REERs followed different patterns across Member 
States. In the euro area, most countries recorded an 
appreciation in REERs during the 2008-2009 
period. Notable exceptions were Ireland and Spain, 
which started the adjustment in 2009.  
Graph I.3.10 indicates that the appreciation of 
REERs based on ULC peaked in the fourth quarter 
of 2009. In 2010, REERs based on ULC 
depreciated in all euro area countries. These 
developments in REERs reflect the evolution in 
Graph I.3.10: REERs based on ULC, y-o-y % change, 2008Q1-2010Q4 
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own nominal unit labour costs. Between 2008 and 
2010, Ireland and Spain recorded the sharpest 
depreciation in REERs based on ULC in the euro 
area, while Slovakia and Slovenia recorded the 
strongest appreciations. 
Competitiveness developments in non-euro area 
Members were significantly different from those in 
the euro area. The Baltic countries recorded the 
most notable depreciation in REERs based on 
ULC. In the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom, 
REERs decreased in 2009 and increased in 2010. 
In the Baltic countries the depreciation in REERs 
is related to the evolution of the nominal unit 
labour costs. In the other countries depreciations in 
nominal exchange rates influenced the evolution of 
the REERs. 
Broad and narrow measures of REERs give 
generally the same signs. Graph I.3.11shows the 
year-on-year evolution of REERs based on ULC 
deflator, GDP deflator and export price deflator. 
This allows a distinction between broad and 
narrow measures of REERs. While REERs based 
on ULC and GDP cover the entire economy, 
export prices deflator concerns prices of exports 
only. Over relatively long time horizons, broad 
REERs indicators convey similar information 
regarding competitiveness positions. But in the 
short-term they may differ substantially. Possible 
reasons are related with the evolution of profit 
margins and indirect taxation. Differences may 
exist between broad and narrow measures of 
REERs. This may be indicative of different price 
dynamics in tradable and non-tradable sectors and 
composition of exports. Graph I.3.11 shows that 
REERs based on the different deflators are aligned 
but there are conflicting signals in some countries. 
REERs based on nominal unit labour costs 
increased only in the Czech Republic, the United 
Kingdom, Sweden, and Poland. This is related 
with both increase in unit labour cost above those 
in competitor countries (except Sweden) and 
appreciation of the currencies after the strong 
devaluation in 2009. By contrast, the Baltic 
countries followed by Ireland and Malta recorded 
the sharpest depreciations, in line with the sharp 
declines in unit labour costs. 
REERs based on GDP deflator depreciated the 
most in Ireland and Latvia. The depreciation of 
REERs based on the GDP deflator was in general 
smaller than those based on ULC, especially in 
countries with the largest falls in ULC. In the 
Baltic countries there was a strong increase in the 
gross operating surplus, after the sharp falls of the 
previous year. In Hungary and Romania REERs 
based on ULC depreciated while REERs based on 
GDP appreciated. This may be related with the 5 
points VAT increase in both countries. In the 
Czech Republic redistribution of income between 
workers and firms has played a role in shaping 
competitiveness. The increase in nominal unit 
Graph I.3.11: REERs based on ULC deflator, GDP deflator and export prices deflator, y-o-y % change, 2010 
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labour costs has been offset by a decreased in 
profit margins. 
REERs deflated by the export prices show the 
lowest average variations. In a number of countries 
they give a conflicting signal to that of REERs 
based on ULC or GDP deflators. Lithuania 
registered the largest difference in REERs based in 
the export deflator and REERs based on ULC. 
This may be related to the large difference between 
the variation in compensation in industry and the 
other sectors (see Graph I.3.8). In France, Austria, 
Cyprus and the Czech Republic, REERs based on 
the export deflator depreciated more than the 
REERs based on ULC. This suggest that export 
firms in these countries have tried to offset the 
increase in cost competitiveness through a drop in 
profit margins, or the unit labour cost in export 
sectors varied considerable from those for the 
whole economy. 
Graph I.3.12: Level of REERs based on ULC (2000=100) and 
y-o-y % change, 2010 
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The negative relation between the variation in 
REERs and their level shows some signs of 
adjustment in cost competitiveness in 2010 (see 
Graph I.3.12). REERs appreciated in countries with 
comparatively depreciated REERs. This was the 
case of the United Kingdom, Sweden and Poland. 
All countries with appreciated exchange rates 
depreciated instead. The Czech Republic was the 
only exception. Estonia, Latvia, Ireland, Lithuania 
and Malta were the countries more strongly driving 
the negative correlation, as they recorded the 
strongest depreciation and have the higher REERs. 
In contrast, the Czech Republic increased further the 
level of appreciation of its REER based on ULC. 
Graph I.3.13: REERs based on ULC and NEERs, y-o-y % 
change, 2010 
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Movements in the nominal effective exchange 
rates (NEERs) influenced the evolution of REERs. 
The strongest relation is not surprisingly for 
countries with flexible exchange rate. Sweden 
recorded the sharpest relative appreciation in the 
nominal effective exchange rate. As a result it 
registered a strong appreciation in the REER based 
on ULC, in spite of the substantial reduction in 
unit labour costs. In Poland the appreciation in the 
REER was influenced by the NEER and by an 
increase in nominal unit labour costs above its 
competitors. The Czech Republic recorded an 
appreciation in the real effective exchange rate of 
about the same size of the nominal effective 
exchange rates (see Graph I.3.13). 
3.4.1. Competitiveness and adjustment in the 
euro area 
In the euro area nominal unit labour costs should 
adjust to differences in business cycle 
developments. In the face of a positive (negative) 
asymmetric shock, unit labour costs in the country 
affected by the shock should increase faster 
(slower) than in the remaining euro area Member 
States in order to rebalance cyclical 
competitiveness positions. 
Graph I.3.14 shows the year-on-year changes in 
REERs based on ULC and the relative output gap, 
calculated as the difference between the output gap 
of each individual country with that of the euro 
area. All countries recorded an output below 
potential. Countries lying above the x-axis 
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recorded a better cyclical position in relation to the 
euro area and below the x-axis are the countries 
that performed relatively worse than the euro area. 
Graph I.3.14: REERs based on ULC, y-o-y % change, and 
relative output gap, 2010 
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Source: Commission services based on AMECO data. 
The results point to a positive relation between the 
relative output gap position and changes in 
REERs. (18) Changes in REERs varied 
considerably across countries in similar cyclical 
position. Ireland, Finland, Spain, Greece and 
Slovenia were all in similar cyclical positions and 
recorded an economic performance relatively 
worse than that of the euro area. However, Ireland 
recorded a strong depreciation of the REER while 
Slovenia only recorded a slight decline in REER 
after the strong appreciation of 2009. 
Apart from contributing to the absorption of 
cyclical divergences, competitiveness adjustment 
is also key for the external rebalancing of the 
economies. Graph I.3.15 plots the current account 
balance in proportion of GDP against changes in 
REERs based on ULC in 2010. There are large 
differences in the current account. The 
Netherlands, Germany and Luxembourg (not 
shown in the graph) recorded the largest surplus. 
Greece, Portugal and Cyprus recorded the largest 
deficits. The correlation between the variation in 
REER and the current account is negative, 
suggesting that in general REER changes are 
helping the external rebalancing of the economy. 
However, the negative correlation is weak and 
mainly driven by Estonia and Cyprus. Notably, 
Greece and Portugal where the current account 
                                                          
(18) This result is confirmed in empirical work on larger 
samples (e.g., Biroli, Mourre, and Turrini, 2010). 
balances are the largest, recorded a depreciation in 
REERs similar to that of the Netherlands, where 
the current account surplus is the largest. 
Graph I.3.15: REERs based on ULC, y-o-y % change, and 
current account balance, 2010 
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Source: Commission services based on AMECO data. 
3.5. POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
The crisis has shown the vulnerability of several 
countries to domestic and external imbalances. It 
has reinforced the importance of wage adjustment 
for absorbing unemployment and enhancing inter-
sectoral reallocation.  
Since the onset of the crisis, wage cuts or wage 
freezes in the public sector have been introduced to 
sustain fiscal consolidation. At the same time, 
better adjustment capacity of wages to productivity 
developments at local level through the use of 
opening clauses has gained importance. In 
countries under the greatest financial distress, 
minimum wages were also a part of adjustment to 
enhance reallocation and restore competitiveness. 
Tax policy has supported moderate wage 
developments by cutting tax burden on labour in 
many countries, notably at the beginning of the 
crisis. This tendency has become less clear since 
2010 due to pressing fiscal consolidation needs in 
a number of countries. 
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3.5.1. Reform activity after the crisis and during 
the recovery 
Wages in the public sector (19) 
Since the onset of the crisis, far-reaching fiscal 
consolidation programs were introduced in several 
countries. Altogether, about a half of the EU 
countries have seen either wage freezes and/or 
wage cuts in the public sector since 2008. 
Depending on the depth of the adjustment, wage 
cuts, wage or hiring freezes, and outsourcing of 
public services were undertaken relatively early, as 
in the Baltics and Hungary, or more recently, such 
as in Spain, Portugal and Italy. In other countries, 
measures to curb public expenditure were taken on 
a continued basis, such as in Ireland and Greece, 
where reductions or freezes of public employees’ 
salaries were implemented already in 2009 and 
followed by further consolidation measures in 
2010. The largest wage cuts were recorded in the 
Baltics and Romania.  
In contrast to the private sector, cutting jobs in the 
public sector has been exceptional. Collective 
bargaining outcomes in the public sector tend to be 
distributive in the sense that employment security 
is usually not tradable against wage moderation. 
Thus, several governments (e.g. Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Romania, and Spain) introduced hiring 
freezes or limited the replacement of retired 
workers. Yet, job cuts were taken or announced in 
Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Germany and the United Kingdom 
Collective bargaining (20) 
Several negotiated solutions have been adopted to 
deal with the consequences of the crisis. Many 
collective agreements at sectoral level concluded 
since 2008 included provisions to increase the 
flexibility of wages at the firm level. In Finland, a 
collective agreement for the technological 
manufacturing sector allows for suspension clauses 
of the pay agreed at the sectoral level under certain 
conditions (i.e. if the company is in a distressed 
                                                          
(19) This section draws on Glassner, V. and A. Watt (2010), 
"Cutting Wages and Employment in the Public Sector: 
Smarter Fiscal Consolidation Strategies Needed", 
Intereconomics, 45 (4). 
(20) This section draws on Glassner, V. and M. Keune (2010), 
"Collective bargaining responses to the economic crisis in 
Europe", ETUI Policy Brief, Issue 1/2010. 
financial position; if the demand is temporarily 
weak; or wage increases would threaten jobs). 
Similar agreements were signed in Germany or in 
Sweden. In the last country, a collective agreement 
for engineers and architects establishes that wage 
increases are exclusively set at the local level.   
In 2010 measures towards greater decentralisation 
in wage setting included an introduction of specific 
firm level collective agreements which allow firms 
to adjust wages according to its market situation 
(Greece) and restrictions on the extension of 
sectoral collective agreement to non-signatory 
parties (Slovakia). Greece reviewed also the 
collective dispute regulation procedure which was 
in the past often a source of an upward wage drift.  
Social partners had also an essential role in 
implementation of statutory provisions on short 
time working and partial unemployment at 
company and sectoral level (e.g. Germany, 
Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands). For example, 
in Germany collective agreements in many sectors 
defines top-ups to the statutory provision on short 
time working benefits. In countries were collective 
agreement is mainly at the enterprise level 
(Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland), short-time 
schemes were implemented through company 
agreements, mostly in multinational companies.  
Wage adjustments as a response to working time 
adjustments varied substantially across companies, 
spanning from fully maintained wages (e.g. in 
Volvo, Renault, DAF Trucks) to a proportionate 
reduction (e.g. Schaeffler, Daimler). In view of 
strengthening employability of workers on the long 
run, training was often included in collective 
agreements as an essential component of short 
time working schemes.   
The minimum wage 
In the period 2008-2009, a cut in the minimum 
wage was rare and only few countries increased 
the minimum wage by less than initially envisaged. 
Since 2010, countries with the largest 
macroeconomic imbalances have reduced the 
minimum wage to restore competitiveness and 
foster labour reallocation. In Ireland, the statutory 
minimum wage was cut, while in Portugal it was 
increased by less than envisaged by the 2006 
tripartite agreement. In Greece, sub-minima for 
young aged below 25 were introduced and the 
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minimum wage frozen until 2012. Conversely, to 
protect income of the lowest-paid workers, the 
minimum wage was increased in several countries, 
in particular in those with a relatively low 
minimum wage as a percentage of the average 
wage (below the EU median). 
Tax wedge 
To reduce labour costs and support labour demand, 
in particular of low-income earners, the tax wedge 
was cut during the crisis in several EU countries, 
among them also in the countries with relatively 
high tax wedges, such as Belgium, Hungary, 
Germany,  France, Austria and Sweden.  
In 2010, the consolidation of public finances 
became a priority in many countries, resulting in 
higher tax burden on labour. In 2010 the tax 
burden on labour was increased in countries with 
relatively low tax wedges such as Ireland, the 
United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Greece, Portugal 
and Spain. 
On the other hand, EU countries with fiscal space 
continued to reduce the tax burden on labour to 
support labour demand and labour supply. Some 
countries with high tax wedge have shifted tax 
burden from labour to other sources of taxation 
(e.g. Hungary, Germany, Finland and Denmark).  
Personal income tax has been changed in almost 
all countries in 2010. A majority of reforms 
augmented tax progressivity, while social security 
contributions remained mainly unchanged. Where 
changes have occurred, increases were prevalent, 
notably by expanding the tax base rather than 
raising the rates.  
3.5.2. Policy priorities looking forward 
In light of the overarching priority to ensure the 
rebalancing of EU economies, the 2001 
Commission Annual Growth Survey includes 
recommendations on wages. "Strict and sustained 
wage moderation, including the revision of 
indexation clauses in bargaining systems" were 
recommended for countries characterised by large 
current account deficits. The Joint Employment 
Report recognises "from a macroeconomic 
perspective, wage dynamics are also important for 
the correction of internal and external imbalances". 
Reforms in wage setting institutions are also part 
of reform packages agreed by countries under 
financial assistance programmes. 
In their 2011 National Reform Programmes 
(NRPs) Member States included a series of policy 
measures and reforms with relevance for the wage 
formation system. 
The reduction of tax wedge, in particular for 
vulnerable groups (i.e. low wage persons, second 
earners, long-term unemployed) is an objective 
common to several countries, in particular those 
with a relatively high tax wedge such as Belgium, 
Hungary, France and Austria ( Graph I.3.16). Only 
few measures entail an increase in the tax burden. 
To support fiscal consolidation, public sector 
wages will remain frozen in the years ahead in 
several EU countries. On the hand, more flexible 
wage setting will be on agenda in a relatively few 
countries (Belgium, Italy, Finland). 
Graph I.3.16: Number of countries announcing reforms 
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Ireland, Greece and Portugal are not taken into account. 
Information about the public pay freeze comes from the 
ETUC annual collective bargaining questionnaire. 
3.6. CONCLUSION 
In spite of growth resuming and inflation picking 
up, compensations per employee continued to 
grow at a moderate rate in 2010 in most of EU 
countries, reflecting the protracted labour market 
slack.  
Reductions in nominal compensation per employee 
were recorded in 2010 in the three Baltics, Greece, 
Ireland, Malta and Hungary, largely as a result of 
salary cuts in the public sector. Sustained nominal 
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wage increases were instead registered in Bulgaria, 
Poland, Slovenia, the UK, Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic. 
In light of rising inflation compared with 2009, 
real compensations per employee fell in 13 EU 
countries and real unit labour costs fell in most 
Member States. The fact that real wage growth 
was moderate in comparison with productivity 
would in principle help reducing unemployment. 
In general, the degree of adjustment in real unit 
labour costs reflects the magnitude of 
unemployment. However, while in some high 
unemployment countries the adjustment was 
comparatively strong (the Baltics), in others it was 
weaker than that recorded in some countries with 
low unemployment (Spain, Slovakia, Ireland). 
The remarkable productivity improvement, 
coupled with wage moderation, resulted in a 
reduction in unit labour costs which appear to  be 
consistent with the external rebalancing of EU 
economies: the competitiveness gains were in 
general more marked in countries with larger 
current account deficits. 
4. EU LABOUR MARKET OUTLOOK 
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After a year of continued economic expansion 
following the 2009 recession, the European 
economy is expected to continue a muted recovery 
in 2011 and 2012. Despite persisting risk factors 
relating inter-alia to tensions in sovereign bond 
markets, credit supply, and inflationary pressures 
in emerging economies, private domestic demand 
is gradually gathering pace, and economic growth 
becoming increasingly self-sustaining. Hard data 
confirm that the recovery is broadening not only 
across countries but also across sectors. According 
to the Spring 2011 Commission Services Forecast, 
EU GDP is expected to expand by 1.8% in 2011 
and by 1.9% in 2012. In the euro area, economic 
expansion is likely to edge up from 1.6% in 2011 
to 1.8% in 2012. All in all, in spite of demand 
resuming and output gaps narrowing, the recovery 
appears more muted compared with previous 
episodes of growth after major recessions. 
Growth patterns are expected to remain highly 
different across countries in 2010, reflecting 
individual challenges policies pursued. Estonia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland and Sweden will 
register a momentum twice as high as the EU 
average. Spain and Ireland are expected to register 
GDP growth well below that of the EU average. In 
Greece and Portugal economic activity is forecast 
to contract again in 2011, amid the ongoing fiscal 
consolidation. In 2012, GDP growth is instead 
expected to gain momentum in most of the EU 
Member States.  
EU labour market conditions stabilized in the 
course of 2010 and have recently started 
improving. Employment in the EU rose since mid-
2010, while the unemployment rate remained 
broadly unchanged at the level of 2009, just above 
9.5% in the EU and 10% in the euro area. Taking 
into account the slightly positive carry-over from 
2010, employment is expected to grow by 0.5% in 
2011 and to gradually speed-up to 0.7% in 2012 
both in the EU and the euro area. The 
unemployment rate in the EU is expected to 
steadily retrench over the forecast horizon, 
declining to 9.5% and 9.1% in 2011 and 2012, 
respectively. For the euro area, unemployment 
forecasts are less optimistic (10% and 9.6% 
respectively in 2011 and 2012). As discussed in 
Chapter 1, the EU unemployment response to 
growth is moving back to normal values, after the 
period of exceptional employment resilience 
immediately after the recession, largely as a result 
of labour inputs adjusting on the extensive margin, 
and the surge in layoffs that took place in late 2009 
and early 2010. Indeed, the adjustment on the 
intensive margin appears complete, and hours 
worked per employee have stopped growing. The 
expected relatively muted unemployment recovery 
is therefore expected to be mostly the result of the 
lacklustre growth, the usual lags with which 
employment adjusts to economic activity and 
highly resilient participation rates. 
One of the reasons that may have held back the 
employment recovery in 2010 is the pending 
uncertainty on the growth outlook, which may 
have induced a wait-and-see attitude on the part of 
firms. As revealed by Graph I.4.1, employment 
growth in 2010 was much below what predicted on 
the basis of business sentiment, as proxied by the 
Business Climate Indicator.  
Graph I.4.1: Business climate indicator and employment 
growth in the EU (2000Q1-2011Q1) 
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(1) Business climate indicator of the monthly business survey 
in Industry  
Source: ECFIN. 
The reason could be that growth was perceived as 
more uncertain. The fact that job creation in 2010 
took place especially in terms of temporary and 
part-time jobs surrogates the argument that 
uncertainty on the economic outlook played a role. 
Looking forward, as the economic recovery 
consolidates and uncertainty evaporates the 
employment recovery would gather momentum. 
Recent information from sentiment indicators 
supports the views that the recovery in 
employment is on its way. In particular, surveys of 
European Commission 
Labour Market Developments in Europe, 2011 
 
56 
employment expectations were back or above their 
pre-crisis levels in all sectors at the end of the year, 
except in the construction industry (Graph I.4.2). 
The euro area PMIs for employment expectations 
also point towards positive employment growth. 
Graph I.4.2: Employment expectations in the EU business 
surveys (industry, construction and services) 
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A key question is the speed at which the incipient 
employment recovery will bring back unemployment 
rates to pre-crisis levels. The recent shifts in the 
Beveridge curve signalling a worsening labour 
matching (chapter 1) and the forecast increase in the 
NAIRU for 2011 and 2012 (reaching 9.1 and 9.2% in 
the euro area and 8.6% and 8.8% in the EU, 
respectively, according the Spring 2011 Commission 
Forecast) suggest that the unemployment rate will 
persist above pre-crisis expected to retrench over the 
forecast horizon. On average, it will reach 10% in 
2011 and then 9.7% in 2012 in the euro area 
(respectively 9.5% and 9.1% for the EU). 
Employment and unemployment evolutions will 
continue to be much differentiated across Member 
States in 2011 and 2012 (Table I.4.1). After 
declining in most of the EU member states in 
2010, employment will resume growing in almost 
all EU countries in 2011 and in all but Portugal in 
2012. Although the unemployment rate is 
declining in most EU countries over the forecast 
horizon, the prospects remain poor in a number of 
countries whose labour markets were strongly hit 
by the crisis and its repercussions to the financial 
and government sector. This is notably the case of 
Greece, Ireland, Spain, Portugal. There will be 
considerable improvements in the Baltic countries, 
but unemployment rates will remain well above 
pre-crisis levels. The prospects for unemployment 
reduction appear also substantial in Germany and 
Sweden and Finland.  
 
Table I.4.1: Employment growth and unemployment rate forecasts by EU Commission (DG ECFIN), OECD and IMF 
2010 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012
BE 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.9 8.3 7.9 7.8 7.6 7.3 8.4 8.2
BG -5.9 0.5 1.0 10.2 9.4 8.5 8.0 6.7
CZ -0.8 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.7 7.3 6.8 6.4 6.6 6.3 7.1 6.9
DK -2.1 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.1 7.4 7.1 6.7 7.2 6.4 4.5 4.4
DE 0.5 0.9 0.5 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.2 7.1 6.4 6.0 6.0 5.4 6.6 6.5
EE -4.8 4.2 1.3 3.2 1.6 16.9 13.0 11.5 14.2 13.0 14.8 12.8
IE -4.1 -1.5 0.4 -2.4 -0.6 -1.5 1.5 13.7 14.6 14.0 14.7 14.6 14.5 13.3
EL -2.1 -2.6 0.1 -3.7 -0.3 -2.4 -0.1 12.6 15.2 15.3 16.0 16.4 14.8 15.0
ES -2.4 -0.6 0.9 -0.7 0.9 0.3 1.0 20.1 20.6 20.2 20.3 19.3 19.4 18.2
FR 0.1 0.8 0.9 0.6 1.0 0.0 0.6 9.7 9.5 9.2 9.0 8.7 9.5 9.1
IT -0.7 0.4 0.9 0.4 0.8 0.3 0.7 8.4 8.4 8.2 8.4 8.1 8.6 8.3
CY -0.3 0.2 0.8 1.0 1.0 6.5 6.3 5.6 6.5 6.3
LV -4.8 1.5 1.7 18.7 17.2 15.8 17.2 15.5
LT -5.1 2.1 2.8 17.8 15.5 12.7 16.0 14.0
LU 1.6 2.1 2.3 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.8 4.5 4.4 4.2 5.4 4.8 5.9 5.8
HU 0.2 0.4 3.0 -0.2 1.0 11.2 11.0 9.3 11.5 11.0 11.5 10.9
MT 2.2 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.2 6.8 6.8 6.7 6.5 6.4
NL -0.6 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.7 -0.2 0.2 4.5 4.2 4.0 4.2 4.0 4.4 4.4
AT 1.0 0.8 0.7 1.4 0.7 0.3 0.3 4.4 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.0 4.3 4.3
PL 0.4 1.1 1.0 0.7 1.2 9.6 9.3 8.8 9.4 8.5 9.0 8.7
PT -1.5 -1.5 -0.9 -1.5 -1.3 -0.8 -0.7 11.0 12.3 13.0 11.7 12.7 11.9 12.4
RO -1.8 0.1 0.6 7.3 7.2 6.8 6.6 5.8
SI -2.2 -1.3 0.3 -0.3 0.4 7.3 8.2 8.0 7.5 7.2
SK -1.4 0.6 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.9 1.6 14.4 14.0 13.3 13.8 12.8 13.3 12.1
FI -0.4 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.8 0.7 8.4 7.9 7.4 7.9 7.1 8.0 7.8
SE 1.1 1.9 1.1 2.3 1.2 8.4 7.6 7.2 7.5 7.0 7.4 6.6
UK 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.6 0.7 7.8 8.0 7.8 8.1 8.3 7.8 7.9
EA-16 -0.5 0.4 0.7 0.3 0.5 10.1 10.0 9.7 9.7 9.3 9.9 9.6
EU-27 -0.5 0.4 0.7 9.6 9.5 9.1 na na
US -0.6 0.8 1.3 0.9 1.9 2.1 2.3 9.6 8.7 8.1 8.8 7.9 8.5 7.7
JP -0.6 -0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 5.1 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.6 4.9 4.6
Employment (annual percentage change) Unemployment (percentage of civilian labour force)
ECFIN OECD IMF ECFIN OECD IMF
Source: EU Commission Spring 2011 forecast, IMF World Economic Outlook database April 2011, OECD Economic Outlook 
n°89 June 2011. The OECD does not publish economic forecasts for BG, CY, LV, LT, MT, SE and the EU27 aggregate. For the 
euro area by OECD, 15 countries are considered (no Cyprus and no Malta).  
 
Part I 
Labour market developments 
 
57 
The differences in the forecast unemployment 
dynamics across countries are mostly linked to the 
multi-speed recovery, however, in some cases, the 
unemployment response to growth response is also 
forecast to differ considerably (Graph I.4.3). While in 
countries where the recession hit first like the Baltic 
countries the rebound in unemployment is expected 
to be large in proportion to GDP growth (in light of 
adjustment of hours worked having come to an end), 
in Ireland the unemployment rate is forecast to rise in 
2011 in spite of positive growth. 
Graph I.4.4: Nominal compensation per employee in EU 
Member States 
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Source: Commission Spring forecast. 
In line with resuming economic growth and rising 
inflation in 2011, the growth rate of compensation 
per employee is expected to gradually accelerate in 
2011 and 2012 in the euro area to 2.1% and 2.3% 
respectively (for the EU 2.3% and 2.7%). Wages 
growth would still be dampened by the continued 
weakness of labour market. Consistently, real 
wages are expected to decelerate and to grow 
below productivity; in 2011 and 2012 real product 
wages are expected to growth in the euro area at 
about 0.7% both years (for the EU 0.7% and 0.9%) 
against a productivity growth of 1.2% and 1% for 
(1.4% both years for the EU). Although the extent 
of wage moderation will in general reflect labour 
market slack, the adjustment is expected to be 
sluggish in Malta, Slovenia, Estonia, Slovakia, 
Lithuania, Poland and Bulgaria (Graph I.4.4). 
Graph I.4.5: Nominal unit labour costs in the euro area 
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Source: Commission Spring forecasts. 
The pick up in compensation per employee of 
2011 and 2012 will translate in an increase of unit 
labour costs for the euro area, partly offset by the 
increase in productivity, of 0.8% and 1.2% 
respectively. The strongest dynamics is expected 
in Bulgaria, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Romania. 
Graph I.4.3: Unemployment developments (left axis) and apparent elasticities of unemployment change to GDP growth  
(right axis) in the EU countries and in the US in 2011 and 2012 
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Unemployment benefit systems allow to insure 
individual incomes during temporary unemployment 
and provide assistance during longer unemployment 
periods. While the main purpose of benefits is to 
provide enough resources for the unemployed to 
search for adequate job matches, unemployment 
benefits reduce incentives to work. The underlying 
reason is moral hazard which induces the sub-
optimal job search intensity by the unemployed. 
Against this, generous and long-lasting transfers to 
the unemployed can create unemployment traps and 
benefit dependence, thus entrenching long-term 
unemployment. Design features help containing the 
efficiency cost of unemployment benefits, as well as 
the implementation of effective activation policies 
and active labour market policies. 
Reduced work incentives have macro-economic 
implications. Unemployment benefits systems that 
better cope with labour market incentives while 
supporting the incomes of the unemployed are 
supporting employment rates and labour supply on 
a permanent basis, thereby bolstering potential 
output. Public finances benefit both directly, via 
reduced expenditures, and indirectly, via an 
enlarged revenue base to finance fiscal imbalances. 
Moreover, countries that need to correct on a 
sustainable basis large current account deficits benefit 
in terms of increased public and private savings. 
EU countries differ considerably in terms of the 
generosity, composition and design of their 
unemployment benefit systems. Some countries 
have traditionally more than others relied on more 
generous unemployment benefits. Although 
strengthening labour market incentives is to a large 
extent a common priority, the desirable and 
feasible way to achieve this goal differs from 
country to country in relation to the current 
features of their unemployment benefit system, the 
overall context of labour market regulations and 
institutions, the state of active labour market 
policies and activation policies, and more 
generally the economic, employment and fiscal 
situation.  
In addition to providing individual insurance and 
assistance, the unemployment benefit system also 
plays the role of macroeconomic stabilisation. It is 
considered a key automatic stabiliser. Its income 
stabilisation role can be strengthened by adapting 
features of unemployment benefit systems over the 
cycle. During economic downturns, generosity, 
design and eligibility conditions of unemployment 
benefit systems may need to be adapted to cater for 
the increased job destruction, reduced job finding 
rates and the stronger need for stabilising incomes. 
Conversely, during recoveries, the unemployment 
benefit system needs to prioritise incentives in the 
labour market with a view to preventing the risk 
that unemployment becomes structural. Options 
for this adapting, whether on a discretionary or a 
more automatic fashion, on the basis of trigger 
variables, are contingent on the characteristics of 
countries' unemployment benefit systems and 
public finances. 
This part is organised as follows. Section 2 
discusses the efficiency effects of unemployment 
benefits and the design features to mitigate moral 
hazard and increase incentives to work. In 
addition, it outlines the main features of 
unemployment benefit systems in EU countries 
and comments upon potential sources of benefit 
traps and benefit dependency. Section 3 explores 
the stabilisation function of unemployment 
benefits and ways to adapt unemployment benefit 
systems over the cycle. Section 4 reviews main 
reforms in unemployment benefits carried out in 
EU countries during the crisis. Finally, section 5 
concludes with a discussion of reform options and 
priorities looking forward. 
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2.1. THE RELEVANCE OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
BENEFIT DESIGN FOR INCENTIVES 
Most advanced economies dispose of an 
unemployment benefits system, largely based 
either on an insurance or welfare principle. The 
broad goal of unemployment benefit systems is 
transferring income to involuntary job losers. 
National systems differ in terms of generosity and 
composition by instruments. There is no single 
model as its design depends on other country 
specific labour market and welfare institutions. 
Depending on the design of the different 
instruments and their practice for transferring 
income to the unemployed, the unemployment 
benefit system can be rather oriented towards the 
insurance principle or the welfare principle. The 
insurance principle aims at consumption 
smoothing, contributions are the main source of 
financing, and benefits are strongly related to 
previous earnings. Conversely, the welfare 
principle aims at redistributing income, financing 
is by means of flat-rate contributions or a general 
tax financing, and benefits are not strongly linked 
to past income (i.e. benefits are capped at 
relatively low levels).    
The unemployment benefits system is composed of 
two main instruments: unemployment insurance and 
unemployment assistance. Unemployment insurance 
benefits (UI) aim at insuring individual incomes 
during the unemployment spell and are typically 
based on an insurance principle. To a varying degree, 
UI benefits also redistribute between low 
income/qualification workers with high 
unemployment risks and high income/qualification 
workers with low unemployment risks. UI benefits 
are payable to involuntary job losers that, within a 
certain reference period, have completed a minimum 
period of employment or paid contributions. 
Unemployment assistance (UA) aims at preventing 
unemployment-related poverty and is based on 
welfare principle. It is usually paid either to the long 
term unemployed who have exhausted their UI 
benefits or to those who failed to qualify for UI 
benefits. To qualify for UA, the unemployed often do 
not need to have any employment/contribution period 
or the required period is shorter than in case of UI 
benefits.  
The financing of unemployment insurance in some 
countries is based on Unemployment Insurance 
Savings Accounts (UISA). The principle in this 
case is not that of insurance but that of individual 
savings. The account is financed by contributions 
by the employee and/or the employer and it is 
earmarked to the particular employment situation 
of the individual employee. This makes the UISA 
more fungible compared with standard 
unemployment insurance schemes. On a positive 
side, UISA reduces moral hazard in job search 
efforts and encourages job mobility. On a negative 
side, UISA does not pool income risks and as a 
result necessitates additional complementary 
redistributive policies to provide sufficient 
coverage to high risk groups unable to accumulate 
sufficient savings. (21) 
Other institutions and policy instruments perform 
functions that partly overlap with those of 
unemployment benefits. The aim of all instruments 
is to provide income support to the unemployed 
but the target group and the modality of income 
support may differ across instruments. 
• Severance payments provide a similar 
insurance to involuntary job losers as UI 
benefits. Yet, their amount is fixed and paid in 
total upfront by a firm, independently from the 
duration of unemployment. While a payment 
independent of the unemployment duration 
greatly minimises any possible adverse 
incentive effects on job search compared with 
UI payments, the uncertainty surrounding the 
duration of unemployment renders UI clearly 
superior as an income insurance tool. (22) 
Severance payments also increase firing costs 
and may cause liquidity problems for firms. 
• Short term working arrangements (STWA) aim 
at protecting jobs and providing income 
support in periods of involuntary total or partial 
inactivity, as result of labour adjustment on the 
                                                          
(21) Among EU countries, Austria has undertaken in 2002 a 
reform of its severance pay system which bears some 
similarities to the UISA. 
(22) Baily (1978) argues for a system that combines both UI 
and redundancy payments. The relative importance of the 
latter should be higher (lower) depending on the magnitude 
of adverse incentive effects (the uncertainty surrounding 
unemployment duration). 
European Commission 
Labour Market Developments in Europe, 2011 
 
62 
internal margin. STWA beneficiaries although 
inactive remain employed. However, the 
efficiency of short-time schemes decay quite 
rapidly when the objective of adjusting the 
labour input without incurring in mass 
redundancies conflicts with the need of 
maintaining an efficient allocation of labour 
across sectors. Similar as UI benefits, STWA 
are financed from the UI fund, though the 
access to STWA is not always conditional on 
the contributory requirements and does not 
necessarily reduce potential entitlements to the 
UI benefits in case of subsequent layoffs. (23)  
• Social assistance provides benefits of last 
resort to the unemployed who are either not 
eligible for unemployment benefits or have 
exhausted their entitlements to unemployment 
benefits and to hardly employable beneficiaries 
outside of unemployment statistics. Social 
assistance is means-tested and usually financed 
from the general taxation. 
Unemployment benefit systems perform a function 
of macroeconomic stabilisation. As job finding 
rate decreases and unemployment duration 
lengthens unemployment benefits provide an 
important income and consumption support to the 
unemployed. Given that the unemployed are likely 
to spend rather than save their means, 
unemployment benefits are an important 
component of automatic stabilisation and are likely 
to raise aggregate demand in weak phases of the 
cycle and contain overheating during upturns.  
On top of providing insurance, assistance, and 
macroeconomic stabilisation, unemployment 
benefits have additional benefits. The purpose of 
UI benefits is to provide enough resources for the 
unemployed to search for adequate job matches, 
not rushing them into unsuitable ones. In this 
respect, moderately generous UI benefits can 
improve the quality and productivity of future job 
matches, thereby increasing total productivity and 
lengthening job tenure (Acemoglu and Shimer, 
1999; Marimon Zolibotti, 1999). Empirical 
evidence on this effect is mixed. 
                                                          
(23) STWA are more likely to benefit prime age workers and 
workers with permanent contracts as they are more likely 
to see their hours worked reduced than young and non-
standard workers who are often first to lose their jobs. 
The main efficiency cost of unemployment 
benefits are reduced incentives to work. The 
underlying reason is moral hazard which induces 
the sub-optimal job search intensity by the 
unemployed. Moral hazard becomes distortionary 
in particular in the context of generous 
unemployment benefits (e.g. Mortensen, 1997; 
Shavell and Weiss, 1979). High net replacement 
rates are usually associated with a high risk of 
unemployment traps; unemployment traps being 
defined as cases of low net income gain from 
taking up work from unemployment. Long benefit 
duration, in particular if benefits do not fall over 
the unemployment spell, increases the risk of 
benefit dependence.  
Incentive effects associated with unemployment 
benefits are empirically significant. Findings from 
a vast empirical literature corroborate theoretical 
predictions: more generous UI benefits tend to be 
significantly associated with higher incidence of 
unemployment and longer periods in 
unemployment (e.g. Layard et al., 1991; Nickell, 
1998; Krueger and Meyer, 2002); a reduction in 
the maximum duration of UI benefits is 
significantly associated to shorter unemployment 
spells (e.g. Krueger and Meyer, 2002 Van Ours 
and Vodopivec, 2005; Lalive, 2008; Caliendo et 
al., 2009). (24) As a rule of thumb, the elasticity of 
unemployment with respect to unemployment 
benefit replacement rates in microeconomic 
studies is estimated to be close to unity (Nickell, 
1998; Krueger and Meyer, 2002), with about half 
of this effect associated to increased 
unemployment incidence and the other half to 
increased duration of unemployment (Krueger and 
Meyer, 2002). The implications of unemployment 
benefits on the aggregate labour supply from those 
findings from microeconomic evidence are however 
not straightforward, as additional effects play a role 
(e.g. via the job search effort on non-recipient 
unemployed and the impact of bargained wages due 
to changed bargaining power of workers). 
                                                          
(24) The maximum duration of unemployment benefits has a 
stronger impact on unemployment duration than 
replacement rates. An increase in the benefit duration by 
one week raises unemployment duration by 0.86 weeks in 
Slovenia (Van Ours and Vodopivec, 2005), by 0.09-0.32 
weeks in Austria (Lalive, 2008), by 0.2 weeks in the US 
(Katz and Meyer, 1990) and by 0.30-0.93 weeks in Czech 
Republic and Slovak Republic (Ham et al., 1998). 
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In addition to reduced workers’ incentives, 
unemployment benefits may induce moral hazard 
behaviour on the part of firms resulting in 
excessive labour shedding. A generous 
unemployment benefits system reduces the 
perceived cost of layoffs by the firm, which may 
be induced to dismiss workers as a result of 
imprudent investments or in the presence of 
temporary rather than permanent demand 
shortfalls. The inefficiency stems from the moral 
hazard as firms may not fully internalise the social 
costs of redundancy decisions. A solution often 
invoked and practiced in some countries, notably 
the US, is to structure social security contributions 
according to “experience rating”, with firms 
having a record of more frequent layoffs paying 
higher contributions. 
Reduced work incentives have macro-economic 
implications. Highly distortionary unemployment 
benefit systems reduce employment rates, the 
aggregate labour supply, and the potential output 
on a permanent basis, which also translates into 
reduced revenues to finance fiscal imbalances. In 
addition, overly generous and distortionary 
unemployment benefit systems may contribute to 
the accumulation of deficits in the external balance 
as they finance consumption while reducing 
income, and therefore lowering national savings. 
Design features help containing the efficiency cost 
of unemployment benefits. There is a broad 
agreement that the following features of 
unemployment benefit systems help containing job 
search disincentives: 
• A design of the tax and benefit system which 
ensures that work pays off for all workers 
categories.  
• A duration of unemployment benefits which 
prevents benefit dependence and long-term 
unemployment. This is relevant in particular 
for older workers and workers with long 
contribution period as they are often entitled to 
overly long payment of benefits. On aggregate, 
however, longer duration of benefits is not 
associated with a higher long-term 
unemployment rate (Graph II.2.1).  
• A profile of benefits over the unemployment 
spell, which sufficiently falls to keep job search 
intensity high. This can be accomplished either 
by reducing UI benefits after a certain elapsed 
period in unemployment or introducing less 
generous UA after the entitlements to UI 
benefits expire. 
Graph II.2.1: Maximum duration of unemployment 
insurance benefits and long term 
unemployment 
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The trade-off between income stabilisation and 
efficiency can also be eased via the 
implementation of effective activation policies. 
Theoretical literature shows that monitoring of job 
search efforts, job search requirements, and 
sanctions for inadequate job search are welfare 
improving and should be an integral part of an 
optimal UI system (e.g. Boone and Van Ours, 
2006, Boone et al., 2007). Empirical research 
confirms these results, as the evidence shows that 
the unemployed facing monitoring and modest 
sanctions are more likely to find a job and exit 
unemployment (Lalive et al., 2005; Abbring et al., 
2005; and Ashenfelter et al., 2005). (25) 
Effective active labour market policies (ALMPs) 
may also reduce the risk of benefit dependence and 
reduced incentives. ALMPs target the less 
employable with a view to have them participating 
in the labour market. ALMPs mostly consist of: 
• Training aiming at improving the employability 
of the unemployed. 
• Measures facilitating taking up work by the 
unemployed. In this respect, employment 
                                                          
(25) The 'threat' of being sanctioned in particular, even if no 
sanction is eventually imposed, is found to be a very 
effective deterrent of low job search. 
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incentives refer to subsidies, usually for open 
market jobs in the private sector, to facilitate 
the recruitment of the unemployed or help to 
ensure the continued employment of persons at 
risk of involuntary job loss. Start-up incentives 
aim at promoting entrepreneurship by 
encouraging the unemployed to start their own 
business or to become self-employed. 
Supported employment and rehabilitation aim 
at promoting the labour market integration of 
persons with reduced working capacity.  
• Direct job creation aiming at creating 
additional jobs, usually of community benefit 
or socially useful, in order to find employment 
for the long-term unemployed or persons 
otherwise difficult to place. Job rotation and 
job sharing covers measures that facilitate full 
or partial substitution of an employee by the 
unemployed for a fixed period.  
ALMP require a careful design as the evidence on 
their effectiveness is mixed (European Commission, 
2006; Kluve et al., 2006; Card et al., 2009). 
2.2. MAIN FEATURES OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
BENEFIT SYSTEMS IN EU COUNTRIES 
EU countries differ considerably in terms of the 
generosity, composition and design of their 
unemployment benefit systems. Some countries 
have traditionally more than others relied on more 
generous unemployment benefits. These countries 
are notably Continental and Nordic countries. 
Conversely, countries like the UK and some of the 
EU-12 have traditionally been characterized by 
less generous unemployment benefits. These 
differences are mostly linked to different welfare 
state size and organisation and a different overall 
institutional set up to support unemployed income. 
A snapshot at the generosity, composition and 
designs of unemployment benefits systems in the 
 
Table II.2.1: Unemployment benefit generosity over the unemployment spell, average wage person, 2009 
UI+UA Social assistance (SA)
Waiting 
period, in 
days
UI NRR 
(d)
Duration of 
initial UI NRR, 
in months (b)
Reduced UI 
NRR (b) (d)
Final duration, 
in months
UI generosity over 
the unemployment 
spell (c)
Waiting 
period, 
in days
UA NRR 
(d)
Duration, in 
months
UB generosity over 
the unemployment 
spell (c)
SA NRR (d)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
BE 0 67 12,0 66,7 indefinite 40,0 40,0 34
DK 0 56 - - 48,0 26,8 26,8 38
PT 0 84 - - 27,6 23,2 -- 32 12 (after UI) or 24 27,1 18
NL 0 74 2,0 69,6 22,0 15,4 15,4 40
FR 8 67 - - 23,0 15,3 -- 24 6 (renewable) 16,7 24
ES 0 60 5,9 60,0 23,7 14,2 -- 27 18 19,1 22
FI 7 51 - - 23,0 11,7 5 20 indefinite (h) 23,5 18
LU 0 84 - - 12,0 10,1 10,1 38
DE 0 60 - - 12,0 7,2 7,2 17
SE 5 48 9,2 48,1 13,8 6,6 5 34 14 11,3 16
BG 0 54 5,5 53,6 11,0 5,9 5,9 7
SI -- 65 3,0 64,0 9,0 5,8 5,8 25
RO 0 48 - - 12,0 5,7 5,7 11
LV (e) 0 84 3,0 62,7 9,0 5,7 5,7 10
EE -- 53 3,3 43,6 11,8 5,5 8 11 9 6,5 10
IE 3 33 - - 15,0 5,0 3 28 indefinite (h) 22,0 31
AT 0 55 - - 9,0 4,9 -- 51 indefinite (h) 35,3 22
EL (g) 6 38 - - 12,0 4,6 -- 13 9 5,7 --
IT 7 57 6,0 59,0 8,0 4,6 4,6 --
SK 0 64 - - 6,0 3,8 3,8 10
HU 0 58 3,0 30,7 8,9 3,5 -- 24 3 4,3 22
LT -- 68 3,0 48,4 6,0 3,5 3,5 13
PL (f) 7 29 - - 6-12 months 3,5 3,5 25
CY 4 58 - - 5,1 3,0 3,0 22
CZ (e) -- 65 2 50 5 2,7 2,7 19
MT -- 36 - - 5,1 1,8 -- 33 indefinite (h) 21,7 34
UK 3 13 - - 6,0 0,8 -- 12 indefinite (h) 8,0 12
UB - unemployment benefits; Countries are ranked by UI generosity per unemployed (column 6)
*Data refer to a single person without children (40 years old with 22 uninterrupted years of contribution period) earning previously average wage. 
"--" Indicates that no information is available or not applicable.
(a) Applicable only for the countries which operate UA scheme. 
(b) Applicable only for the countries with declining profile of UI benefits over the unemployment spell. Note that UI benefits for the average wage person do not decline in some of the EU countries 
(e.g. in Spain, Bulgaria and Italy) as both UI benefits at the beginning of the unemployment spell and reduced UI benefits are subject to the maximum ceiling on benefits. 
(c) UI generosity over the unemployment spell provides info about the available non-discounted total UI benefit amount divided by the wage from work (the average wage). 
UB generosity per unemployed is the sum of the UI generosity and the UA generosity, whereby UA generosity provides info about the available non-discounted total UA benefit amount divided by the wag
(d) Benefits are shown on an annualised basis.
(e) The Czech Republic and Latvia reduce UI benefits twice over the unemployment spell. Net replacement rates in the Czech Republic are 65 % in the first two months, 
50% in the following two months and 45 % in the remaining month while in Latvia they are 84% within the first 3 months, 63% in the following 3 months and 42% in the remaining 3 months. 
(f) In Poland UI duration depends on the regional unemployment rate.
(g) In Greece, UA is paid in 3 separate instalments that are spaced out by 3 months. In other words, the instalments are paid three times within the year.
(h) Indefinite duration is assumed to last 5 years when used in the computation of the UI and UB generosity
(i) A declining profile of UI benefits over the unemployment spell applies only for 2009.
Unemployment assistance (UA) (a)Unemployment insurance (UI)
Source: Commission services; Joint European Commission-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefits models. 
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EU is provided in Table II.2.1 (column 10). Note 
that the data are updated for 2009 and that, in light 
of recent reforms, relevant changes may have 
occurred between the latest update of the tax and 
benefits database from which the figures are taken 
and the current situation. In addition, note that the 
data are shown for the unemployed previously 
earning the average wage. (26) Several features 
stand out: 
• The generosity of the unemployment benefit 
system to the average beneficiary depends on 
the net replacement rates and duration of 
benefits (of unemployment insurance (UI) 
benefits and, if applicable, on unemployment 
assistance (UA)). Belgium, Austria, Portugal 
and Denmark have the most generous 
unemployment benefits. Conversely, Czech 
Republic, Cyprus, Poland, Lithuania and 
Slovakia provide relatively low consumption 
smoothing to the unemployed (Table II.2.1, 
column 10).  
                                                          
(26) The data were also collected for the low wage person, 
previously earning 67% of the average wage (Table II.2.2). 
• Net replacement rates at the beginning of the 
unemployment spell are high especially in 
Portugal, Luxembourg and Latvia, standing in 
stark contrast to low net replacement rates in 
the UK (Table II.2.1, column 2). Once the 
entitlements to UI benefits expire, net 
replacement rates usually decline in all 
countries, though to a lower extent in the 
countries operating an UA scheme (Table 
II.2.1, column 8 and column 11).  
• The maximum duration of UI benefits varies 
widely across the EU countries, spanning from 
5 months in the Czech Republic, Malta and 
Cyprus to indefinite duration in Belgium 
(Table II.2.1, column 5). Large variation is also 
observed for UA as its maximum duration 
ranges from 3 months in Hungary to indefinite 
duration in Finland, Ireland, Austria, Malta and 
the UK (Table II.2.1, column 9). 
The unemployment trap reduces incentives to 
accept jobs more for some categories of workers 
than for others. Table II.2.3 shows that the net 
 
Table II.2.2: Unemployment benefit generosity over the unemployment spell, low wage person, 2009 
UI+UA Social assistance (SA)
Waiting 
period, in days UI NRR (d)
Duration of initial 
UI NRR, in 
months (b)
Reduced UI 
NRR (b) (d)
Final duration, 
in months
UI generosity 
over the 
unemployment 
spell (c)
Waiting 
period, in 
days
UA NRR (d) Duration, in months
UB generosity 
over the 
unemployment 
spell (c)
SA NRR (d)
column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
BE 0 89 12,0 77,3 indefinite 47,8 47,8 53
DK 0 77 - 48,0 37,1 37,1 57
PT 0 78 - 27,6 21,6 -- 39 12 (after UI) or 24 26,2 22
ES 0 78 5,9 68,9 23,7 16,8 -- 32 18 22,6 26
FR 8 70 - 23,0 16,1 -- 32 6 (renewable) 18,0 32
NL 0 76 2,0 72,4 22,0 16,0 16,0 58
FI 7 57 - 23,0 13,1 5 25 indefinite (h) 28,3 24
LU 0 82 - 12,0 9,8 9,8 47
SE 5 69 9,2 66,5 13,8 9,4 5 43 14 15,4 21
RO 0 64 - 12,0 7,6 7,6 15
BG 0 77 5,5 53,8 11,0 7,2 7,2 9
DE 0 60 - 12,0 7,1 7,1 26
IE 3 46 - 15,0 6,8 3 33,5 indefinite (h) 27,0 37
SI -- 76 3,0 69,9 9,0 6,5 6,5 36
EL (g) 6 47 - 12,0 5,7 -- 13 9 6,9
LV (e) 0 83 3,0 61,7 9,0 5,6 5,6 13
EE -- 54 3,3 44,4 11,8 5,6 8 13 9 6,8 12
IT 7 69 6,0 66,1 8,0 5,4 5,4
PL (f) 7 42 - 6-12 months 5,1 5,1 34
AT 0 55 - - 9,0 4,9 -- 51 indefinite (h) 35,3 30
HU 0 73 3,0 40,1 8,9 4,5 -- 34 3 5,5 32
LT -- 83 3,0 58,2 6,0 4,2 4,2 16
SK 0 60 - 6,0 3,6 3,6 12
CY 4 59 - 5,1 3,0 3,0 15
CZ (e) -- 65 2 50 5 2,8 2,8 24
MT -- 48 - 5,1 2,4 -- 36 indefinite (h) 23,8 36
UK 3 19 - 6,0 1,1 -- 16 indefinite (h) 10,5 16
UB - unemployment benefits; Countries are ranked by UI generosity per unemployed (column 6)
*Data refer to a single person without children (40 years old with 22 uninterrupted years of contribution period) earning previously 67% of the average wage. 
"--" Indicates that no information is available or not applicable.
(a) Applicable only for the countries which operate UA scheme. The calculation of net replacement rates assumes equal UA for low wage and average wage persons in all countries  
but AT (in AT, UA is not means tested).Therefore, the net replacement rates are likely to be understimated. 
(b) Applicable only for countries with declining profile of UI benefits over the unemployment spell 
(c) UI generosity over the unemployment spell provides info about the available non-discounted total UI benefit amount divided by the wage from work (67% of the average wage). 
UB generosity per unemployed is the sum of the UI generosity and the UA generosity, whereby UA generosity provides info about the available non-discounted total UA benefit amount divided by the wage from work (67% o
(d) Benefits are shown on an annualised basis.
(e) The Czech Republic and Latvia reduce UI benefits twice over the unemployment spell. Net replacement rates in the Czech Republic are 65 % in the first two months, 
50% in the following two months and 45 % in the remaining months while in Latvia they are 83% within the first 3 months, 62% in the following 3 months and 42% in the remaining 3 months. 
(f) In Poland UI duration depends on the regional unemployment rate.
(g) In Greece, UA is paid in 3 separate instalments that are spaced out by 3 months. In other words, the instalments are paid three times within the year.
(h) Indefinite duration is assumed to last 5 years when used in the computation of the UI and UB generosity
(i) A declining profile of UI benefits over the unemployment spell applies only for 2009.
Unemployment assistance (UA) (a)Unemployment insurance (UI)
Source: Commission services; Joint European Commission-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefits models 
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income gain from accepting jobs at the beginning 
of the unemployment spell is in general smaller for 
low wage workers and workers accepting job 
offers with lower re-employment wages. This is 
especially the case in Luxembourg, Latvia and 
Lithuania and for certain household types, such as 
one-earner couples and single parents. (27) It needs 
to be stressed that such feature is worrisome in that 
low income workers are generally at higher risk of 
unemployment than high wage workers. As the 
risk of unemployment traps concerns a larger share 
of unemployed the negative impact on incentives 
is likely to be more pervasive. 
The risk of unemployment traps for particular 
workers’ categories is shaped to a relevant extent 
by the design of net replacement rates. UI benefits 
are usually set on the basis of previous earnings. 
Yet, in almost all countries there is a minimum 
floor to benefits to protect workers with very low 
earnings and a maximum ceiling. (28) These two 
                                                          
(27) In Lithuania, a high unemployment trap for the low wage 
person stems from a very high net replacement rate at the 
beginning of the unemployment spell (83%, Table II.1.2, 
column 2). Yet, Lithuania is ranked among the countries 
with the least generous UB systems as unemployment 
benefits strongly decline after 3 months of elapsed 
unemployment and are completely withdrawn after 6 months. 
(28) Ceilings on unemployment benefits are absent in those 
countries which operate flat or nearly flat rate 
unemployment benefits (the UK, EL, PL, MT and IE). 
ceilings differ considerably across the EU 
countries and can substantially narrow the range of 
earnings which give right to UI benefits as a 
proportion of previous earnings (Table II.2.4). 
These ceilings on benefits also lead to a large 
variation in net replacement rates, with higher net 
replacement rates for low wage persons and lower 
net replacement rate for high wage persons. In this 
respect, an UI benefit system which incorporates a 
strong redistribution component and sets a high 
minimum floor on benefits is prone to generate 
disincentives to work for low-wage persons.  
Conversely, an UI benefit system with a strong 
link of UI benefits to past income can lead to high 
net replacement rates also for higher wage persons 
(e.g. Portugal, Latvia and Luxembourg). Finally, 
the risk of unemployment traps depends also on 
eligibility rules for unemployment benefits. (29) If 
not eligible for UI benefits, the unemployed 
without sufficient means can typically draw either 
on UA or SA, which are usually associated with 
lower net replacement rates and higher job search 
incentives. 
                                                          
(29) Net replacement rates also depend on the employment 
record/contribution period (DK, LV, PL and RO), family 
composition (DE, CY and MT), worker's occupation – 
white or blue collar (EL) and age (UK). 
 
Table II.2.3: Unemployment traps, 2009 
Effective tax rate for an unemployed person (previous work= 67% of the AW level)
Family Type % of AW BE DK DE GR ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI SE UK CY CZ EE HU LT LV MT PL SK SI US JP BG RO
returning to work at a wage 
equivalent to
50% 103 105 83 76 97 86 84 91 104 94 75 101 85 92 57 : 89 76 93 106 107 69 91 80 96 81 91 102 88
67% 93 89 75 67 81 78 73 79 86 84 67 82 72 76 50 : 79 62 81 86 87 58 75 67 83 68 73 82 73
100% 81 76 67 62 64 62 61 66 71 71 60 66 62 61 44 : 63 49 72 67 68 51 61 55 69 55 57 62 60
150% 73 72 63 54 54 55 58 60 63 64 55 57 57 57 41 : 53 40 67 53 56 45 50 46 61 50 48 49 50
50% 90 90 84 82 96 78 126 90 99 93 83 98 91 100 47 : 92 74 93 106 101 83 73 80 95 81 89 102 86
67% 82 92 72 71 77 72 100 79 99 91 73 79 86 83 50 : 78 61 82 86 83 65 76 63 87 67 72 82 72
100% 71 84 64 65 61 61 76 68 74 77 64 60 71 65 44 : 61 48 74 67 66 55 61 47 73 53 55 62 59
150% 67 75 56 56 51 51 66 61 60 68 58 51 63 60 41 : 51 40 68 53 54 44 51 41 63 45 46 49 50
50% 87 105 97 91 97 87 58 93 100 89 81 105 77 92 39 : 94 76 93 106 113 61 67 85 96 85 94 102 88
67% 81 89 85 72 81 77 54 79 83 78 71 85 67 76 37 : 78 62 81 86 92 51 58 71 83 71 75 82 73
100% 72 74 74 58 64 62 46 66 67 67 62 68 59 61 35 : 63 49 72 67 71 43 49 57 69 57 58 62 60
150% 68 68 65 51 54 52 46 59 59 61 57 57 55 57 35 : 52 40 67 53 58 40 43 48 61 49 48 48 50
% of AW BE DK DE GR ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI SE UK CY CZ EE HU LT LV MT PL SK SI US JP BG RO
returning to work at a wage 
equivalent to
50% 96 105 82 88 96 84 55 87 112 83 84 98 89 92 63 : 90 74 93 100 96 81 75 75 95 55 82 102 84
67% 89 89 85 78 77 81 64 77 87 75 73 80 84 82 72 : 82 61 82 94 79 66 87 63 80 60 70 82 71
100% 78 79 74 60 61 66 66 70 76 74 64 65 73 69 71 : 70 48 73 72 63 60 73 66 79 55 61 62 59
150% 72 76 65 59 51 54 61 64 66 66 58 57 64 62 59 : 57 40 68 57 52 49 58 54 69 47 49 49 53
50% 86 92 82 94 96 74 105 87 98 94 93 93 91 100 39 : 91 69 93 100 91 83 75 75 100 47 85 102 82
67% 79 94 81 82 77 73 96 73 100 85 80 78 93 89 54 : 77 55 81 98 75 66 64 59 84 58 111 82 70
100% 69 95 72 62 59 66 81 68 82 82 68 59 81 70 61 : 59 45 73 88 60 61 58 44 77 54 82 62 58
150% 65 85 62 61 50 53 69 63 66 72 61 52 70 64 52 : 53 37 68 68 50 49 50 39 68 47 63 49 52
50% 87 103 102 110 96 86 63 94 105 82 86 104 84 92 52 : 104 76 96 106 113 67 77 85 96 89 94 102 87
67% 81 91 88 86 79 74 57 81 86 72 75 84 72 76 47 : 86 62 82 86 92 57 64 71 87 74 75 82 73
100% 72 75 76 65 63 61 48 68 69 63 65 69 62 61 43 : 68 49 74 67 71 47 53 57 71 59 58 62 63
150% 68 69 66 56 53 51 47 62 61 59 59 57 57 57 41 : 55 40 68 57 58 42 45 48 62 49 47 48 53
1 earner couple with 
2 children
2 earners couple 
with 2 children
Single
1 earner couple 
2 earners couple
Single parent, 2 
children
Source: Commission services; Joint European Commission-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefits models. 
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Table II.2.4: Threshold values for minimum and maximum 
unemployment benefits, 2009 
Country code Threshold for minimum UI 
benefits (in terms of previous 
earnings, as % of AW)
Threshold for maximum UI 
benefits (in terms of previous 
earnings, as % of AW)
AT no minimum floor 113
BE 40 65
BG 35 71
CY no minimum floor above 200
CZ no minimum floor 117
DE no minimum floor above 200
DK 50 63
EE 35 above 200
ES 34 77
FI 21 above 200
FR no minimum floor above 200
EL flat rate UI flat rate UI
HU 35 71
IE nearly flat rate nearly flat rate
IT no minimum floor 84
LT 18 88
LU no minimum floor 132
LV no minimum floor above 200
MT flat rate UI flat rate UI
NL 38 108
PL flat rate UI flat rate UI
PT 45 136
RO 26 above 200
SE 28 62
SI 28 86
SK no minimum floor above 200
UK flat rate UI flat rate UI
US 27 84
(1) Example: in Denmark workers with previous earnings up 
to 50% of the average wage (the amount which is close to 
the minimum wage) receive flat rate minimum UI benefits 
while workers with previous earnings above 63% of the 
average wage receive flat rate maximum UI benefits. Only 
those workers with previous earnings in the range between 
50% and 63%of the average wage receive UI benefits as a 
proportion of previous earnings. Threshold values are 
presented for a single person without children. 
Source: Commission services; Joint European Commission-
OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefits models. 
 
As stressed above, the duration of unemployment 
benefits is key for the emergence of benefit 
dependence. The practice in EU countries 
regarding UI benefit duration differs considerably. 
About one third of the EU countries sets benefit 
duration uniformly regardless of worker's 
characteristics and in some cases very long which 
accentuates the risk of benefit dependency (e.g. in 
Denmark, Belgium and Finland). 
Conversely, other countries set benefit duration 
according to worker's characteristics. (30) The gap 
between the shortest and the longest UI benefit 
duration may reach 35 months in the Netherlands 
and about 30 months in France and Portugal 
(Graph II.2.2).  UI benefit duration is often shorter 
for younger and temporary workers with a shorter 
contribution period while substantially longer for 
older workers with a long contribution period. 
While the former group is at risk of insufficient 
coverage, the latter group is at high risk of benefit 
dependence (e.g. in the Netherlands, Portugal, 
France, Spain and Slovenia), which is in some 
countries further entrenched by UA available to 
the unemployed once their entitlements to UI 
benefits expire. (31) The risk of benefit dependency 
is large in particular with time-unlimited UA (in 
Finland, Ireland, Austria, Malta and the UK). Long 
unemployment benefits and generous net 
replacement rates, however, do not necessarily 
cause benefit dependence as they can be 
effectively offset with well-designed activation 
                                                          
(30) The maximum duration can depend on age (CZ, IT), family 
status (PL, SE), previous employment duration – based on 
the employment record/contribution period (BG, EE, ES, 
HU, MT, NL and RO) or on the employment 
record/contribution period and age (DE, EL, FR, IE, LT, 
LU, AT, PL, PT, SI) – contracts type (SK), local labour 
market conditions (PL), and participation in training (AT). 
(31) The risk of benefit dependence of older workers further 
increases if unemployment benefits overlap with early 
retirement programmes and sickness and disability 
benefits. 
Graph II.2.2: Minimum and maximum unemployment insurance benefit duration, 2009 
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policies and strictly enforced job search 
conditionality.  
Graph II.2.3: Net replacement rate of unemployed over the 
unemployment spell (unemployment benefits 
only), 2009 
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(1)  Unemployment benefits (UB) include unemployment 
insurance benefits and unemployment assistance. Net 
replacement rates (NRR) show averages over four different 
family types and two earnings levels (67% and 100% of 
average full-time wages). They are evaluated for a prime-
age worker (aged 40) with a long and uninterrupted 
employment record. NRR include cash incomes (excluding, 
for instance, employer contributions to health or pension 
insurance for workers and in-kind transfers for the 
unemployed), income taxes and employees' social security 
contributions. Unemployment benefits are shown on an 
annualised basis. 
Source: Commission services; Joint European Commission-
OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefits models. 
The additional relevant feature for benefit 
dependence and for job search intensity is the 
extent to which benefits fall over the 
unemployment spell. Countries attempt to fight 
benefit dependence not only by limiting benefit 
duration but also by gradually reducing net 
replacement rates over the unemployment spell. 
This is done either by reducing UI benefits over 
time or introducing less generous UA once the 
entitlements to UI benefits expire. (32)  Overall, the 
risk of benefit dependency is lower in countries 
with a large gap between the net replacement rates 
                                                          
(32) Only 4 countries have both a declining UI profile and flat 
UA, which suggests that these instruments can be used 
alternatively to increase job search incentives. Only 7 EU 
countries do not reduce unemployment benefit replacement 
rates over the unemployment spell.  The effective reduction 
of UI benefits usually depends on the minimum floor and 
the maximum ceiling on benefits, which often prevent full 
reduction of net replacement rates for workers with either 
very low earnings or higher earnings. For example, despite 
a declining profile of UI benefits in Spain, Bulgaria and 
Italy, net replacement rates do not change over the 
unemployment spell for the average wage person. This is 
so because UI benefits are subject to the maximum ceiling 
on benefits and as long as the benefit is above the ceiling it 
cannot be reduced. 
in the first year of the unemployment spell and the 
net replacement rates in the remaining years in 
unemployment (e.g. in Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands as shown in the Graph II.2.3).  
Conversely, risk of benefit dependency is large in 
the countries where replacement rates for 
unemployment insurance with long duration do not 
fall sufficiently (e.g. for all workers in Denmark 
and Belgium and for workers with long 
contribution period in Portugal, the Netherlands 
and France) and in the countries setting flat UI 
benefits and time-unlimited UA of the same 
amount (e.g. in Malta, Ireland and the UK). In the 
later case, the risk of benefit dependence is large in 
particular for low wage workers. To some extent, 
benefit dependence may also be related to social 
assistance and other means-tested benefits, paid 
either as a top up to unemployment benefits or as 
an income replacement once unemployment 
benefits are exhausted, to the extent that it flattens 
the profile of net replacement rates over the 
unemployment spell (Graph II.2.4). In this respect, 
also the family composition, notably the presence 
of children and the work status of the spouse, 
shapes net replacement rates. 
Graph II.2.4: Net replacement rate of unemployed over the 
unemployment spell (unemployment benefits 
topped up with social assistance and housing 
benefits), 2009 
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(1)  UB – unemployment benefits; SA – social assistance; HB – 
housing benefits; For the explanation of net replacement 
rates see the comment to the Graph II.2.3. 
Source: Commission services; Joint European Commission-
OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefits models. 
To ease transition into work and reduce benefit 
dependence, most countries allow earned income 
to be supplemented with benefits when taking up 
work (so-called employment-conditional benefits). 
Although benefits can be combined with income 
from work, employment-conditional UI benefits 
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are often subject to restrictions inter alia on the 
amount of earnings (e.g. in the Czech Republic, 
Austria, Cyprus and Luxembourg) and hours 
worked (e.g. in Finland, France, Germany, the 
Netherland and Portugal). In this respect, once 
taking up work, the benefits paid are usually 
reduced either by days or hours worked or 
proportionally to earnings. Earnings disregards are 
not permitted, e.g. in Lithuania and Latvia, 
meaning that UI benefits are fully withdrawn once 
a person receives any earnings from work. 
Earnings can be accumulated also with UA, up to a 
certain threshold (except in Hungary, Portugal and 
Spain), after which they are withdrawn completely 
(e.g. Austria) or reduced (e.g. France and the UK). 
The implications of generosity, duration and 
design of unemployment benefit needs to be 
assessed taking into proper account also the 
presence and effectiveness of activation policies. 
Nearly all countries require the unemployed to be 
registered at the employment office and be 
available for work. Activation strategies aim at 
supporting the unemployed during their job search 
and at controlling the moral hazard induced by the 
payments of benefits to the unemployed. As 
expected, the correlation between the generosity of 
unemployment benefits and an indicator measuring 
the strictness of the job availability requirements is 
positive, although weak (Graph II.2.5).  
Graph II.2.5: Net replacement rate and activation 
strategies 
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(1) UB generosity over the unemployment spell is calculated 
as in the Table 1, footnote c. Job availability requirement 
index is a summary indicator of the strictness of the 
availability criteria. A higher value means  greater strictness.  
Søren Hasselpflug (2005): "Availability criteria in 25 countries", 
Danish Finance Ministry Working Paper, 12, 2005. The index 
refers to 2004 and is expected to be updated in 2011 within 
a Joint European Commission-OECD project. 
Source: Commission services. 
Despite legislation for activation policies is present 
in most EU countries, relevant differences exist in 
terms of enforcement of work-availability criteria 
as employment offices do not have adequate 
resources or effective mechanisms for monitoring 
and enforcing the obligations of benefit recipients 
in terms of job search effort and ALMPs. 
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3.1. THE INCOME SMOOTHING PROPERTIES OF 
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT SYSTEMS 
There is broad agreement that automatic stabilisers 
perform a relevant stabilisation role if properly 
developed and are superior in several respects 
compared with discretionary fiscal stabilisation. 
Automatic stabilizers are usually defined as those 
elements of fiscal policy which mitigate output 
fluctuations without discretionary government 
action. They help to reduce the severity of a 
recession by automatically and timely supporting 
spending during a downturn. Conversely, 
discretionary fiscal stabilisation can be subject to 
recognition, decision, and implementation lags 
given that it takes time to identify the start of 
recession, to decide upon action, enact legislation 
and implement it. Uncertainty about real time 
business cycle developments and the risk that 
policy makers' incentives are not consistent with 
output stabilisation further reduce the effectiveness 
of discretionary fiscal stabilisation.  
Measuring the smoothing impact of automatic 
stabilisers is subject to a series of difficulties and the 
estimates based on macroeconomic data differ in 
magnitude depending on the estimation approach 
chosen. The range of fiscal multiplier estimates is 
large in the literature, spanning from less than zero to 
larger than four (Spilimbergo et al., 2008). The size 
of these estimates typically depends on the type of the 
fiscal stimulus and the selected approach, e.g. 
whether it is econometrics based (e.g. Gali, 1994; 
Fatas and Mihov, 1999) or model based (Van den 
Noord, 2003, Buti et al., 2003). Estimates are 
heterogeneous also across countries, albeit there is 
some evidence that countries with bigger 
governments tend to have larger automatic stabilisers 
(e.g. Baunsgaard and Symansky, 2009).   
There is substantial agreement that unemployment 
benefits are effective components of automatic 
stabilisers. The reason is that unemployment 
benefits provide consumption means to the 
unemployed which tend to be low-income and 
liquidity-constrained and often concentrated in the 
areas and industries that have been the most 
affected by downturn. The share of credit 
constrained households augments and the 
insurance value of benefits increases in particular 
during recessions, when the job finding rate 
decreases and unemployment duration increases. 
In this respect, unemployment benefits support 
aggregate demand for goods and services during 
downturns and dampen inflationary pressures 
during expansions. Apart from stabilising income, 
UI systems help to sustain confidence of workers 
and reduce precautionary savings. In light of the 
timely, targeted and temporary nature of UI benefits 
as automatic stabilisers, a greater provision of UI 
benefits was often suggested as an effective 
stimulus aimed at consumers at the beginning of the 
crisis in 2008 (e.g. Spilimbergo et al., 2008). 
 
Table II.3.1: Income stabilisation in case of unemployment 
shock, 2008 
FEDTax StateTax SIC BEN TaxSicBen
AT 16,3 0,0 17,1 25,2 58,5
BE 24,0 0,0 12,3 24,9 61,2
DE 20,9 0,0 14,5 26,9 62,4
DK 11,6 0,0 9,2 61,5 82,3
EE 17,3 0,0 2,3 3,6 23,3
EL 9,3 0,0 15,0 7,9 32,2
ES 12,4 0,0 6,8 18,4 37,6
EU25 15,6 0,0 12,4 18,8 46,9
EA 15,0 0,0 13,3 20,2 48,5
FI 22,1 0,0 4,9 24,8 51,9
FR 7,5 0,0 19,0 30,3 56,8
HU 20,3 0,0 19,1 7,3 46,7
IE 17,8 0,0 3,6 17,3 38,7
IT 16,4 0,0 10,5 4,2 31,1
LU 12,7 0,0 8,0 38,7 59,3
NL 10,4 0,0 17,1 17,8 45,2
PL 13,4 0,0 16,6 3,0 32,9
PT 14,6 0,0 9,7 14,3 38,6
SE 19,9 0,0 2,7 45,2 67,8
SI 15,2 0,0 22,1 7,3 43,1
UK 19,1 0,0 6,1 16,3 41,5
US 17,4 4,1 5,1 7,1 33,7
Income stabilisation (% of shock absorption)
Source: Eichhorst et al., 2010; Unemployment shock refers to 
an increase in the unemployment rate by 5 pps. FEDTax – 
federal taxes; StateTax – state taxes; SIC – social insurance 
contributions; BEN – unemployment benefits; FEDTax data 
for the US include also the state taxes. 
 
Recent estimates of the automatic stabilisation 
impact of unemployment benefits are based on 
micro data. According to a study by Eichhorst et 
al. (2010) automatic stabilisers absorb 47% of an 
unemployment shock in the EU against only 34% 
in the US with social transfers (in particular 
unemployment benefits) having the highest income 
stabilisation contribution (19% in the EU and only 
7% in the US) (Table II.3.1).  (33) 
                                                          
(33) The automatic stabilisation depends on the characteristics 
of the tax and benefits system, in particular the tax and 
benefit levels, which determine the change in disposable 
income of households experiencing transition from 
employment to unemployment. In this respect, automatic 
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These results suggest that differences in the 
characteristics of the unemployment benefits imply 
different effectiveness of benefits as automatic 
stabilisers. Unemployment benefits as automatic 
stabilisers tend to be considerably stronger in 
Northern and Continental European countries than 
in the NMS and Southern European countries.  
Graph II.3.1: Net replacement rates and income 
stabilisation 
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Source: Commission services. UB – unemployment benefits. 
Data on income stabilization through UB are from Eichhorst 
et al. (2010) and provide information about the % of 
unemployment shock absorbed by UB. For the explanation 
of net replacement rates see the comment to the Graph 
II.3.2. 
 
Replacement rates appear to be positively 
associated with the smoothing impact of 
unemployment benefits and with sentiment of the 
unemployed concerning their own financial 
situation. Graph II.3.1 demonstrates a positive 
correlation between net replacement rates and 
capacity of unemployment benefits to stabilise 
income, thus confirming expectations that higher 
net replacement rates help to stabilise income of 
the unemployed. In addition, by smoothing 
consumption, higher net replacement rates help to 
support sentiments of the unemployed concerning 
their financial situation, including during cyclical 
downturns. 
                                                                                   
stabilisers can also be interpreted as the average effective tax 
rates resulting from taking up a job from unemployment. 
Graph II.3.2: Average sentiments of the unemployed and 
net replacement rate 
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(1) UB – unemployment benefits. For the explanation of net 
replacement rates see the comment to the Graph II.3.1. As 
regards the average sentiments of the unemployed 
concerning their financial situation, the corresponding 
question in the consumer survey reads as follows: "How has 
the financial situation of your household changed over the 
last 12 months?" The answer scheme is qualitative 
according to a five-option ordinal scale. Aggregate 
balances are calculated as the difference between 
positive and negative answering options, measured as pps 
of total answers. Balance values range from -100, when all 
respondents choose the most negative option, to +100, 
when all respondents choose the most positive option. 
Average sentiments of unemployed concerning their past 
financial situation are obtained from the panel data of 25 
EU countries over the period 1990Q1-2010Q2 and are 
demonstrated by country specific effects.  
Source: Joint European Commission-OECD project, using 
OECD Tax-Benefits models and EU Consumer Survey 
Evidence on EU countries over the period 1990-2010 
suggests that sentiments of the unemployed 
concerning their financial position are on average 
higher in countries with higher net replacement rates 
(Graph II.3.2). In addition, in some countries the 
generosity of unemployment benefits and the 
generosity of short time working schemes are 
substitute instruments for consumption smoothing 
(Graph II.3.3). 
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Graph II.3.3: Generosity of short-time working schemes and 
unemployment benefits 
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Source: Commission services. STW – short time work; UB – 
unemployment benefits. UB generosity over the 
unemployment spell is calculated as presented in the Table 
1, footnote c; STW generosity is calculated as the product 
between the net replacement rate and the maximum 
duration of short time work (in months) - see Arpaia et al., 
2010.  
The income smoothing property of unemployment 
benefit systems depends not only on their 
generosity but also on the composition by 
instrument and design. The income protection and 
stabilisation property of unemployment benefits to 
a large extent depends on the parameters of the 
unemployment benefit system which determine the 
effective coverage, i.e. the share of jobless people 
who are receiving unemployment benefits. These 
parameters are: 
• Duration of benefits. Longer duration of UI 
benefits and/or availability of UA on top of 
expired UI benefits ensure that stabilisation 
function is preserved in protracted recessions.  
• Entitlement criteria. Relaxed entitlement 
criteria help to stabilise income of a larger 
share of unemployed, including those with 
shorter contribution period, such as young and 
temporary workers, who are usually at higher 
risk of unemployment. In addition, extending 
the coverage of unemployment benefits to non-
standard workers can also strengthen their 
incentives to take up work. Eligibility 
conditions for non-standard workers has 
become increasingly relevant in light of the 
tendency towards a wider use of fixed-term and 
atypical contracts. Graph II.3.4 and Graph 
II.3.5 provide insight on the degree of 
disadvantage of temporary and self-employed 
workers compared to permanent workers in 
accessing unemployment benefits across EU 
countries, both in terms of eligibility and value 
of benefits received. (34) 
Graph II.3.4: Access of temporary workers to 
unemployment benefits 
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Source: Commission services, Alphametrics (2009); A degree 
of disadvantage of 100 implies that temporary workers are 
entitled to the same unemployment benefits as permanent 
workers. A value of this indicator below 100 implies a higher 
degree of disadvantage of temporary workers compared 
to permanent workers. 
 
Graph II.3.5: Access of the self-employed to 
unemployment benefits 
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(1) Alphametrics (2009); A degree of disadvantage of 100 
implies that the self-employed are entitled to the same 
unemployment benefits as permanent workers. A value of 
this indicator below 100 implies a higher degree of 
disadvantage of the self employed compared to 
permanent workers. 
Source: Commission services. 
                                                          
(34) In some countries employees must have been employed for 
at least 4 months in the past 6 months to be entitled for 
unemployment benefits, implying that workers with short 
contracts are not covered. Moreover, although eligible to 
receive unemployment benefits, the value of benefits 
received by temporary workers may be lower due to shorter 
duration of payments. 
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3.2. ADAPTING THE GENEROSITY OF 
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS OVER THE CYCLE 
There are several reasons for adapting generosity 
and eligibility conditions of unemployment benefit 
systems. Changes in the eligibility criteria during 
downturns help to operate income transfers 
towards a growing pool of unemployed, with a 
view to obtain a more effective cyclical 
stabilisation. The adaptation of eligibility is 
required also on the basis of changing composition 
of the pool of the unemployed, as in downturns a 
greater share of unemployed is likely to have short 
work history and then no entitlement to benefits. 
On the side of generosity, more generous benefits 
in downturns are justified not only because of 
stronger stabilisation needs but also because of 
weaker disincentive effects (e.g. Andersen and 
Svarer, 2009; Kiley, 2003; Sanchez, 2008). The 
risk of unemployment hystheresis (e.g. associated 
to loss of skill during unemployment) is lower in 
downturns as the share of long term 
unemployment falls. Moreover, job search effort is 
less distorted by the presence of benefits when the 
job finding rate is low, which is typically the case 
during downturns. Symmetrical arguments apply 
to recoveries.  
The adaptation of the unemployment insurance 
benefit system may also require sufficient fiscal 
space in downturns. The reason is that 
unemployment benefit expenditures are highly 
countercyclical. In this respect, during large and 
protracted recessions the collected contributions 
may not be sufficient to cover the cost of 
unemployment transfers, thus calling for either 
larger contributory rates or reduced transfers. 
Conversely, when the cycle is particularly strong, 
the reduction in the number of unemployment 
benefit recipients may justify a reduction in 
contributory rates or more generous transfers. To 
ensure stable financing of the unemployment 
insurance benefit system, its design may need to be 
adapted in such a way that savings during good 
times would create sufficient fiscal space for 
higher expenditures in bad times.  
The adaptation of the unemployment benefit 
system over the cycle may take place as a result of 
discretionary decisions by policy makers or in light 
of automatisms set in the legislation. In the former 
case, the increase or reduction in unemployment 
benefit generosity requires new legislation to be 
proposed by government and approved by 
Parliament. When the adaptation is automatic 
instead, the revision in eligibility conditions, 
replacement rates and duration is the outcome of 
already existing legislation that defines ex-ante the 
conditions under which this revision will have to 
take place. Those conditions normally consist of 
trigger variables (representing the state of the 
economic cycle) and associated changes in 
relevant unemployment benefits parameters. 
The choice of trigger variables and associated 
changes matters considerably for a successful 
implementation of automatic rules for 
unemployment benefits. Setting a trigger variable 
requires first a choice about a suitable economic 
indicator(s), which should ideally move in tandem 
with labour market conditions, thus reflecting 
timely underlying job finding conditions (e.g. 
Schwartz, 2008). It also requires setting criteria for 
automatic rules to turn on or off, usually defined in 
terms of the level or a relative change of the 
indicator. The Box II.3.1 on trigger variables 
summarises positions found in the literature.  
In practice, the use of sophisticated trigger 
variables proves problematic. In light of imperfect 
timeliness of relevant statistics and possible 
interpretation and communication difficulties it is 
difficult to choose an appropriate economic 
indicator which also captures timely the precise 
underlying labour market developments and job 
finding conditions. 
An additional difficulty is posed by the potential 
persistency of the indicator which may prevent 
automatic rules to turn on or off. In practice, 
however, the choice of a trigger variable is simpler 
than proposed in the literature as shown by US 
experience (see Box II.3.2). 
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Overall, there are pros and cons from an automatic 
adaptation of unemployment benefit generosity 
over the cycle. 
• On the one hand, an automatic adaptation: (i) 
permits to obtain a more predictable system; 
(ii) reduces the risk of hysteresis in 
unemployment benefit generosity as a result of 
the constitution of interest group; (iii) prevents 
the risks associated with decision and 
implementation lags for enacting new 
legislation. 
• On the other hand, automatic systems: (i) may 
lack credibility if automatic increases in 
generosity are likely to clash with budgetary 
objectives; (ii) require a careful design to be 
effective and sustainable without revisions; (iii) 
additional discretionary legislation may in any 
case be need to adapt unemployment benefits 
in light of structural reforms in the labour 
market, welfare, and taxation fields. 
 
 
Box II.3.1: Proposed trigger variables in the literature
In the US the generosity of the unemployment benefits is automatically adjusted over the business cycle on 
the basis of trigger variables. The literature has made different proposals for these variables.  
Schwartz (2008) proposed a trigger designed on the basis of the average duration of unemployment spells 
using a Markov Switching model to identify cyclical phases in the labour market. Benefits are extended in 
each quarter following a period of recession, defined as a period of high rates of exhaustion of UI benefit 
and low job finding probabilities. The duration is brought to the standard one, after one quarter following a 
recovery. 
Wenger and Walters (2006) suggest two triggers. A broad trigger requires an increase in the unemployment 
rate by 20% over the previous two years to activate the extension. This extension is reversed when the 
unemployment rate has returned to the level of the previous year. The trigger that turns off the automatic 
extension is increased annually by 10% to avoid benefits being paid for too long as unemployment becomes 
persistent. Alternatively, a narrow trigger requires a larger increase in the unemployment rate – i.e. by 25% 
over the previous two years - to activate the extension of benefits and faster reversal to previous duration. 
The threshold level of the unemployment rate which brings duration back to normal is increased over the 
following years, so that periods of persistent unemployment are not accompanied by too long benefit 
duration.  
Recently, Wenger and Boushey (2010) proposed a two-tier trigger system for the US. The first-tier extends 
benefits by 20 weeks when the state unemployment rate is at or above an average of 6.5% over a period of 
three-months or when it increases by 20%. The extension is withdrawn when state unemployment rate falls 
below an average of 6.5% over a three-month period and when the number of persons claiming UI returns to 
pre-recession level. If state unemployment rate rises above an average of 8.5% over a three-month period, 
the second tier is activated and benefits are automatically extended by additional 13 weeks (on top of 20 
weeks from the first tier). The second tier turns off when state unemployment rate falls below an average of 
8.5% over a three-month period. These policy triggers, however, risk of staying activated for too long if the 
unemployment rate gets persistent. 
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Not only the generosity but also the design of 
unemployment benefits needs to be adapted over 
the cycle. In particular, while in downturns the 
system needs to be designed in such a way to 
maximise its income stabilisation function, during 
economic recoveries the priority becomes that of 
minimising benefit dependence and fostering 
incentives. In this respect, it is during recoveries 
that avoiding excessive duration of benefits, 
ensuring a declining profile of transfers and 
strengthening activation policies becomes even 
more important.  
Existing literature suggests a reduction in benefit 
duration and more rapid decline of replacement 
rates over the unemployment spell during cyclical 
upswings (Sanchez, 2008 and Kiley, 2003). In 
addition, some analysis advocate lower net 
replacement rates at the beginning of the 
unemployment spell on the account of higher 
probability of finding a job (Kiley, 2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
Box II.3.2: Unemployment benefits system in the US
In the US, each state administers its own UI benefit system, setting state taxation rules, eligibility criteria, 
level and duration of benefits. The benefit system allows for the adjustment of benefit generosity over the 
cycle on the basis of a three-tiered process: 
• The regular unemployment benefit program provides regular unemployment benefits available for up to 
26 weeks.  
• The temporarily extended benefit program provides income support once regular benefits expire, up to 
additional 13 or 20 weeks, on the basis of automatic rules set with respect to the state's insured 
unemployment rate, defined on the basis of the 13-weeks moving average of the UI beneficiaries as a 
percentage to the total number of insured workers in the first four of the last six quarters. The level of 
extended benefits remains identical to those under the regular program. Extension of benefits is financed 
by both the state and the federal governments equally.  
• The temporary supplemental benefit program provides additional income support after the entitlements 
to regular and extended benefits are exhausted on the basis of an act legislated by the Congress. The 
level of benefits is identical to those under the regular and extended program while benefit extension is 
entirely financed by the federal government. 
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Most countries reformed their unemployment 
benefit systems with a view to strengthen the 
automatic stabilisers and support aggregated 
demand. Loosening the eligibility rules to increase 
the coverage of unemployment benefits, most 
notably for short-tenured displaced workers, 
increasing the replacement rates at the beginning 
of the unemployment spell and extending benefit 
duration were among the main measures that 
contributed to support income and consumption of 
jobless people. Countries with more generous 
unemployment benefits made fewer adjustments to 
the parameters of the system than countries with 
less generous benefits (Table II.4.1). 
Regarding eligibility, several countries extended 
the coverage of unemployment benefits to workers 
with short-employment history, in most cases on a 
permanent basis.   (35) Several countries took 
measures to reduce the impact of the crisis on 
future entitlements, inter alia counting the period 
of parental leave in the employment record 
(Slovakia), removing the waiting period 
requirement for receiving benefits (Spain until 
2009 and the UK) or temporarily doubling the 
contribution period in the unemployment insurance 
fund (Sweden and the UK). To extend coverage, 
individuals with short spells of unemployment 
were allowed in Portugal, Spain and Slovakia to 
receive benefits without loosing the eligibility to 
benefits for frequently loosing a job.  
Unemployment benefits were raised, in particular 
at the beginning of the unemployment spell in 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic and Poland (Graph II.4.1). 
Unemployment benefits were also increased in 
Latvia and Finland, regardless of the length of the 
unemployment spell. To avoid a fall of benefits 
following the downward wage adjustment due to 
the crisis, ad hoc adjustments were made in Latvia 
                                                          
(35) The work requirement for eligibility to unemployment 
benefit was reduced in Finland (from 43 to 34 weeks 
during the preceding 28 months), in Portugal (from 450 to 
365 days during the preceding 24 months), in France (from 
6 months during the last 22 months to 4 months during the 
last 28 months), in Latvia (from 9 months during the 
previous 12 months to 12 months during the previous 18 
months) and in Slovenia (from 12 months during the last 
18 months to 9 months during the last 24 months from 
2011 onwards). 
and Finland to the reference wage used to compute 
the unemployment benefits. (36) 
Graph II.4.1: Change in net replacement rates 
(unemployment benefits only) in the first year 
of unemployment over the period  2007 and 
2009 
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(1) For the explanation of net replacement rates see the 
comment to the Graph II.3.1. The net replacement rates 
may change when unemployment benefits are modified or 
when taxes on earnings are modified more or less than 
taxes on benefits. 
Source: Commission services; Joint European Commission-
OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefits models. 
Owing to the leveraged fiscal position, Lithuania 
reduced the amount of maximum benefit but 
increased the fixed part of UI benefits. Lump sum 
payments were given to the unemployed not 
qualifying for unemployment benefits (in Italy a 
one-off payment of 30% of previous income with a 
ceiling of 4000 € was given to displaced workers 
previously employed with a project contract work) 
or having exhausted their benefit entitlements (in 
Greece, France and Spain). 
The duration of the benefits was raised in 
Romania, Latvia and Finland – Graph II.4.2 and 
Graph II.4.3. (37) Conversely, the duration was 
                                                          
(36) In Finland, unemployment benefits are based on pre-crisis 
salaries; in Latvia, the period relevant for the calculation of 
unemployment benefits was extended from 6 to 12 months. 
In addition, in Finland, the increase in the replacement rate 
is small as it concerns only those on the "Change Security" 
system. In situations of mass dismissals and company 
closure, this system gives the right to the employees to 
individual programmes or re-employment or re-education, 
free time for job searching and counselling while still on 
the job and higher levels of benefits in the transition period. 
(37) In 2009, the duration of unemployment benefits was 
increased by 3 months for some categories of the 
unemployed in Latvia to 9 months for all unemployed 
regardless of the insurance period in Latvia (previously 
duration was dependent upon the social insurance record). 
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reduced in few countries. For example in Ireland it 
declined from 15 to 12 months (from 12 to 9 
months) for those with at least (less than) 260 days 
of paid contributions. In France, duration was 
made proportional to the affiliation period (i.e. the 
period of contribution required for eligibility), 
which was reduced to increase the coverage of 
precarious workers. (38) Duration was also 
shortened in the Czech Republic and Poland; while 
to stabilise incomes of displaced workers the initial 
level of UI benefits was increased. 
 
                                                                                   
In Lithuania UI benefits were extended by 2 months in the 
municipalities particularly hit by recession compared to the 
national average. A change in the unemployment duration 
in the Netherlands, Sweden and Italy was not related to the 
crisis. 
(38) As a result, UI benefits can now be granted in France only 
for 4 months (previously 7 months). 
Graph II.4.2: Change in the maximum unemployment 
insurance benefits duration over the period 
2007 and 2009 
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Source: Commission services. Joint European Commission-
OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefits models. 
 
 
Table II.4.1: Policy measures in EU countries, 2008Q2 – February 2010 
Policy 
measure Generosity
Policy 
measure Generosity
Policy 
measure Generosity
Policy 
measure Generosity
BE 34,13 34,13 92 x +
DK 27,23 27,23 110
PT 23,26 27,15 67 x +
FR 15,29 16,71 103 x + x +
NL 13,15 13,15 126 x +
ES 13,04 18,03 70 x + x +
FI 11,96 23,97 89 x +/- x + x +
LU 10,18 10,18 50
SE 7,31 12,08 154 x +
DE 7,13 7,13 133
EE 5,43 6,43 65
SI 5,03 5,03 25 x +
AT 4,94 37,47 90
LV 4,77 4,77 52 x + x + x +
IE 4,28 21,12 94 x - x -
IT 3,96 3,96 -- x +/-
SK 3,87 3,87 33 x +
PL 3,59 3,59 14 x - x +
HU 3,17 3,89 33
CY 2,99 2,99 78
LT 2,99 2,99 27 x - x + x +/-
GR 2,93 4,15 55 x + x +
CZ 2,85 2,85 30 x - x +
MT 1,90 21,89 155
UK 0,74 8,12 100 x +
BG 22 x +
RO 42 x +
UI and UB generosity for a single 
average wage person (22 years of 
contribution history)
UB generosity over 
the unemployment 
spell, UB=UI+UA 
(a)
UB coverage UI duration
Policy measures as regards UB coverage and generosity of UI benefits + lump sum 
payments to unemployed
Replacement rate Lump sum payments to unemployedUI generosity over the 
unemployment 
spell (a)
UB coverage 
(b)
Source: Source: Commission services, Joint European Commission-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefits models; EC/OECD 
Questionnaire on Employment and Social Policy in the Economic downturn; '"+" indicates an increase in generosity; "-" 
indicates a reduction in generosity; "+/-" indicates that both measures to increase and reduce generosity were adopted; (a) 
UB generosity and UI generosity over the unemployment spell are calculated as presented in the Table 1, though for 2007. 
Countries are ranked by UI generosity over the unemployment spell. (b) UB coverage is calculated as a ratio of 
unemployment benefit recipients to total number of registered unemployed persons. UB coverage may exceed 100 for some 
countries as part-time workers (considered as employed) may receive unemployment benefits and some persons may 
continue receiving unemployment benefits despite being de-registered as unemployed (in particular older persons). 
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Graph II.4.3: Change in the minimum unemployment 
insurance benefits duration over the period 
2007 and 2009 
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
LV RO IT CZ IE FR NL
In months
Source: Commission services. Joint European Commission-
OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefits models. 
 
Only few countries accompanied an increase in the 
generosity of benefits with stricter conditionalities 
to avoid the build up of either benefit dependency 
or incentives to early retirement. For example, 
readiness to work or training activities was 
introduced in Italy among the conditionalities for 
unemployment benefits, the waiting period for 
unemployment benefits was prolonged in 
Lithuania for months during which severance pay 
is paid, and the minimum age for receiving 
additional days of benefits after the exhaustion of 
standard benefits was increased permanently from 
59 to 60 years in Finland. Only, Ireland restricted 
eligibility criteria for new UI benefit claimants. 
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There is no single model for unemployment 
benefit systems. Countries differ considerably in 
terms of generosity (eligibility conditions, net 
replacement rates, benefit duration…), 
composition by instruments (unemployment 
insurance, unemployment assistance), and design 
(modulation of benefits over the unemployment 
spell, link of benefits to past earnings…). Those 
differences are related to the overall labour market 
and welfare policy framework and to economic, 
fiscal and employment conditions. 
Unemployment benefits involve a trade-off 
between income smoothing and economic 
efficiency which depends, however, on the features 
of the unemployment benefit system and on the 
implementation of flanking policies. The positive 
stabilisation effects of unemployment benefits may 
imply weakened incentives in the labour market. A 
series of reforms can help to ease this trade off, 
notably by re-designing the level and time profile 
of unemployment benefit replacement rates in such 
a way to tackle the issue of unemployment traps 
and benefit dependence. Activation policies aimed 
at strengthening job search efforts for benefit 
recipients can also contribute to ease the above 
trade-off. 
As stressed in the European Commission’s 2011 
Annual Growth Survey, ensuring a full use of the 
labour potential will be a key priority looking 
forward. In response to the crisis, the EERP 
recommended emergency labour market support 
measures and was successful in containing 
excessive labour shedding and sustaining the 
income and consumption of the unemployed, thus 
helping to contain the magnitude of the recession. 
Looking forward, priorities are changing. 
Although the economic outlook is becoming 
increasingly differentiated across countries, and 
therefore priority policy actions, there are a series 
of common elements. First, with growth resuming, 
the focus of budgetary policies is increasingly 
shifted to stabilising public finances. Second, 
macro and structural policies need to be conducive 
to a sustainable correction of the macroeconomic 
imbalances and to the stabilisation of financial 
markets. Third, it needs to be avoided that the past 
recession creates permanent effects on the growth 
potential. To this end, ensuring a full use of the 
labour potential is a key priority.  
Reforms in unemployment benefit systems need to 
take into account these priorities and focus on 
strengthening incentives in the labour market and 
better adapting to the cycle. The Annual Growth 
Survey calls for reforms oriented towards: (i) 
design of unemployment benefits that rewards the 
unemployed going back to work or self-
employment, including effective activation 
policies (ii) tax and benefit systems ensuring that 
work pays; (iii) unemployment insurance systems 
that adequately adapt to economic conditions. The 
Joint Employment Report also stresses the need of 
unemployment benefit systems that provide the 
right incentives to work, while ensuring income 
support and adaptability to the business cycle. 
Some examples of past reforms in unemployment 
benefit systems in EU counties show that these can 
be effective in tackling incentives. 
Most concrete options for reforms ahead fall under 
a few headings, but the associated trade-offs 
depend crucially on the specific policy context of 
countries and their economic and employment 
situation. 
• Unemployment insurance schemes need to be 
adapted to the economic cycle. A key choice is 
whether to move towards systems that adapt 
automatically the eligibility to benefits and 
their generosity on the basis of variables 
reflecting the cyclical evolution of the labour 
market or to keep those adaptations 
discretionary. The advantages in terms of 
timeliness, predictability and protection from 
vested interests from an automatic adaptation 
are likely to arise mostly for those countries 
where such systems can be implemented in a 
credible and sustainable manner, in particular 
where there is no risk of clash with budgetary 
targets and where the financing, structure, and 
design of the unemployment insurance is 
expected to stay relatively stable. 
• The design of unemployment benefit systems 
needs to address the risk of unemployment 
traps and benefit dependence. Reforms of this 
type are relevant notably for countries with 
poor design of unemployment benefit schemes, 
a serious problem of long-term unemployment, 
insufficient infrastructure to ensure effective 
activation policies over the medium term, and 
overarching budgetary consolidation needs. 
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• Reform action to tackle unemployment traps 
needs to focus on net replacement rates. 
Priority should be given to the work categories 
at higher risk. Depending on the design of 
replacement rates, unemployment traps are 
often very high for low wage earners and in 
some cases when benefits are strongly linked to 
past income they can be high also for high 
wage earners.  
• Reforms aimed at tackling benefit dependence 
should address the duration and the time profile 
of benefits over the unemployment spell. In 
some countries the duration of unemployment 
insurance is overly long; in others the issue 
mostly pertains to the duration of 
unemployment assistance. Replacement rates 
for unemployment insurance with long duration 
do not fall sufficiently in some countries. In 
other countries, with relatively short duration 
of unemployment insurance, an issue of benefit 
dependence may arise if net benefits do not fall 
sufficiently when the unemployed move from 
unemployment insurance to unemployment 
assistance. 
• Effective activation policies need to flank 
unemployment benefit systems. Only in 
relatively few countries legislation concerning 
activation policies aimed at ensuring job search 
efforts by the unemployed is absent or nearly 
absent. In most cases, increased effectiveness 
of activation policies necessitates improved 
infrastructure and implementation, including 
adequate staffing in Public Employment 
Services, profiling of benefit recipients and 
tailor-made job search conditionality, regular 
monitoring of job search, credible and 
proportionate sanctions for lack of job search 
activity or compulsory training or other 
ALMPs. 
Other additional specific reform options include: 
• Strengthening ALMPs. In countries with a 
quantitatively relevant and entrenched 
unemployment problem, governments may 
consider using public funds to finance policies 
aimed at increasing the employability of long-
term unemployed and subsidising employment. 
Training for the re-skilling and up-skilling of 
the unemployed, employment subsidies and 
direct job creation may contribute in this 
respect, subject to a regular cost-benefit 
assessment. This type of financing can partly 
be achieved by means of savings in 
unemployment benefits obtained by 
strengthening incentives during the recovery. 
Such strategies seem adequate for counties 
with a large pool of long-term unemployed, 
sufficient fiscal space, and insufficiently 
developed ALMPs. 
• Reforming the funding principle of 
unemployment insurance schemes with a view 
to increasing their portability and versatility. 
Individualised unemployment accounts 
financed by employees and/or employer 
contributions have the potential to increase the 
job-to-job portability of unemployment 
insurance schemes and to make these schemes 
more fungible, since they can be used to 
finance not only consumption during 
unemployment but also training or retirement 
income. These options appear relevant for 
countries with strong need of adjustment and 
sectoral relocation and for countries that are 
still in the phase of developing their own 
unemployment benefit system. 
• Ensuring an adequate support for the newly 
unemployed after the expiration of short-time 
working schemes currently in place. In some 
countries, the labour market support during the 
crisis came also in terms of increased use of 
STWs. These schemes allowed to subsidise 
employment while reducing hours, and to 
obtain a relatively contained increase in 
unemployment rates. They provide a temporary 
cushion, and their discontinuation is necessary 
to prevent subsidising unviable jobs and 
delaying labour reallocation (Arpaia et al., 
2010). Most STWs are currently being 
discontinued as a result of recovering economic 
activity. In some cases, however, the 
termination of these schemes will result in 
increased job destruction. Therefore, in some 
countries inflows into unemployment may still 
be relatively high for some time and the 
adjustment in the generosity of eligibility rules 
and benefits for unemployment insurance 
schemes could be delayed or raised if necessary 
and compatible with fiscal space. 
Part III 
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In the current post-recession economic 
environment, a series of EU countries need to 
adjust to country-specific shocks and at the same 
time correct significant external imbalances. The 
adjustment process differs across EU countries 
since the crisis had a largely asymmetric effect. 
Countries with larger banks' exposure and major 
housing bubbles were hit hardest by the financial 
crisis. The negative impact of the crisis also 
appears to be deeper and lasting longer in countries 
characterised by large current account deficits, in 
light of reduced external financing availability 
ensuing from a re-assessment of risks. Moreover, 
the recovery appears more problematic in the 
Member States that have to take ambitious 
consolidation measures to ensure fiscal solvency. 
The extent to which a monetary union was hit by 
major idiosyncratic shocks is probably 
unprecedented. An efficient adjustment of labour 
costs to those shocks is crucial since cost and price 
adjustment is the only way to nominal adjustment 
within a monetary union. Such nominal adjustment 
is needed to reduce both internal and external 
imbalances and to decrease rapidly the high 
unemployment that characterises some euro area 
Member States by allowing for reallocation across 
industries.  
The role of wage setting frameworks received 
attention in recent EU economic surveillance. In 
light of the overarching priority to ensure the 
rebalancing of EU economies, the Annual Growth 
Survey includes recommendations on wages. This 
is reflected where necessary in Country Specific 
Recommendations in the framework of the BEPGs 
and Employment Guidelines. "Strict and sustained 
wage moderation, including the revision of 
indexation clauses in bargaining systems" were 
recommended for countries characterised by large 
current account deficits.  
The Joint Employment Report recognises that 
"from a macroeconomic perspective, wage 
dynamics are also important for the correction of 
internal and external imbalances". Moreover, 
reforms in wage setting institutions were part of 
the reform packages agreed by countries under 
financial assistance programmes. 
Looking forward, a proper understanding of the 
interaction between labour cost developments and 
macroeconomic imbalances and the implications 
of reforms of wage setting frameworks will be key 
for a successful implementation of the Excessive 
Imbalance Procedure (EIP).  
The aim of this part of the report is threefold. First, 
it discusses the interaction between labour costs, 
price competitiveness and imbalances. Besides 
labour costs also other factors influence the 
competitiveness of a country, for example mark-
ups. However, the focus here is exclusively on 
labour costs, in order to keep the discussion 
concise. Second, it proposes analytical benchmarks 
in order to assess the role of labour cost 
developments in driving price competitiveness and 
imbalances. Third, it discusses the role of 
government policies and wage setting institutions 
in triggering labour cost developments and shaping 
the responsiveness of wages to shocks. 
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2.1. LABOUR COST DEVELOPMENTS AS 
COMPETITIVENESS SHOCKS 
Exogenous shocks to labour costs affect both 
internal and external imbalances. The effect on 
internal imbalances is relatively straightforward, 
because labour costs directly influence the level of 
employment. Generally, labour cost shocks arising 
from the government's tax or wage policies (public 
sector wages, minimum wages) or from collective 
bargaining (e.g. a "wage push" linked to changed 
bargaining power of wage setters) may create or 
aggravate internal imbalances. Whether labour cost 
developments increase internal imbalances is 
usually assessed by looking at unit labour costs: 
imbalances are thought to increase if nominal 
labour costs increase much above or decrease 
much below productivity.  
The impact of labour costs on external imbalances 
is more difficult to assess, because their connection 
is less direct. Exogenous developments in labour 
costs affect price competitiveness and therefore the 
trade balance and the current account. Labour cost 
shocks, if not offset by productivity developments, 
mark-up reductions and matched in partner 
countries, have implications for price 
competitiveness as measured by the ULC-based 
REER. This would increase (fall) for shocks 
leading to higher (lower) unit labour costs, thus 
leading to a worsening (improvement) of the trade 
balance and therefore the current account balance.  
A worsening competitiveness position has clear 
implications for the current account balance. 
Graph III.2.1, displays a clear negative relationship 
between percentage changes in the ULC-based 
REER and changes in the current account over 
GDP ratio for euro area countries since 1999. 
However, this negative relationship cannot be 
interpreted as price competitiveness changes 
causing current account movements, since several 
other factors are important as well. For example as 
EC (2007) points out, the changing dynamics in 
risk premia and real interest rates and softened 
lending standards were among the main drivers of 
growing current account imbalances in the euro 
area in this period. In particular, absorption booms 
in countries receiving net capital inflows were 
followed by overheating and stronger inflation 
dynamics, resulting in competitiveness losses. 
Graph III.2.1: Changes in REER and in current account 
balance, euro area, 1999-2007 
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Source: Commission services. 
The direct impact of price competitiveness shocks 
on current account balances depends on trade 
openness and differs across countries. Assuming 
that the whole change in ULCs is translated into 
final prices (perfect pass-though from costs to 
prices), the partial equilibrium impact of the REER 
on the current account can be approximated by 
current account semi-elasticities.  
Graph III.2.2: Current account semi-elasticities 
 
Source: Salto and Turrini (2010). 
Graph III.2.2 displays recent estimates of long-
term current account elasticities for EU countries. 
A 1% increase in the REER appears to bring about 
a reduction in the current account balance / GDP 
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ratio of between ½ a point and 1 and ½ a point. (39) 
The current account reacts more to price 
competitiveness when the price elasticity of trade 
flows is higher and the economy is more open to 
trade.  
The overall impact of labour cost changes on the 
current account depends on other transmission 
channels and general equilibrium interactions as 
well. Exogenous changes in labour costs or labour 
taxes affect current account balances also via 
channels different than their effect on price 
competitiveness. For instance, positive aggregate 
demand effects associated with cuts in the tax 
wedge may reduce the saving-investment balance, 
thus offsetting the impact on the trade balance 
arising from the reduction in unit labour costs and 
the associated price competitiveness improvement. 
2.2. MARKET-DRIVEN LABOUR COST ADJUSTMENT 
Labour cost adjustments are important channels 
through which an economy adjusts to aggregate 
shocks. Therefore market-driven differentials in 
wage inflation across countries are natural and 
contribute to the correction of cyclical divergences 
in monetary unions. If a shock drives the output 
gap in a given country much above (below) that in 
other members of a monetary union, weaker 
(stronger) labour cost pressures lead to an 
improvement (deterioration) of price 
competitiveness and then to stronger (weaker) 
growth via net exports. In this respect, the market-
driven adjustment of labour costs contributes to the 
automatic correction of internal imbalances and is 
perceived as a key equilibrating mechanism in 
monetary unions (European Commission, 2007b). 
However, the working of this automatic 
equilibrating mechanism can be mitigated by other 
factors, such as a labour force shock due to 
immigration. In any case, reforms that permit a 
prompt response of labour costs and prices are 
often advocated as key for a better functioning of 
the euro area adjustment mechanism. Graph III.2.3 
depicts the expected positive relation between 
price competitiveness changes and output gaps 
across euro-area countries. 
                                                          
(39) It needs to be stressed that estimates of current account 
elasticities are notoriously uncertain due to well-known 
difficulties in estimating trade elasticities (e.g. Imbs and 
Mejean, 2011). 
Graph III.2.3: Changes in REER and output gaps in current 
account balance, euro area, 1999-2007 
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The market-based adjustment of labour costs to 
external imbalances is less obvious. The dynamics 
of labour costs within monetary unions is driven 
by a complex set of factors and an automatic 
adjustment to external imbalances via the market 
mechanism is not granted. As stressed in the 
previous section, labour cost developments may 
even be positively correlated with current account 
deficits if both are driven by domestic demand 
booms (ensuing, for instance, from looser financial 
conditions). 
Neither is labour cost adjustment to internal 
imbalances necessarily consistent with the 
correction of external imbalances. It could be the 
case that the automatic adjustment mechanism to 
cyclical divergences (internal imbalances) 
contributes to a widening rather than to a 
correction of current account imbalances. The 
domestic demand boom that took place before the 
2008 crisis in several peripheral euro-area 
countries was associated with output gaps above 
those recorded on average in the euro area and by 
positive inflation differentials. The loss in 
competitiveness associated with above-average 
growth rate of prices helped to cool down the 
overheating via falling net exports. This happened, 
however, at the expense of growing current 
account imbalances. Conversely, at the current 
juncture adjustment to cyclical divergences in a 
series of euro-area countries that are characterised 
by protracted recessions or stagnation (e.g. Greece, 
Spain, Portugal) would imply recovery via net 
exports and correction of current account deficits 
that were accumulated in the past. 
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Apart from the adjustment in overall labour costs, 
relative labour costs play a relevant role in the 
correction of current account balances. On the one 
hand, what ultimately matters for international 
price competitiveness is the relative price of the 
goods and services that are traded. In this respect, 
price competitiveness gains do not necessarily 
require major changes in overall labour costs if 
labour costs developments in tradable activities are 
supportive of adjustment. On the other hand, by 
looking only at relative labour costs in tradable 
activities compared with foreign partners, a key 
element is missing: the so-called "internal real 
exchange rate". For a successful rebalancing 
process, resources need to be shifted from non-
tradable to tradable goods and services. If wages 
remain high in the non-tradable sector this process 
cannot take place. In this respect, falling relative 
wages in the non-tradable versus the tradable 
sector favour the correction of current account 
deficits. 
2.3. THE RELEVANCE OF SUPPORTIVE WAGE 
DEVELOPMENTS FOR THE ADJUSTMENT OF 
EXTERNAL IMBALANCES 
Current account deficits are the result of 
exogenous trends in price competitiveness or 
excessively buoyant demand conditions. In the 
latter case, price competitiveness developments 
interact in a relevant fashion as growth in domestic 
absorption has implications for inflation 
differentials. If current account deficits adjust as a 
result of capital flights and the reassessment of 
financial risks, adjustment on the quantity side will 
be accompanied by a major contraction in 
economic activity and unemployment. Similar 
effects on economic activity will result from 
policies aimed at keeping the growth rate of 
domestic demand under control. Consistent price 
competitiveness developments are part of the 
recipe for engineering a rapid adjustment in 
competitiveness and a recovery in employment. In 
absence of such competitiveness adjustment, 
subdued economic activity and high 
unemployment will be persistent, with large social 
costs. Symmetrically, countries with large and 
persistent current account surpluses may want to 
correct such imbalances to de-cumulate risky 
foreign assets and ensure a smoother pattern of 
consumption across time periods and generations. 
Adjusting current account deficits requires not 
only keeping under control the growth rate of 
domestic demand (which would resume as the 
economy recovers), but also putting in place 
adequate expenditure-switching policies which 
require restoring relative prices to a pre-boom, pre-
deficit situation. Actually, the correction in relative 
prices might even have to target a more ambitious 
benchmark, in light of accumulated net foreign 
liabilities and the associated increased net foreign 
income deficit. As mentioned previously, market-
based wage adjustment can help in this respect but 
it may not be sufficient. Other policy tools to 
support the adjustment of wages and prices and to 
foster productivity growth might be needed. In 
particular, those policies aimed at avoiding an 
overdevelopment of the non-tradable sector in any 
economy should be seriously considered. This 
implies fiscal policy (fiscal incentives), human 
capital investment and financial sector regulation 
among the most important. 
The effective use of policies requires a proper 
understanding of ongoing labour cost 
developments and of the impact of policy tools on 
labour cost outcomes. Current trends in wages may 
or may not be in line with adjustment to internal 
and external imbalances. Having appropriate 
analytical tools to assess wage developments is the 
first requirement for effective policy intervention. 
The second requirement is a proper understanding 
of the transmission channels and the quantitative 
impact of policy measures affecting labour costs. 
3. ASSESSING AGGREGATE WAGE DEVELOPMENTS 
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3.1. BENCHMARKING LABOUR COST 
DEVELOPMENTS 
In order to assess whether labour costs grew too 
fast or too slow in a Member State labour cost 
growth has to be compared to appropriate 
benchmarks. This section uses three benchmarks 
for such an assessment while focusing on the 
following three questions. Are labour cost 
developments consistent with effective labour 
market matching and with an efficient use of 
labour inputs? Is the growth in labour costs 
compatible with orderly developments in price 
competitiveness? Are labour cost developments 
consistent with standard responses to 
fundamentals?  
The three benchmarks are the following: (40) 
• Real compensation per employee growth in 
line with productivity growth. 
• Nominal compensation per employee growth in 
line with the maintenance of price 
competitiveness, i.e. consistent with a constant 
ULC-based REER. 
• Nominal compensation per employee growth 
consistent with estimated wage equations.  
The productivity growth benchmark embodies an 
equilibrium condition (Cobb-Douglas production 
function with constant returns to scale) and 
provides grounds for a normative assessment. If 
this requirement is satisfied then there is evidence 
that labour cost developments are consistent with 
matching between demand and labour supply and 
with a fair and efficient allocation of resources. 
This condition implies indeed that labour costs 
grow broadly in line with labour demand and that 
labour is rewarded in proportion to its contribution 
to value added growth. Therefore this benchmark 
can signal internal imbalances. 
Some caveats are in order. First, the condition 
refers to microeconomic properties of labour 
markets: labour market matching is supported if 
                                                          
(40) These benchmarks are not specifically aimed at 
operationalising EIP surveillance and that they are not 
directly linked to thresholds of the EIP scoreboard. 
the equality of real labour cost and productivity 
holds across industries, firms, geographical areas, 
occupation. Second, the above properties regarding 
efficiency and distribution hold under the 
assumption of perfect competition, constant returns 
to scale in production, and factor neutral 
technological progress, which implies that relevant 
deviations from those assumptions may render the 
equality between real labour cost and productivity 
growth less meaningful. Third, temporary 
deviations from the equality of real labour cost and 
labour productivity growth may be desirable in 
several instances: the need to offset previous 
discrepancies between real labour cost and 
productivity levels, the need to ensure the effective 
and rapid absorption of unemployment, the need to 
rapidly correct potentially harmful and 
unsustainable external imbalances.  
The fourth caveat is computational, since the 
standard output-per-employee measures neglect 
the phenomenon of labour hoarding during the 
cycle and adjustment on the extensive margin by 
reducing or increasing working hours. Moreover, 
Short Term Working Schemes whereby 
employment is maintained although producing 
lower output via subsidized schemes is not 
captured by output-per-employees measures. To 
account for the above phenomena, both output per 
employee and output per hour worked could be 
used as alternative measures of labour 
productivity, but available series are generally 
shorter and available with lags. An additional issue 
is the endogeneity of the labour productivity 
measure. (41) This is often addressed by resorting 
to a different measure of productivity, namely the 
share of labour in Total Factor Productivity (TFP), 
which represents a proxy of labour productivity in 
the long-term, along a balanced growth path 
(European Commission, 2007a). In light of the 
well-known measurement issues with TFP, and 
because of the strong assumption that countries are 
evaluated on a balanced growth path (assumption 
hardly satisfied for catching up economies) this 
route was not followed in the present report. 
                                                          
(41) The issue arises because comparing meaningfully real 
wages to labour productivity requires that two being 
independent. However, since labour productivity depends 
on labour intensity of production techniques which depends 
in turn on wages, an endogeneity issue arises. 
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The constant ULC-based REER benchmark 
compares actual nominal labour cost growth to the 
hypothetical labour cost growth that would leave 
the ULC-based REER constant. This hypothetical 
labour cost growth assumes that labour 
productivity is unchanged as well as unit labour 
costs in partner countries, and requires the 
variation in the REER to be offset by a variation in 
nominal labour costs.  
This benchmark has no clear normative 
implications. It just permits to assess whether, 
keeping labour productivity and unit labour costs 
developments in partner countries unchanged, 
developments in nominal wage and non wage 
labour costs are in line with the maintenance of 
price competitiveness, and therefore in this respect 
not harmful for external imbalances. The meaning 
of this benchmark is that of a consistency check 
and its usefulness is that it can separate the role of 
productivity and unit labour costs in foreign 
countries from those of labour cost per employee 
developments. It needs to be stressed that constant 
price competitiveness is a neutral benchmark 
which is chosen for convenience, and that 
desirable price competitiveness developments need 
not imply constancy of the REER in light of the 
need to correct existing imbalances, Balassa-
Samuelson-driven equilibrium appreciation trends.  
The wage equation benchmark takes into account 
the response of labour costs to main determinants 
such as inflation, labour productivity, 
unemployment, and that distinguishes between 
short and long-term dynamics. The aim of this 
benchmark is to assess whether labour cost 
developments observed in a given country and 
time period were in line with what would be 
predicted on the basis of fundamentals or whether 
some temporary or structural factors (policy or 
market driven) played in the sense of promoting 
exceptionally high or low labour cost growth. 
 
 
Box III.3.1: Are real wages growing in line with productivity sufficient to avoid price 
competitiveness losses?
Real wages growing in proportion with labour productivity throughout the economy indicate that
labour demand equals supply. Under some conditions (constant returns to scale, perfect
competitions, factor-neutral technological progress, no change in the tax wedge…) this implies
that: (i) wages grow in line with labour demand; (ii) labour receives its contribution to value
added; (ii) the wage share remains constant; (iii) real unit labour costs (RULC) remains constant.  
The proportionality of real wages and productivity is however not sufficient for stable
developments in REERs. Price competitiveness may change either because in partner counties real
wages do not follow productivity or because of inflation differentials. Large and persistent
inflation differentials are normally the result of different monetary conditions across countries.
Hence, in a monetary union, real wages growing in line with productivity in all members are
normally helpful to create the conditions for orderly competitiveness developments. However,
even this is not a sufficient condition for stable competitiveness developments (as measured by
ULC-based REERs) for a series of reasons: (i) different intensity of trade with non-euro area
countries characterized by different monetary conditions and floating nominal exchange rates; (ii)
demand-driven inflation differences arising from cyclical divergences; (iii) inflation differences
linked to asymmetric sectoral productivity developments (Balassa-Sameulson effects) and to
catching up dynamics (changing comparative advantage, improvements in product quality…). 
It needs to be stressed that the appreciation of ULC-based REERs does not always signal 
competitiveness problems. If a country has a stronger relative productivity growth in the tradable 
compared with partner countries, the REER would appreciate due to rising wages throughout the 
economy, but without significant implications for the export performance, since in the tradable 
sector productivity and wage dynamics would offset each other (necessarily so, because cross-
border differences in the prices of tradables are limited by international competition and 
arbitrage). 
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This benchmark is estimated by a macroeconomic 
wage regression. The regression explains nominal 
labour cost growth with inflations, growth in 
labour productivity and changes in the 
unemployment rate. A limited number of variables 
was chosen for the regression, because the aim is 
not to explain wage growth in each country as 
much as possible, but rather to see whether wage 
growth in a country is consistent with the  
The specification can be regarded as a reduced 
form supply-demand system for the labour market. 
It also assumes that in case of a shock labour cost 
growth converges on the long run to the 
equilibrium predicted by these fundamentals. 
Technically a panel error-correction model is 
estimated, which is described in detail in the 
Appendix. The panel was chosen, because it 
provides more robust estimates. 
Graphs III.A3.1 and III.A3.2 compare real 
compensation per employee growth to the labour 
productivity benchmark. As expected, real labour 
cost growth follows quite closely labour 
productivity growth in most countries. In line with 
expectations, it is also observed that after the 
crisis, the reduction in real labour cost growth is 
not as dramatic as that of labour productivity, as a 
result of temporary labour hoarding. Before the 
crisis, some countries like Austria and Germany 
were characterised by real labour cost growth 
below productivity, while the opposite took place 
in other countries e.g. Ireland.  
Graphs III.A3.3 and III.A3.4 display the growth in 
nominal compensation per employee and the ULC-
based REER benchmark. Differences between the 
actual nominal compensation growth and this 
benchmark are often remarkable. This is for 
several reasons, including the fact that in some 
cases changes in REER are also linked to nominal 
exchange rate developments and that the 
assumption of a constant REER is a demanding 
one. The positions of most Member States of the 
EU15 improved before 2000 since actual labour 
cost growth was lower than that implied by a 
constant REER. The UK and Portugal were 
notable exceptions to this pattern. However, after 
2000 many countries experienced competitiveness 
losses, including Denmark, Spain, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, when labour cost growth exceeded the 
constant REER rate. In the new Member States 
labour cost growth generally exceeded the constant 
REER benchmark between 1995 and 2010, except 
for Cyprus, Poland and Slovenia. 
Graphs III.A3.5 and III.A3.6 show the growth in 
nominal compensation per employee and the 
predictions from wage equations. (42) Until 2008, 
labour cost growth was lower than that predicted 
by the fundamentals in Austria, Spain, Finland, 
Slovakia and in Germany after 2003, while in the 
UK and Hungary labour cost growth was 
consistently higher than that predicted by the 
fundamentals. Predicted nominal labour cost 
growth falls considerably after the crisis. This 
pattern is fairly consistent with that resulting from 
the labour productivity benchmark, although 
predicted labour cost developments appear in this 
case less volatile. With this benchmark, the fall in 
labour costs after the crisis is further justified by 
rising unemployment. 
These results show that different labour cost 
benchmarks provide complementary information. 
These differences, nevertheless, can help 
identifying ex-post the role of labour cost 
developments in driving competitiveness. 
Moreover, the reading of labour cost benchmarks 
should not be mechanistic. The information 
provided by the different benchmarks should use 
instead to shape a view on the role of labour costs 
in the evolution of competitiveness.  
In some cases all benchmarks point to a similar 
role of labour costs in shaping macroeconomic 
imbalances. For instance, in the case of Germany, 
all benchmarks confirm that in the second part of 
the 2000s moderate labour cost growth contributed 
to the reduction of the REER; symmetrically, in 
the case of Latvia, all benchmarks reveal a role for 
exceptionally strong labour cost growth in driving 
the deterioration of competitiveness in the second 
half of the 2000s.  
In other cases, indications from different 
benchmarks may differ. For example, in the mid 
2000s, labour cost growth appears to have been 
above one compatible with stable competitiveness 
for Ireland and Slovakia. However, such labour 
cost growth in both countries appears in line with 
                                                          
(42) The predictions include fixed effects: country-specific 
constants.  These can be interpreted as structural elements 
explaining wage growth in each country on top of inflation, 
labour productivity, and unemployment and the error 
correction term. 
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what explained by fundamentals, as revealed by 
the benchmark based on the estimation of wage 
equations, and in the case of Slovakia also broadly 
in line with productivity growth.  
An overall assessment of labour cost developments 
needs to look at a broader set of variables and 
cannot be limited to the benchmarks outlined 
above. Other aspects that could be included in the 
analysis are labour force shocks (for example, 
immigration) and the change in the sectoral 
structure of the economy Furthermore, 
disaggregated labour cost data would permit to 
decompose aggregate developments between 
common trends and composition effects. An 
assessment of trends at sectoral level appears 
necessary in several respects: (i) distinguishing 
between government vs private sector dynamics; 
(ii) assessing whether labour cost dynamics 
between tradable and non-tradable sectors are 
supportive of the reallocation of resources 
necessary for the rebalancing of the economies; 
(iii) assessing whether labour cost developments 
are supportive of the growth of the most dynamic 
export sectors. An analysis of labour cost 
developments at sub-national level is relevant 
especially for the assessment of the response of 
labour costs to local unemployment conditions. 
Firm-level data are helpful to measure the response 
of labour costs to productivity conditions at the 
level of the firm. A decomposition of labour cost 
data by education and skills of the workforce 
permits to control for effects arising from changing 
composition of employment. 
3.2. UNIT LABOUR COSTS AND PRICE 
COMPETITIVENESS DEVELOPMENTS 
ACROSS EU COUNTRIES 
Next to the assessment of labour cost 
developments another frequent policy question is 
how labour costs influence competitiveness. As it 
was discussed in chapter 3.1 unit labour costs 
(ULCs) are usually used to assess this relationship. 
The ULC is the ratio of compensation per 
employee and real output per the number of 
employed. Therefore the evolution of the ULCs 
depends both on nominal labour cost developments 
and on productivity. Since it compares nominal 
cost to a real variable ULC developments also 
indicate whether price stability is maintained in a 
country or not. 
Graph III.A3.7 and III.A3.8 show ULC index 
numbers for Member States and therefore provide 
information on the cumulative growth rates in 
labour cost conditions compared to a base year.   
ULCs (solid line) were growing in all EU countries 
since 2000, with the exceptions of Germany and 
Poland. In all countries, nominal compensation per 
employee grew faster than productivity, except 
Germany and Poland, where nominal labour costs 
rose broadly at the same pace as productivity 
(dashed line). In some euro-area countries (e.g. 
Spain, Italy, Portugal), rising ULCs were to a 
greater extent the result of stagnating labour 
productivity, while in others (notably Ireland) 
strong productivity growth contributed to contain 
ULC dynamics. In most New Member States 
stronger labour productivity growth is normally 
overshadowed by an even higher growth of 
nominal labour costs, a phenomenon consistent 
with Balassa-Samuelson effects and structural 
change during catching up. 
Graph III.3.1: REER and unit labour cost growth rates 
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Source: Commission services. 
Stronger ULC growth is normally associated with 
price competiveness losses, as measured by the 
real effective exchange rate (REER). The 
relationship between the growth in the REER and 
the ULC is however less than perfect, as price 
competitiveness as measured by the real exchange 
rate is driven also by developments in competitor 
countries (Graph III.3.1). Moreover, REER 
developments appear to be more strongly 
associated to dynamics in overall price levels than 
to changes in real unit labour costs (Graphs 
III.A3.9, III.A3.10). This suggests that real labour 
costs growing above or below productivity have no 
straightforward implications for the REER. 
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Overall, differences in ULC growth are driven to a 
large extent by inflation differentials associated 
with catching up dynamics, financial development 
and integration, and different monetary and 
exchange rate arrangements. This is especially the 
case for differences across New Member States 
and between New Member States and the rest of 
EU countries. To some extent, also within the euro 
area inflation differentials were driven by catching 
up dynamics, but credit dynamics associated with 
the reduction of risk premia played a relevant role. 
In some instances, however, policy frameworks 
affecting productivity and labour cost 
developments may have played a role. For 
instance, productivity differences across euro area 
countries are to some extent the result of quality 
and quantity differences in infrastructure and 
education and research facilities and staff, and 
different degree of specialisation in dynamic 
sectors. Different policy frameworks also affected 
ULCs via labour cost developments (e.g. the 
sustained episodes of wage moderation in 
Germany and Poland). 
4. GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND LABOUR COST 
DEVELOPMENTS 
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4.1. GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND 
REGULATION AFFECTING LABOUR COSTS 
The analysis of labour cost developments in the 
previous chapter did not take into account 
government policies explicitly. However, policy 
decisions affect labour cost dynamics both directly 
and indirectly. An proper assessment of labour cost 
developments has to look at these effects as well. 
First, there are government policies with an almost 
direct impact on wage developments: 
• Wage and employment in the public sector. 
Wages in the government sector spill over to a 
certain extent to the private sector and, in 
absence of other mechanism of wage co-
ordination and in presence of a large public 
sector may play a role of wage leadership. 
Government employment decisions can 
indirectly contribute to wage demands in the 
private sector, as the bargaining power of 
unions and workers is higher when government 
absorbs a relevant share of the workforce. 
• The definition of statutory minimum wages. 
Minimum wages aim at guaranteeing a "fair" 
wage also in low pay employment and to 
address cases in which workers are in a weak 
position vis-a-vis employers with significant 
bargaining power. In spite of generally being 
significantly below actual wages, they squeeze 
the lower end of the wage distribution and 
minimum wage changes may play a signalling 
role for contractual wages. 
• The introduction of statutory wage indexation 
systems. Wage indexation may induce real 
wage rigidity, thus hampering the absorption of 
unemployment in the presence of real shocks 
(e.g. Fischer, 1977). If wage indexation 
mechanisms do not take into account inflation 
linked to changes in the terms of trade (notably, 
changing prices of imported energy), second-
round inflation effects may aggravate 
competitiveness losses. 
• Social security contributions and direct labour 
taxation. Higher non-labour costs correspond to 
increased ULCs in the short-to-medium term. 
In the longer run, net wages adjustments 
partially compensate for the increased tax 
wedge. 
Second, there are also government regulations and 
policies that affect wage responsiveness in a more 
indirect way. These are the unemployment benefit 
system and employment protection legislation 
(EPL). Although they may have an impact on the 
level of wages, this impact is likely to be rather 
indirect and uncertain. These labour market 
institutions may instead play a more relevant role 
as framework conditions shaping the extent to 
which wages respond to fundamental determinants 
via the market mechanism and collective 
bargaining: 
• The generosity of unemployment benefits. 
Higher replacement rates and especially longer 
duration of unemployment benefits may reduce 
labour supply and increase the bargaining 
power of unions and workers, thus leading to 
higher wages. Generous unemployment benefit 
replacement rates and duration may also affect 
the responsiveness of real wages to 
unemployment, as the cost associated with 
higher wage demands in terms of increased risk 
of unemployment is mitigated by benefit 
generosity (e.g. Peeters and den Reijer, 2003); 
• Employment protection regulation. It is often 
argued that generous EPL may translate into 
lower wages in light of the so-called “bonding” 
argument: employers are induced to shift onto 
workers the cost of generous severance 
payments or cumbersome dismissal procedures. 
In general, EPL raises the effective cost of 
labour, thereby reducing job creation and 
labour demand and thereby translating into 
lower wages for a given level of “all-inclusive“ 
labour costs. EPL also affects the 
responsiveness of wages. It has been argued 
that high EPL shifts the power between the 
insiders and outsiders to the labour market.  
High EPL raises the bargaining power of the 
employed and therefore their ability to resist 
wage moderation. This makes it more difficult 
to replace currently employed workers with 
low-wage outsiders, which  leads to downward 
wage rigidity (Holden, 2004). 
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The evidence supports the view that government 
wages directly affect private wage dynamics. 
Graph III.4.1 shows that a series of euro area 
countries that had the largest growth in private 
wages in the past decade were those exhibiting the 
largest positive gap between government and 
private wage dynamics. This prima-facie evidence 
is confirmed by several empirical studies (for 
example Lamo, Perez and Schuhknecht, 2008; 
Holm-Halluda et al., 2010) that report strong 
correlation between public and private sector 
wages. Moreover, European Commission (2008) 
and Perez and Sanchez (2010) also find evidence 
that public sector wages affect private sector 
wages through "demonstration effects", that is by 
influencing the outcome of private wage 
agreements taking place after a change in public 
sector wages. The magnitude of the effects of 
government wage growth on private wage 
developments is likely to depend considerably on 
government size, as with a large government sector 
demonstration effects are stronger, and the impact 
on the bargaining power of workers more 
pronounced. Finally, it has to be mentioned that 
the impact of wages signed in public companies 
and in the private companies that operate in the 
same sector as public companies is also crucial for 
private sector wage developments. 
Graph III.4.1: Growth gap between compensation per 
employee in public and private sectors 
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Minimum wages affect actual wages via different 
channels. Graph III.4.2 shows that the correlation 
between nominal wages and statutory minimum 
wages (lagged 3 years) is strong. More rigorous 
empirical evidence from aggregate series supports 
the view that minimum wages may perform a 
coordination role and drive overall wage 
developments. (43) Analysis on disaggregate data 
permits to decompose the effect of minimum 
wages in two elements: (i) the truncation of the 
lower end of the wage distribution, (ii) effects 
spilling over higher up in the wage distribution 
("spillovers" or "ripple effects"). Most studies find 
a spike at the minimum wage in the wage 
distribution (e.g. Card and Kruger, 1995, Di 
Nardo, Fortin and Lemieux, 1996; Stewart and 
Swaffield, 2002), and several studies  provide also 
evidence for spillover effects for employees whose 
wage is close to the minimum (e.g. Manning, 
2003; Neumark, Schweitzer and Wascher, 
2004). (44) This evidence supports the view that 
minimum wages may perform a coordination role 
and drive wage developments close to the 
minimum wage, although the effect is largely 
country-specific, depending inter-alia on the 
overall wage setting framework and on the extent 
to which minimum wages are binding in light of 
their level and design. 
Graph III.4.2: Minimum wages and compensation per 
employee 
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Source: Eurostat. 
Changes in social security contributions and labour 
taxes are likely to have a strong impact on ULCs. 
Graph III.4.3 shows that nominal labour costs per 
employee tend to grow broadly in the same 
proportion as the tax burden on labour. Although 
                                                          
(43) Gramlich (1976) estimates the elasticity of the average 
wage to the minimum wage in a Phillips curve equation 
and reports an elasticity of 0.027. Elasticities estimated in 
other similar studies are also fairly low. 
(44) Neumark, Schweitzer and Wascher (2004) estimate an 
elasticity of actual wages to the minimum wage of 0.8 for 
workers less than 10 per cent above the minimum that 
gradually declines to 0.4 for the a wage between 10 and 30 
percent above the minimum and to 0.15 for 1.5 to 2 times 
the minimum. 
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the scatterplot is not to be interpreted as causation 
(the tax burden being linked to labour 
compensations) it suggests that a substantial part 
of the tax wedge adds to labour costs rather than 
being shifted onto workers in terms reduced net 
wages. Evidence on the impact of the tax wedge on 
total compensation costs (reviewed, inter-alia, by 
Nickell and Layard, 1999, and Daveri and 
Tabellini, 2000) indicate that in the short run 
labour taxes are passed on to workers only to a 
minor extent. However, it is unclear whether this 
holds in the long run as well: Layard et al. (1991) 
and Nickell (2004) argue that real wage absorb 
these tax changes. Azemar and Desbordes (2010) 
provide evidence that wage bargaining institutions 
influence the long run response and in countries: 
with low wage bargaining coordination, about half 
of non-wage labour costs are shifted by to 
employees, while in high coordination countries 
the shift is almost complete. 
Graph III.4.3: Tax burden on labour and labour costs 
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Source: OECD. 
The extent to which changes in government wages, 
minimum wages, tax wedges affect price 
competitiveness and imbalances depends on a 
number of factors. Assuming that these policies 
produce a significant impact on labour costs, the 
ultimate effect on imbalances depend on a number 
of conditions being in place: 
• First, changes in unit labour costs need to 
translate into final prices rather than being 
mostly absorbed by cost-price mark-ups; 
• Second, employment and employment 
composition effects may have repercussions on 
labour productivity thus possibly offsetting, via 
this channel, the impact on unit labour costs;  
• Third, the impact on price competitiveness 
depends on accompanying policies. For 
instance, in the relevant case of tax wedge cuts, 
budgetary neutrality could be achieved in 
different ways, and whether revenues are raised 
or expenditures cut, and which type of 
alternative revenues are used to compensate for 
the tax wedge cut matters for the overall impact 
on price competitiveness (e.g. European 
Commission, 2009); 
• Fourth, general equilibrium effects play a role. 
In addition to the mechanic partial equilibrium 
effect of price competitiveness on the trade 
balance and therefore the current account, it 
needs to be taken into account that these 
policies affect consumption, investment and the 
budget balance with non-trivial and possibly 
relevant implications for the current account. 
Still in the case of cuts in the tax wedge, the 
associated boost in consumption and 
investment tends to reduce the savings-
investment balance, thereby offsetting the 
positive impact on the current account arising 
from trade balance developments linked to 
price competitiveness improvements. 
4.2. THE ROLE OF THE WAGE BARGAINING 
SYSTEM 
Government may also promote reforms in the 
wage bargaining system with a view to affect 
labour cost developments. Since wage outcomes 
are driven by the market mechanism and by 
bargaining institutions that the government can 
only partly control and shape, reforms will consist 
of a mix of legislative acts defining the broad 
framework for collective bargaining and a dialogue 
to influence the practice followed by social 
partners. 
A series of aspects of the collective bargaining 
framework may have a bearing on wage outcomes. 
First of all, wage bargaining may either be highly 
decentralised (taking place mostly at firm level), 
highly centralised (wage formation at national 
level) or may take at an intermediate level, 
normally at the level of sectors, an in some cases at 
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the level of regions or occupations. Aggregate 
wage developments depend to some extent on the 
extent of centralisation because this matters for the 
bargaining power of wage setters and for the extent 
to which wage bargaining takes into account 
national-level objectives. Moreover, centralisation 
matters for the extent to which wages can reflect 
differences in productivity across sectors and firms 
and labour market conditions across geographical 
areas. Some economic theories (e.g. Calmfors and 
Driffill, 1998) predict that the worst case for wage 
moderation is when bargaining centralisation is 
intermediate (typically, bargaining taking place at 
sectoral level): in this case unions may have 
substantial bargaining power while not fully 
internalising the aggregate implications of their 
wage demands; 
Secondly, the degree of coordination also matters 
for the extent to which wage dynamics could be 
consistent with macroeconomic objectives. 
Horizontal co-ordination (across sectors) could be 
either explicit ("peak-level" coordination involving 
bilateral or tripartite agreements or social pacts) or 
implicit, achieved by means of regular interaction 
among sectoral trade unions or the existence of 
phenomena of "wage leadership" and "pattern 
bargaining" (some sectors or confederations 
driving the outcome in the rest of the economy). 
Vertical co-ordination (across bargaining levels) 
also affects overall wage outcomes; in most EU 
countries this is ensured by the legal enforceability 
of collective contracts and the so-called 
"favourability principle" whereby lower levels of 
bargaining an only improve upon conditions 
established at higher level. For a given degree of 
centralisation, more effective coordination helps in 
achieving macroeconomic goals (stabilising 
inflation, tackling unemployment, correcting 
external imbalances). In particular, since the 
decisions related to wage contract renegotiation are 
characterised by a high degree of interdependency, 
uncoordinated wage setting frameworks may lead 
to wage inertia in the presence of aggregate shocks 
(Ball and Romer, 1991); 
Thirdly, wage outcomes are also affected by the 
bargaining coverage, namely, the extent to which 
employees are covered by collective bargaining, 
which in turn largely depends on the presence and 
use of extension mechanisms, which permit 
bargained wages are extended to firms that are not 
part of contracting organisations. Extension 
mechanisms provide a level playing field for firms 
belonging to the same employers’ organisation. At 
the same time, the erga omnes extension of 
bargained wage conditions may create tensions 
between wage and productivity conditions at firm 
level in sectors where employers’ organisations are 
not representative or where firms’ productivity is 
largely dispersed. Such a risk could to some extent 
reduced by the use of variable pay systems, 
whereby wages are linked to individual, company, 
or group performance; 
Finally, other aspects of collective bargaining 
matter for aggregate wage dynamics, including the 
presence of wage indexation mechanisms 
enshrined in law or in collective contracts and the 
legal framework and practice followed for 
negotiating and renewing contracts. While 
automatic indexation clauses ensure nominal 
flexibility in the presence of changing cost of 
living at the expense of risks of real rigidity in the 
presence of shocks of different sources (e.g. terms 
of trade shocks), long average duration of contracts 
or long lags before renewal present the risk of 
nominal rigidity. It needs however to be taken into 
account that contract length is ultimately the result 
of collective bargaining, and that contract duration 
depends on negotiation costs and on the cost of 
keeping contracts unchanged, that largely depends 
on the prevailing inflation rate (Ball, Mankiw, and 
Romer, 1988).  
The elements and characteristics of the wage 
setting system differ considerably across EU 
countries. Table III.4.1 shows the average value of 
indicators from the ICTWSS database. (45) A 
description of the indicators is provided in 
Appendix 2. It appears that countries differ quite 
considerably in terms of minimum wage practices, 
union density, level at which collective bargaining 
takes place, coverage of collective bargaining, 
wage bargaining coordination. Wage bargaining is 
relatively decentralised in the UK, Luxemburg, 
and in most New Members States, conducted 
mainly at sectoral level in most continental and 
                                                          
(45) The Database on Institutional Characteristics of 
Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State 
Intervention and Social Pacts is compiled by Professor 
Jelle Visser t the Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labor 
Studies and in one of the most systematic and 
comprehensive databases on collective bargaining 
characteristics. See also European Commission (2010, 
2011) for analyses based on the ICTWSS database. 
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southern European countries, relatively centralised 
in Belgium and the Netherlands, Ireland, Finland, 
Slovenia.  
 
Table III.4.1: Wage bargaining characteristics 
Union 
density
Coordination of 
wage 
bargaining
The dominant 
level(s) at 
which wage 
bargaining 
takes place
Minimum 
Wage 
Setting
Bargaining 
coverage, 
adjusted
AT 36,4 4,0 2,7 1,1 99,0
BE 53,0 4,5 3,4 3,9 96,0
BG 27,5 2,0 2,5 7,7 25,0
CY 67,2 2,0 2,0 6,0 :
CZ 34,0 2,0 2,0 5,8 49,5
DE 24,2 4,0 2,5 1,0 64,2
DK 73,5 3,5 2,6 1,0 77,8
ES 15,8 3,5 3,0 6,0 80,2
EE 20,2 1,0 1,0 3,9 22,6
FI 75,3 3,8 4,1 1,8 86,7
FR 8,3 2,0 2,0 6,0 95,4
UK 30,3 1,0 1,0 4,3 35,0
EL 27,5 4,0 3,5 3,0 82,3
HU 25,5 2,0 2,0 4,9 41,7
IE 41,8 5,0 4,0 2,8 :
IT 34,8 4,0 3,0 1,0 80,5
LT 23,0 1,0 1,0 5,3 13,5
LU 42,5 2,2 2,2 5,0 60,0
LV 23,4 1,0 1,0 6,8 20,0
MT 55,7 1,0 1,0 5,0 56,6
NL 22,8 4,0 3,3 4,5 84,7
PL 24,8 1,0 1,0 6,5 40,9
PT 20,6 2,7 2,0 5,7 67,9
RO 39,2 3,9 2,0 6,4 :
SK 35,5 4,2 2,5 4,4 44,3
SI 44,2 4,2 3,8 3,1 100,0
SE 79,5 3,0 3,0 1,0 91,2
(1) Average value of indicators by country, 1995-2007. See 
Appendix 2 for the definition of the indicators. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Union density range from very high rates in 
Scandinavian countries to much lower rates in 
France, Spain and the Baltics. Bargaining coverage 
exhibits instead a lower degree of variation, being 
low mostly in countries where extension 
mechanism are not in place or rarely used. 
Although erga-omnes extension mechanisms at 
sectoral level are common in EU countries, 
considerable differences exist: in some countries 
the extension is automatic or semi-automatic, in 
others is the outcome of government decisions and 
/or subject to conditions regarding the 
representativeness of contracting organisations. 
Moreover, countries differ in terms of presence 
and applicability of opening clauses allowing firms 
to derogate also downward from collective 
contracts concluded at higher level. Practices 
regarding minimum wage policies vary widely, 
ranging from countries where no statutory 
minimum wage is in place to others in which the 
minimum wage is set by the government with little 
involvement of the social partners. 
A series of trends have characterised wage setting 
institutions over the past two decades. First, 
unionisation has been falling in most EU countries, 
as a result of transformations in the structure of the 
economies and in collective representation. 
Second, in a number of countries there was a 
gradual tendency towards more decentralised (and 
generally less coordinated) wage setting 
frameworks, mostly in response to changing 
dynamics of international competition. Although 
the mail level at which collective bargaining takes 
place has remained stable over time, a higher 
incidence of firm-level bargaining has taken place 
in a series of countries, while in others the use of 
opening clauses providing ways to derogate from 
higher-level collective agreements has been 
introduced. Third, bargaining coverage followed 
largely country-specific trajectories: it fell in most 
New Member States, the UK, Germany and 
Portugal, while it remained stable or increased in 
the remaining countries. 
As revealed by the cross-country correlation 
among average indicator values in Table III.4.2, 
the various elements and characteristics of the 
wage setting system are strongly linked. Countries 
with a more centralised wage setting are also 
characterised by a high degree of wage 
coordination and or bargaining coverage and a less 
intensive use of minimum wage policies. The same 
correlation pattern is observed also across a whole 
panel of EU countries over the 1995-2007 period, 
indicating that changes over time in wage setting 
institutions within a country are correlated. Hence, 
for instance, reforms reducing the centralisation of 
wage bargaining tend to be accompanied by a 
stronger use of minimum wage policies.  
Countries tend to fall into a relatively limited 
number of typologies of collective bargaining 
models. These strong correlation patterns across 
wage setting characteristics also reveal that 
countries tend to cluster into a relatively small 
number of wage setting models. Although different 
taxonomies of wage setting models are found in 
the literature (e.g. OECD 2004; McHugh 2002; 
European Commission 
Labour Market Developments in Europe, 2011 
 
96 
Traxler and Kittel 2000; Calmfors and Driffill, 
1988), the position of the country along the trade-
off between wage setting centralisation and 
coordination is among the most relevant 
identification criteria of alternative models.  
Due to the strong correlation across wage setting 
characteristics, disentangling the effect on wage 
outcomes poses a series of difficulties. There is 
broad agreement that research so far managed only 
to a certain extent to demonstrate a strong and 
robust patter of relations between wage bargaining 
characteristics and wage outcomes (e.g. Aidt and 
Tzannatos, 2002; Flanagan, 1999). For instance, 
empirical evidence on aggregate data shows that 
the degree of centralisation matters for the 
distribution of wages (more centralised bargaining 
allows for less differentiation at sectoral or firm 
level), while the impact on aggregate 
developments is less clear-cut (e.g. OECD, 2004). 
Recent evidence on individual wage data from EU 
countries finds instead a significant role of 
bargaining de-centralisation (as measured by the 
incidence of firm-level bargaining) on the 
occurrence of downward real wage rigidity 
episodes (Messina et al., 2010). 
Prima facie evidence does not show a strong link 
between collective bargaining characteristics and 
wage outcomes. Graph III.4.4 plots average 
indicators of bargaining centralisation against the 
growth rate of RULCs over the 1995-2007 period 
for a cross-section of EU countries. The graph 
does not reveal any significant pattern. This prima 
facie evidence does not support the view that in 
more centralised wage setting systems real wages 
tend to grow above productivity. The relation 
appears instead to be negative but very weakly so, 
between centralisation and the apparent elasticity 
of real wages to labour productivity (Graph 
III.4.5). This suggests that the degree of 
centralisation could matter for the extent to which 
real wages respond to changes in productivity. 
This evidence however cannot be taken as 
conclusive in light of the small sample and since 
other wage determinants are not properly 
controlled for. 
Graph III.4.4: Level of bargaining and growth in real unit 
labour costs, EU27, average 1995-2007 
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Source: Commission services elaboration. 
After controlling for wage determinants via 
econometric wage equations, there is no impact of 
collective bargaining characteristics on short term 
wage developments. Table III.A3.1 shows that, 
when added to a long-run equation, bargaining 
 
Table III.4.2: Correlations among wage bargaining characteristics, EU27, 1995-2007 
Union 
density
Coordination of 
wage bargaining
The dominant level(s) at which 
wage bargaining takes place
Minimum Wage 
Setting
Bargaining coverage, 
adjusted
Union Density 1
Coordination of wage bargaining 0,038 1
The dominant level(s) at which wage bargaining 
takes place 0,295 0,835* 1
Minimum Wage Setting -0,608* -0,468* -0,272 1
Bargaining coverage, adjusted 0,342 0,492 0,637* -0,399 1
Union Density 1
Coordination of wage bargaining 0,179* 1
The dominant level(s) at which wage bargaining 
takes place 0,283* 0,819* 1
Minimum Wage Setting -0,456* -0,347* -0,367* 1
Bargaining coverage, adjusted 0,285* 0,607* 0,595* -0,322* 1
Correlation of average values across countries
Correlation across the whole panel
(1) Denotes partial pairwise correlation coefficients different from zero at least at 10% statistical significance level. See 
Appendix 2 for the definition of the indicators. 
Source: Commission services. 
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characteristics have no explanatory power. This 
evidence suggests that changes in collective 
bargaining elements do not affect the level of the 
wage after controlling for other factors. The 
inclusion of the same bargaining characteristics in 
Error Correction Model regressions reveals that a 
change in those elements induces no short-term 
impact on wages (Table III.A3.2). 
Graph III.4.5: Level of bargaining and apparent elasticity 
between real wage and labour productivity, 
average EU27, 1995-2007 
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Source: Commission services elaboration. 
Over the longer term, wage levels show some 
association with bargaining characteristics, notably 
with the elements affecting bargaining coverage. 
This is understood by via the estimation of wage 
equations in cross-country regressions. Table 
III.A3.3 shows that after controlling for 
unemployment and productivity countries with the 
highest bargaining coverage tend to have 
significantly higher real wages, while countries 
with higher union density tend to exhibit lower 
wages. As for the level of bargaining, it shows a 
weak concave relation in line with the predictions 
of the Calmfors and Driffill (1998) model 
(revealed by the negative sign of the squared 
bargaining level indicator). This result is however 
not robust with respect to the inclusion of the wage 
coordination and bargaining coverage indicators. 
When both elements are controlled for, the relation 
between real wages and the bargaining level turns 
convex. All in all, elements of the wage setting 
frameworks affecting bargaining coverage at given 
union density, notably extension mechanisms, 
appear to be associated significantly and robustly 
with higher wage levels in cross-country analysis. 
Several aspects of the bargaining framework 
appear to have a role in shaping the response of 
wages to structural determinants. Table III.A3.4 
reports results from the estimation of long-run 
wage equations for different country groups. By 
splitting the sample between countries with a high 
vs. a low degree of bargaining centralisation it 
appears that the bargaining level may matter for 
the responsiveness of wages to shocks. (46) In more 
centralised settings the response to unemployment 
and to terms of trade appears insignificant. 
Columns 5 to 8 of the table display results for a 
sample split according to the degree of wage 
coordination. (47) In line with expectations, in 
coordinated settings there is a stronger response to 
unemployment (the response to unemployment has 
a sign opposite to what expected in uncoordinated 
settings) and a weaker one to labour productivity. 
The result can be interpreted in light of the 
stronger dependency of wage outcomes on the 
determinants of central union confederations' 
bargaining power in centralised wage settings: 
with high (low) unemployment, wage setters will 
more likely ask for wage growth below (above) 
productivity when coordination is high. Finally, 
the sample is split between countries characterised 
by the presence of automatic indexation 
mechanisms either established by law or by 
collective bargaining throughout most of the 
sample period and the rest. It appears, in line with 
expectations, that the countries with indexations 
systems exhibit on average a weaker reaction of 
wages to unemployment and terms of trade, after 
controlling for their response to prices and 
productivity. (48) A broadly consistent picture 
emerges from the estimation of Error Correction 
regressions for the same sample splits (Table 
III.A3.5). 
                                                          
(46) The groups are defined as those countries where the 
average centralisation indicator over the 1995-2007 period 
was above or below the median average value, see footnote 
to Table 9 for the list of countries in the two groups). 
(47) As coordination is highly intertwined with centralisation, 
the split is performed only for countries with intermediate 
degree of centralisation (sectoral or industry level, 
eventually with additional company level bargaining) and 
distinguishes two polar group of countries: those with 
coordination achieved via national level agreements and 
pattern bargaining (highest two values of the coordination 
index) versus those countries with fragmented and 
uncoordinated bargaining or weak enforceability of industry 
agreements (lowest 2 values of the coordination index). 
(48) See also Lunnemann and Wintr (2010) for evidence on the 
effect of wage indexation using micro wage data. 
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Social pacts and wage agreements may be 
effective in driving wage outcomes in the short to 
medium term. Overall, the results in Table III.A3.6 
are in line with existing studies, since it appears 
that wage bargaining characteristics institutions 
have no strong or robust implications for wage 
levels or growth, notably in the short term, but 
could matter for wage responsiveness. In some 
occasions, however, wage growth targets or 
ceilings could be explicitly mentioned in collective 
bargaining, no only in national level wage 
agreements but also via the operation of so-called 
social pacts, i.e. publicly announced formal policy 
commitments agreed between the government and 
the social partners with a view to address specific 
issues of achieve pre-defined targets (Avdagic, 
2008).  
Graph III.4.6: Average number of social pacts concluded 
per year across EU27 countries) 
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Source: ICTWSS database. 
Graph III.4.6 suggests that social pacts became 
frequent in a series of countries notably in the run-
up to EMU, as an instrument to foster nominal 
convergence. Some social pacts and national wage 
agreements include explicit ceilings for wage 
increases. By augmenting a wage equation with a 
lagged indicator taking value 1 whenever such 
type of social pact or national wage agreement was 
signed it appears that wages were negatively 
affected within a 3-year time horizon, with a 
borderline level of statistical significance. The 
evidence supports the view that those instruments 
may be in driving wage outcomes in the short run 
if effectively implemented. 
 
Reforms in the bargaining framework depend on 
cooperative and effective social dialogue. 
Developments in wage bargaining frameworks 
could have played a role in driving wage outcomes 
in some countries, but the success of reforms in 
collective bargaining depends on a series of 
factors, including the context for social dialogue. 
For instance, a non automatic application of the 
extension mechanism, increased frequency of firm-
level bargaining at firm level, the effective use 
opening clauses partially explain the German wage 
moderation performance. Also in Spain an 
increasing number of workers took advantage of 
these clauses in 2010 (7-15% according to the 
figures of the Ministry of Labour Affairs and the 
Spanish Statistical Institute). However, inother 
countries, legislative changes encouraging firm-
level bargaining (e.g. Portugal) were so far less 
effective in influencing outcomes. 
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Assessing the implications of wage developments 
for macroeconomic imbalances requires a proper 
understanding of the relevant links and 
transmission channels. Labour costs are largely 
driven by the market mechanism and interact with 
the rest of the economy. In particular, nominal 
wages are jointly determined with price levels, 
productivity, and unemployment. In monetary 
unions, competitiveness plays an adjustment role 
in the presence of asymmetric shocks. Current 
account imbalances, wages, and competitiveness 
may be driven by common determinants, notably 
cross-border financial flows. A simplistic view 
according to which labour costs move exogenously 
and cause imbalances should be avoided, while a 
good understanding of the complex interlinks 
between wages, competitiveness and imbalances is 
needed. 
The comparison of actual wage trends with 
appropriate benchmarks is a first screening for 
assessing wage developments, and a full-fledged 
analysis requires disaggregated data at sectoral, 
regional, skill level. 
• The comparison of real wage growth with 
productivity growth provides information on 
whether wage developments are consistent with 
the maintenance of balances labour market 
conditions. 
• Comparing nominal wage growth with that that 
would be consistent with the maintenance of a 
constant ULC-based REER provides a prima-
facie assessment whether wage growth is in 
line with orderly developments in current 
accounts. 
• Depending on the specific context, wages may 
be evolving according to standard market-
driven relations with fundamentals or could 
instead be driven by temporary or more 
structural shocks driven by policy, technology, 
or factors underlying parties bargaining power 
in collective agreements. Comparing actual 
wages with those obtained from predictions 
from estimated wage equations permits to shed 
light on this aspect.  
Concerning the analysis of the effects of policies 
and reforms in wage setting institutions, the 
conclusions from the analysis in this part of the 
report can be summarised as follows:  
• Policy action in the filed of statutory minimum 
wages, government wages, labour taxes can 
have a direct impact on labour cost 
developments, whose overall impact on 
competitiveness and imbalances may depend 
also on other relevant transmission channels. 
Moreover, the government can play a role in 
driving wage outcomes via the conclusion of 
wage pacts. 
• Despite the assessment of the implications of 
wage bargaining characteristics on wage 
developments is notoriously complex and there 
is no strong evidence in support of a single, 
superior wage setting model, analysis carried 
out in the present report supports the view that: 
(a) selected wage bargaining elements, notably 
affecting bargaining coverage, can have a 
significant impact on wage outcomes over the 
medium-to-long term; (b) There are aspects of 
the wage bargaining system that matter for the 
extent to which wages respond to fundamental, 
notably unemployment and the terms of trade. 
These are: (i) the degree of centralisation 
bargaining, (ii) the coordination of wage 
setting, (iii) the presence of automatic 
indexation clauses.  
• The analysis also suggests a number of 
conclusions for future labour market reforms 
that aim at affecting wage outcomes:  
• Reforms aimed at promoting a quick correction 
of wage developments should be distinguished 
from those aimed at revising the framework 
conditions where wage formation takes place. 
Regarding the former, policy action should 
target tax wedges, government wages, 
minimum wages. The promotion of social pacts 
and tripartite agreements on wages could also 
be considered. As for the more general issue of 
the mechanics of wage formation, reforms 
could concern concrete aspects of the wage 
setting system.  
• Reforms intended to achieve a rapid correction 
of competitiveness (e.g. tax wedge cuts) need 
to take into account the complexity of feed 
backs and interactions (not only direct effects 
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on relative prices, but also effects on domestic 
demand, budgetary effect etc.) and cross-
country spillovers. 
• Reforms concerning selected aspects of the 
wage setting system need to take into account: 
(i) the tools that are at the disposal of the 
government to induce the desired change in the 
system, since many aspects of wage bargaining 
are a matter of practice followed by social 
partners rather than law; (ii) the systemic 
nature of the wage setting system and the 
repercussions that reforms in one part trigger in 
other parts of the wage setting framework (e.g. 
the implications of reforms in the extension 
mechanism for the extent of wage coordination, 
the implications of the elimination of 
indexation systems for contract duration and 
renewal…); (iii) the relevance of a cooperative 
social dialogue for reforms whose success 
depends also on the practice followed by social 
partners in collective bargaining (e.g. the 
effective use of opening clauses in sectoral 
agreements, reforms aimed at supporting 
bargaining at firm level…). 
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In analogy with existing work (e.g. Nickell, 1988; Manning, 1993; Bell, Nickell, Quintini, 2002; Nunziata, 2005) the estimated 
dynamic wage equation can be obtained as a reduced form specification incorporating both demand and supply-side labour market 
determinants. Nominal wages are assumed to be related to the price level, labour productivity, and unemployment.  
• Price levels matter for both labour demand and labour supply. Firms are willing to offer higher wages if the price of their own 
output is higher; wage setters demand higher wages if the cost of living is higher. In principle, both product and consumption 
prices could be included in the equation. In light of the high collinearity of the two variables, only the price level variable that 
performed best, the CPI index was kept. 
• Labour productivity is aimed at capturing labour demand: the higher the productivity of labour at given price level, the higher 
the nominal wages firms are willing to pay. 
• The unemployment rate captures mostly supply-side determinants, as wage demands by unions are expected to become more 
moderate in the presence of higher unemployment. 
The dynamic relationship between nominal wage growth and the explanatory variables is specified as an error-correction model. 
This assumes that there is an equilibrium relationship between the nominal wage level, the price level, the unemployment rate and 
labour productivity to which nominal wages will converge even if there are transitory shocks that divert wages from this 
equilibrium. Note that such a framework does not exclude the possibility of reverse causation (e.g. wages affecting prices) and 
multiple long-run relations among the variables. It does not address the endogeneity of the labour productivity variable either. 
This wage equation is estimated for a panel of countries using yearly data. The long-run equilibrium relationship is specified as:  
ititititiit etyproductiviuCPIwage ++++= )ln()ln()ln()ln( 321 βββα     (1) 
where i and t index the countries and time, wage denotes nominal compensation per employee, CPI is the consumer price index, u is 
the unemployment rate, productivity is the GDP per total employment and e is the disturbance and 
iα  is a fixed effect.  
In addition to the above basic specification, also specifications including terms trade (higher terms of trade expected to be reflected 
in higher wages, other things being equal) are estimated. Alternative specifications are also estimated using as explanatory variable 
real wages and dropping the price level from the list of the explanatory variables.  
Given that wage and CPI are non-stationary variables (1) can be estimated as a co-integrating relationship. The satisfactory fit of the 
equilibrium relationship and the highly significant error correction terms both indicate that one can assume co-integration among the 
variables in (1). For this reason, and in light of the limited power of available panel integration and cointegration tests, those tests 
were not performed. 
The dynamic wage equation is specified as: 
itititititiit etyproductiviuCPIwage εγθθθµ ++∆+∆+∆+=∆ −1321 )ln()ln()ln()ln( )      (2) 
where 
1−ite
)  is the residual from (1) and therefore γ  measures the speed of adjustment to a random shock.  
When interpreting the parameters of (1) and (2) one should be aware that they capture both demand and supply-side effects.  
The dataset consists of the 27 EU countries and observations range between 1980 and 2010 resulting in an unbalanced sample. For 
robustness check the estimation results are also presented for a larger set of countries, the euro area and adding terms of trade 
(National accounts definition, 2000=100, source: AMECO) as an explanatory variable. In all cases a fixed effect estimator is used 
and standard errors are clustered according to the panel identifier. The results are presented in Tables III.A3.7 and III.A3.8. 
 
Description of variables in the wage equation 
Variable Definition 
wage Nominal compensation per employee, total economy, local currency unit, source: AMECO. 
CPI National CPI (All-items); 2000=100, source: AMECO. 
u Unemployment rate, source: Eurostat. 
productivity 
Calculated as GDP over total employment. The GDP variable is at 2000 market prices; local 
currency unit, source: AMECO. The total employment variable is from OECD, complemented by 
Eurostat employment (15-64 years) figures if the former is missing.  
Terms of trade Terms of trade index, 2000=100 Source: AMECO 
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Table III.A2.1: Description of ICTWSS indicators of wage setting institutions 
ICTWSS variable Description
Union Density Net union membership as a proportion wage and salary earners in employment, calculated as (0-100) = NUM*100/WSE.E
5 = economy-wide bargaining, based on a) enforceable agreements between the central organisations
of unions and employers affecting the entire economy or entire private sector, or on b) government
imposition of a wage schedule, freeze, or ceiling.
4 = mixed industry and economy-wide bargaining: a) central organisations negotiate non-enforceable
central agreements (guidelines) and/or b) key unions and employers associations set pattern for the
entire economy.
3 = industry bargaining with no or irregular pattern setting, limited involvement of central
organizations and limited freedoms for company bargaining.
2 = mixed industry- and firm level bargaining, with weak enforceability of industry agreements
1 = none of the above, fragmented bargaining, mostly at company level
5 = national or central level
4 = national or central level, with additional sectoral / local or company bargaining
3 = sectoral or industry level
2 = sectoral or industry level, with additional local or company bargaining
1 = local or company bargaining
0 = No national (cross-sectoral or inter-occupational) minimum wage;
1 = Minimum wages are set by collective agreement or tripartite wage boards in (some) sectors;
2 = Minimum wages are set by national (cross-sectoral or inter-occupational) agreement
(“autonomous agreement”) between unions and employers;
3 = National minimum wage is set by agreement (as in 2) but extended and made binding by law or
Ministerial decree;
4 = National minimum wage is set through tripartite negotiations;
5 = National minimum wage is set on fixed rule (index-based minimum wage) after negotiations or
consultations with by the social partners;
6 = National minimum wage is set by government, but after (non-binding) tripartite consultations;
7 = National minimum wage set by judges or expert committee, as in award-system;
8 = National minimum wage is set by government, without fixed rule.
Bargaining 
coverage, adjusted
Employees covered by wage bargaining agreements as a proportion of all wage and salary earners in employment with the right 
to bargaining, expressed as percentage, adjusted for the possibility that some sectors or occupations are excluded from the right 
to bargain; ranges from 0 to 100. 
Social pact
A (tripartite) social pact between the government, the unions and the employers, or between the government and the unions, is 
reached and signed in specified year. Values: 0 = no; 1 = yes; 2 = two pacts in same year; 3 = three pacts in same year etc
Wage maximum in 
the social pact The pact or agreement also contains a norm or ceiling regarding maximum wage rise; 1 if true, 0 if false.
Coordination of 
wage bargaining
The dominant 
level(s) at which 
wage bargaining 
takes place
Minimum Wage 
Setting
Source: Jelle Visser. 2009. The ICTWSS Database: Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, 
State Intervention and Social Pacts in 34 countries between1960 and 2007. Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies 
AIAS, University of Amsterdam. 
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Graph III.A3.1: Benchmark for real compensation per employee growth: labour productivity growth, EU15 
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Graph III.A3.2: Benchmark for real compensation per employee growth: labour productivity growth, New Member 
States 
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Graph III.A3.3: Benchmark for nominal compensation per employee growth: constant ULC-based REER, EU15 
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Graph III.A3.4: Benchmark for nominal compensation per employee growth: constant ULC-based REER, New Member 
States 
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Graph III.A3.5: Benchmark for nominal compensation per employee growth: prediction from wage equation, EU15 
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Graph III.A3.6: Benchmark for nominal compensation per employee growth: prediction from wage equation, New 
Member States 
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Graph III.A3.7: Unit labour cost, nominal compensation per employee and labour productivity indices EU15 (index 
numbers, 2000=100) 
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Graph III.A3.8: Unit labour cost, nominal compensation per employee and labour productivity indices New Member 
States (index numbers, 2000=100) 
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Graph III.A3.9: REER, price levels, real unit labour costs, EU15, (index numbers, 2000=100) 
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Graph III.A3.10: REER, price levels, real unit labour costs, New Member States, (index numbers, 2000=100) 
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Table III.A3.1: Wages and institutions: evidence from long-run wage equations, various samples, 1980-2007 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: log of real 
compensation per employee 
Explanatory variables
Unemployment rate -0.00529* -0.00548+ -0.00760** -0,00508 -0,00513 -0.00761** -0.00735**
[0.00251] [0.00284] [0.00213] [0.00302] [0.00302] [0.00213] [0.00200]
Log labour productivity 0.880** 0.885** 0.841** 0.899** 0.899** 0.866** 0.874**
[0.0881] [0.0745] [0.0666] [0.0836] [0.0836] [0.104] [0.102]
Union Density 0,001 0,000359 0,000736
[0.00251] [0.00279] [0.00289]
Bargaining coordination -0,0171 0,00115 0,00519
[0.0165] [0.00724] [0.00754]
Bargaining coverage 0,00111 0,00125 0,00155
[0.00180] [0.00154] [0.00131]
Bargaining level 0,00237 -0,0217 -0,00861 0,0427
[0.00541] [0.0213] [0.0169] [0.0465]
Bargaining level squared 0,00384 0,00255 -0,00685
[0.00336] [0.00280] [0.00811]
Constant 1.860** 1.937** 1.911** 1.863** 1.895** 1.859** 1.792**
[0.178] [0.0904] [0.136] [0.104] [0.107] [0.228] [0.241]
Observations 285 308 251 308 308 245 326
R-squared 0,852 0,85 0,849 0,847 0,847 0,849 0,819
Number of countries 27 27 24 27 27 24 31
EU countries OECD countries
(1) Estimation method: Least Square Dummy Variables. See Appendix 1 and 2 for the definition of the variables. Robust 
standard errors in brackets. Clustering of standard errors by country** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Table III.A3.2: Wages and institutions: evidence from Error Correction Models, various samples, 1980-2007 
(6) (7)
Dependent variable: ∆log of real compensation per employee 
Explanatory variables
∆Unemployment rate -0,000467 -0,00191
[0.00162] [0.00178]
∆Log labour productivity 0.562** 0.454**
[0.125] [0.128]
Error correction term -0.138* -0.0767+
[0.0531] [0.0449]
Union Density -0,000161 0,000402
[0.000725] [0.000476]
Bargaining coordination 0,00363 0,00235
[0.00416] [0.00248]
Bargaining coverage -0,000536 -0,000584
[0.000906] [0.000772]
Bargaining level -0.0165+ -0,00551
[0.00828] [0.0133]
Bargaining level squared 0.00303* 0,000867
[0.00117] [0.00213]
Constant 0,0581 0,0311
[0.0645] [0.0472]
Observations 221 321
R-squared 0,198 0,151
Number of countries 24 31
EU countries OECD countries
(1) Estimation method: Least Square Dummy Variables. See Appendix 1 and 2 for the definition of the variables. Robust 
standard errors in brackets. Clustering of standard errors by country** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Table III.A3.3: Wages and institutions: evidence from cross section regressions, 1995-2007 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: log of real 
compensation per employee in 2000 
euros
Explanatory variables
Unemployment rate -0.0122** -0.0112** -0.00998** -0.0112** -0.0111** -0.0126** -0.0126**
[0.00202] [0.00210] [0.00195] [0.00209] [0.00215] [0.00164] [0.00159]
Log labour productivity 1.053** 1.038** 1.025** 1.041** 1.041** 1.030** 1.062**
[0.0113] [0.0110] [0.0140] [0.0119] [0.0120] [0.0117] [0.00900]
Union Density -0.00150** -0.00235** -0.00275**
[0.000234] [0.000264] [0.000263]
Bargaining coordination 0.0109+ 0.0188* 0.0156**
[0.00580] [0.00738] [0.00567]
Bargaining coverage 0.00205** 0.00330** 0.00218**
[0.000358] [0.000419] [0.000344]
Bargaining level 0,00587 0,0241 -0.209** -0.131**
[0.00760] [0.0267] [0.0345] [0.0342]
Bargaining level squared -0,00359 0.0343** 0.0192**
[0.00512] [0.00579] [0.00637]
Constant 1.886** 1.789** 1.686** 1.803** 1.787** 1.876** 1.850**
[0.0381] [0.0363] [0.0394] [0.0361] [0.0485] [0.0492] [0.0426]
Observations 306 329 270 329 329 264 352
R-squared 0,986 0,984 0,987 0,984 0,984 0,991 0,989
EU countries OECD countries
(1) Estimation method: Least Squares with year effects (pooled cross sections). See Appendix 1 and 2 for the definition of the 
variables. Robust standard errors in brackets. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Table III.A3.4: Wages and institutions: evidence from long-run wage equations, various sample splits, EU27, 1980-2007 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dependent variable: log of 
nominal compensation per 
employee 
Explanatory variables
Log CPI 1.093** 1.054** 0.989** 0.973** 0.969** 0.973** 1.060** 1.064** 1.011** 0.965** 1.021** 0.955**
[0.0737] [0.0401] [0.0853] [0.0847] [0.0725] [0.0696] [0.0353] [0.0274] [0.0294] [0.0176] [0.0171] [0.0511]
Unemployment rate -0.00907+ -0,00638 -0,00156 -0,00183 0.00868** 0.00851* -0.00559** -0.00691* -0.00511+ -0.00396* 0,000174 0,000251
[0.00432] [0.00435] [0.00252] [0.00249] [0.000811] [0.00199] [0.000705] [0.00152] [0.00253] [0.00187] [0.00190] [0.00223]
Log labour productivity 0.780** 0.706** 0.793** 0.817** 1.046** 1.011** 0.370+ 0.408* 0.803** 0.827** 0.789** 0.868**
[0.113] [0.0812] [0.111] [0.115] [0.139] [0.135] [0.131] [0.0936] [0.0644] [0.0489] [0.0296] [0.0692]
Log terms of trade 0.834** 0,064 0.300* 0,468 0.464** 0,134
[0.142] [0.187] [0.105] [0.341] [0.125] [0.0732]
Constant -2.946** -6.537** -2.357** -2.622* -3.005** -4.304** -2.254** -4.472+ -2.513** -4.502** -2.622** -3.073**
[0.233] [0.587] [0.306] [0.890] [0.114] [0.476] [0.0392] [1.612] [0.0935] [0.553] [0.0617] [0.226]
Observations 186 186 143 143 56 56 52 52 448 448 101 101
R-squared 0,978 0,983 0,984 0,984 0,991 0,992 0,984 0,986 0,99 0,992 0,992 0,993
Number of countries 16 16 11 11 5 5 4 4 22 22 5 5
Countries with out 
indexation systems 
throughout the whole 
sample period 
Countries with  
indexation systems 
throughout the whole 
sample period
Countries with less 
bargaining coordination 
and intermediate 
centralisation
Countries with more 
bargaining coordination 
and intermediate 
centralisation
Countries with  
relatively decentralised 
bargaining
Countries with  
relatively centralised 
bargaining
(1) "Estimation method: Least Square Dummy Variables. See Appendix 1 and 2 for the definition of the variables. Robust 
standard errors in brackets. Clustering of standard errors by country** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.  
Relatively decentralised bargaining: BG, CY, CZ, DE, EE, FR, UK, HU, LT, LU, LV, MT, PL, PT, RO, SK. Relatively decentralised 
bargaining: AT, BE, DK, ES, FI, EL, IE, IT, NL, SI, SE. Intermediate centralisation of bargaining and low coordination: BG, CY, CZ, 
FR, HU. Intermediate centralisation of bargaining and high coordination: AT, DE, IT, SK. Countries with indexation throughout 
the sample period: BE, CY, ES, LU, MT." 
Source: Commission services. 
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Table III.A3.5: Wages and institutions: evidence from Error Correction Models, various sample splits, EU27, 1980-2007 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dependent variable: ∆log of 
nominal compensation per 
employee 
Explanatory variables
∆Log CPI 1.069** 1.083** 0.734** 0.724** 0.885** 0.864** 0,303 0,435 0.967** 0.968** 0.849** 0.855**
[0.0709] [0.0691] [0.151] [0.147] [0.0568] [0.0452] [0.173] [0.196] [0.0459] [0.0427] [0.0611] [0.0752]
∆Unemployment rate -0.00630+ -0,00533 0,00119 0,000984 0.00268** 0.00305* 0,00304 0,00123 -0.00425* -0.00358+ 0.00432** 0.00441**
[0.00338] [0.00370] [0.00147] [0.00152] [0.000356] [0.000723] [0.00172] [0.00199] [0.00185] [0.00187] [0.000737] [0.000835]
∆Log labour productivity 0,394 0.431+ 0.254* 0.265* 0.950* 0.964* 0,516 0.581+ 0.463** 0.500** 0.162+ 0.177*
[0.255] [0.214] [0.0929] [0.0978] [0.305] [0.279] [0.253] [0.205] [0.146] [0.133] [0.0648] [0.0494]
∆Log terms of trade 0,152 0,0814 0,264 0,273 0.147* -0,0355
[0.134] [0.0547] [0.170] [0.165] [0.0673] [0.0233]
Error correction term -0,0767 -0,164 -0.253* -0.251* -0.360** -0.373** -0,449 -0,454 -0.0941* -0.151* -0.265** -0.302**
[0.0761] [0.127] [0.0817] [0.0799] [0.0537] [0.0534] [0.230] [0.217] [0.0452] [0.0545] [0.0185] [0.0424]
Constant 0,0143 0,0117 0.0177** 0.0178** 0,0051 0,00493 0,0203 0,0158 0.0116** 0.00997* 0.0139** 0.0136**
[0.00995] [0.00866] [0.00532] [0.00523] [0.00943] [0.00796] [0.00882] [0.00834] [0.00402] [0.00363] [0.00189] [0.00244]
Observations 170 170 132 132 51 51 48 48 426 426 96 96
R-squared 0,703 0,712 0,442 0,447 0,701 0,71 0,369 0,4 0,777 0,788 0,778 0,796
Number of countries 16 16 11 11 5 5 4 4 22 22 5 5
Estimation method: Least Square Dummy Variables. See Appendix 1 and 2 for the definition of the variables. Robust standard errors in brackets. Clustering of standard errors by country** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<
Countries with  
relatively decentralised 
bargaining
Countries with  
relatively centralised 
bargaining
Countries with out 
indexation systems 
throughout the whole 
sample period 
Countries with  
indexation systems 
throughout the whole 
sample period
Countries with less 
bargaining coordination 
and intermediate 
centralisation
Countries with more 
bargaining coordination 
and intermediate 
centralisation
(1) Estimation method: Least Square Dummy Variables. See Appendix 1 and 2 for the definition of the variables. Robust 
standard errors in brackets. Clustering of standard errors by country** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Table III.A3.6: The role of social pacts: evidence from long-run wage equations, EU27, 1980-2007 
(1) (2)
Dependent variables Dependent variables
Explanatory variables Explanatory variables
Log CPI 1.013** ∆Log CPI 0.946**
[0.0467] [0.0814]
Unemployment rate -0.00410+ ∆Unemployment rate -0,0012
[0.00239] [0.00106]
Log labour productivity 0.827** ∆Log labour productivity 0.522**
[0.0781] [0.111]
Error correction term -0.108*
[0.0443]
Dummy, 1 if pact or agreement setting cap 
to wage growth, 1 lag -0,00544
Dummy, 1 if pact or agreement setting 
cap to wage growth, 1 lag -0,00133
[0.00700] [0.00265]
Dummy, 1 if pact or agreement setting cap 
to wage growth, 2 lags -0,0129
Dummy, 1 if pact or agreement setting 
cap to wage growth, 2 lags -0,00608
[0.00798] [0.00372]
Dummy, 1 if pact or agreement setting cap 
to wage growth, 3 lags -0.0109*
Dummy, 1 if pact or agreement setting 
cap to wage growth, 3 lags 0,00069
[0.00525] [0.00163]
Constant -2.582** Constant 0.0105*
[0.137] [0.00443]
Observations 502 Observations 428
R-squared 0,987 R-squared 0,725
Number of countries 27 Number of countries 24
∆Log nominal 
compensation per 
employee
∆Log nominal 
compensation per 
employee
(1) Estimation method: Least Square Dummy Variables. See Appendix 1 and 2 for the definition of the variables. Robust 
standard errors in brackets. Clustering of standard errors by country** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Table III.A3.7: Long-run wage equations, various sample, 1980-2007 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable log nominal 
compensation per employee
Explanatory variables
Log CPI 0.973** 1.008** 0.969** 1.117**
[0.0200] [0.0265] [0.0170] [0.0635]
Unemployment rate -0.00430* -0.00448* -0.00319+ -0.00517*
[0.00199] [0.00213] [0.00175] [0.00230]
Log labour productivity 0.820** 0.808** 0.837** 0.549**
[0.0496] [0.0591] [0.0448] [0.103]
Log terms of trade 0.297*
[0.120]
Constant -2.275** -2.524** -3.775** -2.620**
[0.107] [0.0846] [0.538] [0.239]
Observations 793 549 549 108
R-squared 0,992 0,991 0,991 0,969
Number of countries 37 27 27 12
OECD countries EU countries EU countries Euro-area EU countries
(1) Estimations method: Least Square Dummy Variables. See Appendix 1 for the definition of the variables. Robust standard 
errors in brackets. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
European Commission 
Labour Market Developments in Europe, 2011 
 
120 
 
 
 
Table III.A3.8: Wage equations, Error Correction Model, various sample, 1980-2007 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable ∆ log nominal 
compensation per employee
Explanatory variables
∆ Log CPI 0.918** 0.955** 0.955** 0.379**
[0.0450] [0.0452] [0.0438] [0.0925]
∆ Unemployment rate -0.00341* -0.00324+ -0,00268 -0,00113
[0.00131] [0.00166] [0.00170] [0.00163]
∆Log labour productivity 0.387** 0.412** 0.442** 0,115
[0.0686] [0.121] [0.116] [0.107]
∆ Log terms of trade 0.108+
[0.0566]
Error correction term -0.114** -0.107* -0.138** -0.313*
[0.0362] [0.0418] [0.0466] [0.126]
Constant 0.0137** 0.0124** 0.0112** 0.0231**
[0.00293] [0.00323] [0.00305] [0.00262]
Observations 756 522 522 96
R-squared 0,783 0,771 0,778 0,283
Number of countries 37 27 27 12
Estimations method: Least Square Dummy Variables. See Appendix 1 for the definition of the variables. Robust standard errors in brackets. C
OECD countries EU countries EU countries Euro-area EU countries
(1) Estimations method: Least Square Dummy Variables. See Appendix 1 for the definition of the variables. Robust standard 
errors in brackets. Clustering of standard errors by country** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. 
Source: Commission services. 
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European Union (27 countries) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 486478 488525 490635 492266 493683 0.3 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 327892 329230 330413 330898 331157 0.1 %
(% of total population) 67.4 67.4 67.3 67.2 67.1 -0.1 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 230437 232048 234302 235080 235271 0.1 %
Male 126927 127592 128502 128412 128302 -0.1 %
Female 103510 104456 105800 106668 106969 0.3 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 70.3 70.5 70.9 71.0 71.0 0.0 pps
Young (15-24) 44.2 44.2 44.4 43.8 43.1 -0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 84.3 84.4 84.8 84.9 84.9 0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 46.4 47.2 48.1 49.1 49.7 0.6 pps
Nationals (15-64) 70.2 70.5 70.8 71.0 71.0 0.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 71.0 71.0 71.8 71.8 71.8 -0.1 pps
Male 77.6 77.7 78.0 77.8 77.7 -0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 47.6 47.6 47.9 47.0 46.2 -0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 92.0 91.9 92.0 91.8 91.7 -0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 56.1 57.0 57.9 58.6 58.9 0.3 pps
Female 63.0 63.3 63.9 64.3 64.5 0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 40.7 40.7 40.9 40.6 39.8 -0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 76.5 76.9 77.5 77.9 78.1 0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 37.2 38.0 38.8 40.2 41.1 1.0 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 64.5 65.4 65.9 64.6 64.2 -0.5 pps
Young (15-24) 36.6 37.4 37.5 35.1 34.1 -1.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 78.2 79.1 79.6 78.2 77.6 -0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 43.5 44.6 45.6 46.0 46.3 0.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 45.5 46.3 46.0 43.9 42.7 -1.2 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 73.3 73.2 72.2 70.0 69.0 -1.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 95.2 93.4 92.2 92.3 91.9 -0.4 pps
Nationals (15-64) 60.7 61.3 61.5 60.3 59.7 -0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 3.7 4.1 4.4 4.3 4.4 0.0 pps
Male 71.6 72.5 72.8 70.7 70.1 -0.6 pps
Young (15-24) 39.6 40.4 40.4 37.2 36.2 -0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54) 86.0 86.8 86.9 84.6 83.9 -0.7 pps
Older (55-64) 52.7 53.9 55.0 54.8 54.6 -0.2 pps
Female 57.3 58.3 59.1 58.6 58.2 -0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 33.5 34.2 34.6 33.0 31.8 -1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 70.3 71.4 72.3 71.7 71.3 -0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 34.9 35.9 36.8 37.8 38.6 0.8 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 211392.6 215297.6 217754.1 213874.5 212439.7 -0.7 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 1.7 1.8 0.9 -1.8 -0.5 1.3 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) : : : : : : pps
Male : : : : : : pps
Female : : : : : : pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 14.5 14.4 14.2 14.3 14.5 0.2 pps
Male 10.2 10.1 9.9 9.9 10.1 0.2 pps
Female 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.5 0.1 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 14.5 14.6 14.1 13.6 13.9 0.3 pps
Male 14.0 13.9 13.3 12.8 13.3 0.5 pps
Female 15.1 15.3 15.0 14.5 14.6 0.1 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 17.5 17.6 17.6 18.1 18.5 0.4 pps
Male 6.9 7.0 7.0 7.4 7.8 0.4 pps
Female 30.7 30.7 30.6 31.0 31.4 0.4 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 8.3 7.2 7.1 9.0 9.7 0.7 pps
Young (15-24) 17.3 15.5 15.5 19.8 20.8 1.0 pps
Prime age (25-49) 7.3 6.4 6.3 8.2 8.9 0.7 pps
Older (55-64) 6.2 5.5 5.1 6.3 6.9 0.6 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 11.7 10.9 11.6 14.9 16.2 1.3 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 8.3 7.0 6.5 8.4 9.1 0.7 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 4.6 4.0 3.8 5.0 5.4 0.4 pps
Nationals (15-64) 7.9 6.9 6.7 8.4 9.1 0.7 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 13.1 12.0 12.2 16.4 16.8 0.4 pps
Male 7.6 6.6 6.7 9.1 9.7 0.6 pps
Female 9.0 7.9 7.6 9.0 9.6 0.6 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 45.9 42.7 37.0 33.1 39.9 6.8 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 41.2 41.2 41.0 40.6 40.8 0.5 %
Male 42.3 42.3 42.1 41.7 41.9 0.5 %
Female 39.2 39.2 39.1 38.9 39.1 0.5 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -4.0 -1.8 -1.6 -3.6 -2.5 1.1 pps
Building and construction 3.6 5.3 0.3 -5.1 -3.4 1.7 pps
Services 2.4 2.1 1.5 -0.4 0.5 1.0 pps
Manufacturing industry 0.2 0.6 -0.1 -5.5 -3.1 2.4 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 2.7 3.3 0.6 -1.3 3.2 4.4 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.8 0.4 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 3.2 3.6 4.1 2.5 1.6 -0.9 pps
Wage and salaries : : : : : : pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 1.6 1.1 -0.5 -2.5 2.3 4.8 pps
2009-2010
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Euro Area 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 319851 321690 323377 324454 325360 0.3 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 214210 215228 216116 216349 216421 0.0 %
(% of total population) 67.0 66.9 66.8 66.7 66.5 -0.2 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 151266 152741 154382 154748 154535 -0.1 %
Male 84074 84607 85141 84895 84606 -0.3 %
Female 67192 68134 69241 69853 69929 0.1 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 70.6 71.0 71.4 71.5 71.4 -0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 44.3 44.4 44.6 43.8 42.6 -1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 84.6 84.8 85.3 85.3 85.2 -0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 44.9 46.2 47.1 48.4 49.4 1.0 pps
Nationals (15-64) 70.6 71.0 71.4 71.5 71.4 -0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 70.7 70.8 71.5 71.5 71.4 -0.1 pps
Male 78.5 78.6 78.8 78.5 78.2 -0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 47.9 47.8 47.9 46.8 45.6 -1.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 93.1 93.0 93.0 92.6 92.4 -0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 54.6 55.7 56.5 57.4 58.2 0.8 pps
Female 62.8 63.3 64.1 64.6 64.6 0.0 pps
Young (15-24) 40.6 41.0 41.2 40.7 39.5 -1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 76.1 76.6 77.4 77.9 77.9 0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 35.7 37.1 38.1 39.9 41.0 1.1 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 64.7 65.6 66.0 64.7 64.2 -0.5 pps
Young (15-24) 36.9 37.7 37.7 35.2 33.9 -1.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 78.3 79.2 79.5 78.0 77.3 -0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 41.7 43.2 44.3 45.1 45.8 0.6 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 47.7 48.6 47.8 45.4 44.4 -1.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 73.3 75.0 73.5 71.5 70.3 -1.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 93.0 91.4 90.1 90.4 89.1 -1.3 pps
Nationals (15-64) 59.9 60.5 60.6 59.4 58.8 -0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 4.7 5.0 5.4 5.3 5.3 0.1 pps
Male 72.6 73.3 73.3 71.1 70.4 -0.7 pps
Young (15-24) 40.4 41.0 40.6 37.3 36.0 -1.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.1 87.7 87.5 84.9 84.1 -0.8 pps
Older (55-64) 50.9 52.4 53.3 53.5 53.8 0.3 pps
Female 56.8 57.9 58.7 58.3 57.9 -0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 33.4 34.4 34.7 33.0 31.7 -1.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 69.5 70.6 71.6 70.9 70.5 -0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 32.9 34.5 35.7 37.1 38.1 1.0 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 138526.0 141228.6 142695.6 139993.1 138883.6 -0.8 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 1.7 1.8 0.8 -1.9 -0.5 1.4 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) : : : : : : pps
Male : : : : : : pps
Female : : : : : : pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 14.7 14.5 14.3 14.3 14.5 0.2 pps
Male 10.3 10.2 9.9 9.9 10.1 0.1 pps
Female 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 0.1 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 16.7 16.6 16.3 15.4 15.6 0.2 pps
Male 15.8 15.8 15.2 14.3 14.8 0.5 pps
Female 17.7 17.6 17.4 16.6 16.6 0.0 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 18.7 18.8 18.9 19.5 19.9 0.4 pps
Male 6.7 6.8 6.8 7.3 7.6 0.3 pps
Female 34.0 34.2 34.1 34.4 34.8 0.4 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 8.5 7.6 7.6 9.6 10.1 0.5 pps
Young (15-24) 16.6 15.1 15.5 19.7 20.5 0.8 pps
Prime age (25-49) 7.6 6.8 6.9 8.9 9.6 0.7 pps
Older (55-64) 7.2 6.3 5.9 6.9 7.4 0.5 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 11.6 10.8 11.7 15.1 16.5 1.4 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 8.2 7.1 6.9 8.5 8.9 0.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 5.1 4.5 4.3 5.4 5.9 0.5 pps
Nationals (15-64) 7.9 7.1 7.0 8.7 9.3 0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 14.0 12.9 13.2 17.8 18.1 0.3 pps
Male 7.6 6.7 7.0 9.4 10.0 0.6 pps
Female 9.7 8.7 8.5 9.8 10.4 0.6 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 46.2 44.3 39.3 35.6 42.5 6.9 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 41.1 41.1 40.9 40.5 40.8 0.7 %
Male 42.2 42.2 42.0 41.5 41.8 0.7 %
Female 39.0 39.1 39.0 38.7 38.9 0.5 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -1.8 -1.8 -1.7 -2.4 -0.6 1.8 pps
Building and construction 2.8 3.8 -2.0 -6.7 -3.7 3.0 pps
Services 2.3 2.1 1.4 -0.5 0.5 1.0 pps
Manufacturing industry -0.4 0.4 0.0 -5.4 -3.3 2.1 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 2.3 2.6 3.3 1.5 1.6 0.1 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 0.6 0.2 1.3 0.8 0.7 0.0 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 2.5 2.8 3.6 2.8 1.5 -1.3 pps
Wage and salaries : : : : : : pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 1.4 1.0 -0.4 -2.3 2.2 4.5 pps
2009-2010
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Belgium 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 10546 10614 10708 10796 10892 0.9 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 6941 7008 7073 7126 7177 0.7 %
(% of total population) 65.8 66.0 66.1 66.0 65.9 -0.1 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 4616 4701 4747 4769 4856 1.8 %
Male 2562 2595 2609 2609 2649 1.5 %
Female 2054 2106 2138 2159 2207 2.2 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 66.5 67.1 67.1 66.9 67.7 0.7 pps
Young (15-24) 34.7 33.9 33.4 32.4 32.5 0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 84.5 85.3 85.7 85.6 86.3 0.8 pps
Older (55-64) 33.6 35.9 36.1 37.2 39.2 2.0 pps
Nationals (15-64) 67.0 67.5 67.4 67.3 67.9 0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 61.2 63.3 64.3 63.1 65.1 2.0 pps
Male 73.4 73.6 73.3 72.8 73.4 0.6 pps
Young (15-24) 37.4 36.1 36.0 34.9 35.2 0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 91.9 92.5 92.3 91.8 92.2 0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 42.7 44.4 44.5 45.2 47.6 2.4 pps
Female 59.5 60.4 60.8 60.9 61.8 0.9 pps
Young (15-24) 31.9 31.6 30.8 29.9 29.8 -0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 77.0 78.0 79.0 79.2 80.4 1.2 pps
Older (55-64) 24.6 27.5 27.9 29.3 30.9 1.6 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 61.0 62.0 62.4 61.6 62.0 0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 27.6 27.5 27.4 25.3 25.2 -0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 78.4 79.7 80.5 79.8 80.0 0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 32.0 34.4 34.5 35.2 37.3 2.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 36.0 37.4 37.8 36.0 37.5 1.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 69.8 71.6 71.8 70.3 66.5 -3.8 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 95.3 92.0 89.3 88.8 91.6 2.8 pps
Nationals (15-64) 56.4 57.2 57.4 56.6 56.7 0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 4.6 4.9 5.0 5.0 5.3 0.3 pps
Male 67.9 68.7 68.6 67.2 67.4 0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 30.4 29.9 29.7 27.4 27.3 -0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 85.9 87.0 87.0 85.7 85.5 -0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 40.9 42.9 42.8 42.9 45.6 2.7 pps
Female 54.0 55.3 56.2 56.0 56.5 0.5 pps
Young (15-24) 24.7 25.0 25.0 23.2 23.1 -0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 70.7 72.3 73.8 73.8 74.4 0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 23.2 26.0 26.3 27.7 29.2 1.5 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 4232.9 4348.1 4413.7 4389.4 4450.6 1.4 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 1.2 1.6 1.7 -0.4 0.7 1.1 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) : : : : : : pps
Male : : : : : : pps
Female : : : : : : pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 13.2 13.1 12.7 13.2 13.0 -0.2 pps
Male 9.4 9.2 8.9 9.2 9.0 -0.1 pps
Female 3.8 3.9 3.8 4.0 4.0 0.0 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 8.7 8.6 8.3 8.2 8.1 -0.1 pps
Male 6.9 6.8 6.6 6.5 6.7 0.2 pps
Female 10.8 10.8 10.2 10.2 9.6 -0.6 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 22.0 21.9 22.4 23.2 23.7 0.5 pps
Male 7.0 7.1 7.5 8.2 8.4 0.2 pps
Female 41.0 40.5 40.8 41.4 42.1 0.7 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 8.3 7.5 7.0 7.9 8.3 0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 20.5 18.8 18.0 21.9 22.4 0.5 pps
Prime age (25-49) 7.4 6.8 6.3 7.1 7.6 0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 4.8 4.2 4.4 5.1 4.6 -0.5 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 14.0 13.0 12.5 13.7 15.4 1.7 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 8.2 7.6 7.0 8.1 8.2 0.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 4.5 3.8 3.6 4.5 4.5 0.0 pps
Nationals (15-64) 7.5 6.8 6.3 7.1 7.5 0.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 17.4 15.5 14.2 16.2 16.4 0.2 pps
Male 7.4 6.7 6.5 7.8 8.1 0.3 pps
Female 9.3 8.5 7.6 8.1 8.5 0.4 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 51.2 50.4 47.5 44.2 48.8 4.6 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 40.9 41.1 40.8 40.8 41.2 1.0 %
Male 41.8 41.9 41.7 41.7 42.1 1.0 %
Female 38.9 39.4 39.0 39.2 39.5 0.8 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -1.2 -2.4 -1.2 -1.3 -1.3 0.0 pps
Building and construction 3.8 3.6 2.7 -0.8 0.4 1.2 pps
Services 1.5 2.1 2.0 0.3 1.5 1.1 pps
Manufacturing industry -1.2 -1.1 -0.2 : : : pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 3.3 3.4 3.6 1.8 1.1 -0.8 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 1.0 1.1 1.7 0.7 -0.8 -1.5 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 2.5 3.8 3.5 4.2  :   : pps
Wage and salaries 4.8 4.9  :    :    :   : pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 1.5 1.3 -0.7 -2.4 1.5 3.9 pps
2009-2010
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Bulgaria 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 7706 7673 7640 7607 7564 -0.6 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 5238 5198 5169 5122 5046 -1.5 %
(% of total population) 68.0 67.7 67.7 67.3 66.7 -0.6 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 3376 3448 3505 3442 3356 -2.5 %
Male 1782 1820 1859 1828 1775 -2.9 %
Female 1595 1628 1646 1614 1582 -2.0 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 64.5 66.3 67.8 67.2 66.5 -0.7 pps
Young (15-24) 28.9 28.9 30.1 29.5 28.9 -0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 82.3 84.5 85.5 84.3 83.4 -0.9 pps
Older (55-64) 43.0 45.7 48.7 49.2 47.9 -1.2 pps
Nationals (15-64) 64.5 66.3 67.8 67.2 66.5 -0.7 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 61.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 pps
Male 68.8 70.6 72.5 72.0 70.8 -1.2 pps
Young (15-24) 31.3 31.7 34.0 34.0 33.4 -0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 85.1 87.5 88.8 88.0 86.3 -1.7 pps
Older (55-64) 53.6 55.3 58.7 57.4 55.7 -1.7 pps
Female 60.2 62.1 63.1 62.5 62.3 -0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 26.4 26.0 26.1 24.8 24.2 -0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 79.4 81.4 82.1 80.6 80.5 -0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 33.9 37.2 40.2 42.1 41.3 -0.8 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 58.6 61.7 64.0 62.6 59.7 -2.9 pps
Young (15-24) 23.2 24.5 26.3 24.8 22.2 -2.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 75.7 79.4 81.3 79.2 75.7 -3.5 pps
Older (55-64) 39.6 42.6 46.0 46.1 43.5 -2.6 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 25.3 25.1 27.4 28.5 25.0 -3.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 71.5 76.2 76.9 71.0 66.4 -4.6 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 84.1 86.7 89.3 88.5 84.6 -3.8 pps
Nationals (15-64) 58.5 61.6 63.9 62.5 59.6 -2.9 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 pps
Male 62.8 66.0 68.5 66.9 63.0 -3.9 pps
Young (15-24) 25.4 27.1 29.3 28.0 25.4 -2.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 78.6 82.5 84.7 82.7 77.9 -4.8 pps
Older (55-64) 49.5 51.8 55.8 54.1 50.3 -3.8 pps
Female 54.6 57.6 59.5 58.3 56.4 -2.0 pps
Young (15-24) 21.0 21.8 23.1 21.4 18.9 -2.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 72.8 76.2 77.9 75.8 73.6 -2.2 pps
Older (55-64) 31.1 34.5 37.7 39.2 37.7 -1.6 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 3071.7 3208.8 3306.2 3204.8 3010.4 -6.1 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 3.3 3.2 2.6 -2.6 -5.9 -3.3 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) : : : : : : pps
Male : : : : : : pps
Female : : : : : : pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 11.5 10.9 10.9 11.2 11.5 0.4 pps
Male 7.7 7.3 7.2 7.4 7.4 0.0 pps
Female 3.8 3.6 3.8 3.8 4.1 0.4 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 6.1 5.1 4.9 4.6 4.4 -0.2 pps
Male 6.2 4.8 5.5 5.1 5.0 -0.1 pps
Female 6.1 5.4 4.3 4.1 3.9 -0.2 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 1.8 1.5 2.0 2.1 2.2 0.1 pps
Male 1.3 1.1 1.6 1.8 2.0 0.2 pps
Female 2.3 1.9 2.4 2.5 2.4 -0.1 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 9.0 6.9 5.6 6.8 10.2 3.4 pps
Young (15-24) 19.5 15.1 12.7 16.2 23.2 7.0 pps
Prime age (25-49) 8.0 6.1 4.8 6.0 9.2 3.2 pps
Older (55-64) 7.9 6.8 5.5 6.3 9.3 3.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 20.5 18.0 14.9 15.8 23.1 7.3 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 7.7 5.8 4.5 6.2 9.7 3.5 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 4.0 2.4 2.3 2.9 4.5 1.6 pps
Nationals (15-64) 9.0 6.9 5.7 6.9 10.3 3.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) : : : : : : pps
Male 8.7 6.5 5.5 7.0 10.9 3.9 pps
Female 9.3 7.3 5.8 6.6 9.5 2.9 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 55.7 58.9 51.6 43.1 46.4 3.3 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 41.4 41.4 41.4 40.7 40.9 0.5 %
Male 41.9 41.9 41.8 41.0 41.1 0.2 %
Female 40.9 40.9 40.9 40.3 40.6 0.7 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -1.3 -1.2 1.9 -0.6 -3.6 -3.0 pps
Building and construction 25.1 17.7 18.6 -8.9 -18.6 -9.7 pps
Services 3.4 3.3 2.2 -0.6 -4.7 -4.1 pps
Manufacturing industry 3.3 3.4 -0.1 -7.2 -7.2 0.0 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 6.3 12.7 16.3 9.4 7.2 -2.2 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP -0.5 3.2 7.3 4.9 4.1 -0.8 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 5.8 17.2 20.2 13.1 9.2 -3.9 pps
Wage and salaries 11.7  :    :    :    :   : pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 3.1 3.2 3.5 -2.9 6.4 9.3 pps
2009-2010
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Czech Republic 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 10265 10320 10422 10499 10522 0.2 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 7307 7347 7410 7431 7400 -0.4 %
(% of total population) 71.2 71.2 71.1 70.8 70.3 -0.5 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 5140 5132 5163 5209 5192 -0.3 %
Male 2873 2888 2922 2952 2943 -0.3 %
Female 2267 2244 2241 2257 2249 -0.4 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 70.3 69.9 69.7 70.1 70.2 0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 33.5 31.9 31.1 31.8 30.9 -1.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 88.2 87.8 87.3 87.7 87.8 0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 47.7 48.2 49.5 49.6 49.7 0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64) 70.3 69.7 69.6 70.0 70.1 0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 77.7 81.5 77.0 77.4 78.1 0.7 pps
Male 78.3 78.1 78.1 78.5 78.6 0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 37.7 36.7 35.9 37.3 36.2 -1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 94.8 95.0 94.8 95.1 95.5 0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 62.7 62.5 64.2 63.1 62.4 -0.7 pps
Female 62.3 61.5 61.0 61.5 61.5 0.0 pps
Young (15-24) 29.2 26.9 26.1 26.1 25.3 -0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 81.3 80.3 79.6 79.9 79.8 -0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 34.0 35.2 36.1 37.2 38.0 0.8 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 65.3 66.1 66.6 65.4 65.0 -0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 27.7 28.5 28.1 26.5 25.2 -1.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 82.5 83.5 83.8 82.5 82.2 -0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 45.2 46.0 47.6 46.8 46.5 -0.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 21.1 22.2 23.2 21.4 19.7 -1.7 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 73.8 74.4 74.0 71.7 69.8 -1.9 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 98.9 96.1 95.8 97.9 102.2 4.3 pps
Nationals (15-64) 64.6 65.4 65.8 64.4 64.0 -0.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.0 pps
Male 73.7 74.8 75.4 73.8 73.5 -0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 31.5 32.8 32.4 31.1 29.6 -1.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 90.4 91.7 92.1 90.5 90.5 0.0 pps
Older (55-64) 59.5 59.6 61.9 59.6 58.4 -1.2 pps
Female 56.8 57.3 57.6 56.7 56.3 -0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 23.7 23.9 23.5 21.7 20.6 -1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 74.5 74.9 75.2 74.1 73.4 -0.7 pps
Older (55-64) 32.1 33.5 34.4 35.0 35.5 0.5 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 4769.4 4855.9 4933.5 4857.2 4809.6 -1.0 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 1.9 2.7 1.2 -1.2 -0.8 0.4 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) : : : : : : pps
Male : : : : : : pps
Female : : : : : : pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 15.3 15.4 15.2 15.9 16.8 0.9 pps
Male 11.2 11.3 11.2 11.5 12.1 0.6 pps
Female 4.1 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.7 0.3 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 8.0 7.8 7.2 7.5 8.2 0.7 pps
Male 6.8 6.5 5.7 6.1 6.8 0.7 pps
Female 9.4 9.4 9.1 9.3 9.8 0.5 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.8 5.1 0.3 pps
Male 1.7 1.7 1.6 2.0 2.2 0.2 pps
Female 8.0 7.9 7.8 8.5 9.1 0.6 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 7.2 5.3 4.4 6.7 7.3 0.6 pps
Young (15-24) 17.5 10.7 9.9 16.6 18.3 1.7 pps
Prime age (25-49) 6.3 4.8 4.0 6.0 6.4 0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 5.3 4.6 3.9 5.7 6.5 0.8 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 24.8 20.4 19.4 24.4 25.3 0.9 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 6.4 4.7 3.7 6.2 7.0 0.8 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 2.5 1.7 1.7 2.5 2.8 0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64) 7.2 5.4 4.4 6.8 7.4 0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 6.2 5.6 3.7 5.8 4.6 -1.2 pps
Male 5.8 4.2 3.5 5.9 6.4 0.5 pps
Female 8.9 6.7 5.6 7.7 8.5 0.8 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 54.2 52.3 49.3 30.1 41.0 10.9 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 42.4 42.3 42.3 41.6 41.6 0.0 %
Male 43.8 43.6 43.6 42.9 42.8 -0.2 %
Female 40.4 40.4 40.3 39.8 39.9 0.3 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -0.7 -1.1 0.8 -2.2 -2.8 -0.6 pps
Building and construction 2.0 4.3 2.7 1.4 0.3 -1.1 pps
Services 2.0 3.3 1.0 0.7 0.0 -0.8 pps
Manufacturing industry 2.3 1.8 1.0 -5.9 -2.4 3.5 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 5.9 6.3 6.3 0.4 3.8 3.4 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 4.8 2.9 4.4 -2.1 5.0 7.1 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 6.3 8.4 6.6 5.9 1.6 -4.3 pps
Wage and salaries 7.9 9.4 8.7 0.0  :   : pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 4.8 3.4 1.2 -3.0 3.2 6.2 pps
2009-2010
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Denmark 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 5415 5431 5483 5517 5551 0.6 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 3569 3573 3592 3592 3622 0.8 %
(% of total population) 65.9 65.8 65.5 65.1 65.2 0.1 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 2875 2866 2897 2897 2878 -0.7 %
Male 1516 1513 1528 1521 1512 -0.6 %
Female 1360 1353 1369 1376 1366 -0.7 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 80.6 80.2 80.7 80.7 79.5 -1.2 pps
Young (15-24) 69.9 70.9 72.4 71.7 67.4 -4.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 88.9 89.0 89.9 89.7 89.0 -0.7 pps
Older (55-64) 63.1 60.8 59.0 60.3 61.1 0.8 pps
Nationals (15-64) 81.0 81.2 81.4 81.0 79.9 -1.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 70.6 63.9 68.9 75.0 72.8 -2.2 pps
Male 84.1 83.9 84.5 84.0 82.7 -1.2 pps
Young (15-24) 70.6 72.3 73.4 72.6 67.5 -5.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 92.3 92.5 93.4 92.4 92.4 0.0 pps
Older (55-64) 69.5 66.9 66.2 67.7 67.3 -0.4 pps
Female 77.0 76.4 76.8 77.3 76.1 -1.2 pps
Young (15-24) 69.3 69.4 71.4 70.7 67.2 -3.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 85.4 85.4 86.4 87.0 85.6 -1.4 pps
Older (55-64) 56.7 54.6 51.8 52.9 55.0 2.0 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 77.4 77.1 77.9 75.7 73.4 -2.3 pps
Young (15-24) 64.6 65.3 66.9 63.6 58.1 -5.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 86.1 86.3 87.6 85.1 83.2 -1.8 pps
Older (55-64) 60.7 58.6 57.3 57.5 57.6 0.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 59.3 76.1 77.3 74.4 59.9 -14.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 78.5 71.0 71.6 69.1 75.6 6.5 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 94.5 84.4 81.9 83.1 90.0 7.0 pps
Nationals (15-64) 74.8 73.9 74.1 72.0 69.6 -2.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 2.5 3.2 3.7 3.7 3.9 0.2 pps
Male 81.2 81.0 81.9 78.3 75.8 -2.6 pps
Young (15-24) 65.0 66.3 68.4 63.6 56.9 -6.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 90.1 90.2 91.2 87.2 85.9 -1.3 pps
Older (55-64) 67.1 64.9 64.6 64.1 62.7 -1.4 pps
Female 73.4 73.2 73.9 73.1 71.1 -2.0 pps
Young (15-24) 64.1 64.2 65.4 63.7 59.4 -4.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 82.0 82.4 84.0 82.9 80.6 -2.3 pps
Older (55-64) 54.3 52.4 50.1 50.9 52.5 1.5 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 2761.7 2756.5 2798.9 2720.6 2659.6 -2.2 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 2.1 2.8 1.9 -3.1 -2.1 1.0 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) : : : : : : pps
Male : : : : : : pps
Female : : : : : : pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 8.0 8.1 8.0 8.4 8.1 -0.3 pps
Male 5.9 6.0 6.0 6.2 5.9 -0.3 pps
Female 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.2 0.0 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 8.9 8.6 8.3 8.9 8.6 -0.3 pps
Male 7.9 7.4 7.5 8.3 8.3 0.0 pps
Female 9.9 9.9 9.1 9.6 8.8 -0.8 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 23.0 23.5 23.9 25.2 25.8 0.6 pps
Male 12.3 12.5 13.3 14.0 14.1 0.1 pps
Female 35.0 35.8 35.8 37.4 38.6 1.2 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 3.9 3.8 3.3 6.0 7.4 1.4 pps
Young (15-24) 7.7 7.9 7.6 11.2 13.8 2.6 pps
Prime age (25-49) 3.2 3.1 2.6 5.3 6.6 1.3 pps
Older (55-64) 3.9 3.5 2.8 4.7 5.8 1.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 6.7 5.7 5.0 9.0 11.0 2.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 3.2 3.0 2.8 5.8 7.0 1.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 3.3 3.0 2.3 4.0 5.0 1.0 pps
Nationals (15-64) 3.8 3.6 3.1 5.8 7.1 1.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 8.3 9.7 8.8 11.2 14.7 3.5 pps
Male 3.3 3.5 3.0 6.5 8.2 1.7 pps
Female 4.5 4.2 3.7 5.4 6.6 1.2 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 20.8 16.2 13.1 9.1 19.1 10.0 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 39.5 39.3 39.1 39.1 39.5 1.0 %
Male 40.9 40.6 40.4 40.3 40.7 1.0 %
Female 37.1 37.1 37.1 37.2 37.6 1.1 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -2.4 -2.4 1.3 -2.5 -2.5 0.0 pps
Building and construction 6.9 4.3 1.0 -9.2 -6.8 2.4 pps
Services 2.3 2.9 2.1 -1.5 -0.9 0.5 pps
Manufacturing industry -0.8 2.3 1.3 -9.7 -7.2 2.5 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 3.5 3.6 3.6 2.4 2.7 0.3 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 1.4 1.3 -0.2 2.0 -0.7 -2.7 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 3.0 3.3 3.7 2.8 3.1 0.3 pps
Wage and salaries 5.4 6.5 5.8 -1.4 0.4 1.8 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 1.3 -1.1 -2.9 -2.2 3.9 6.1 pps
2009-2010
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Germany 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 81489 81363 81265 80967 80760 -0.3 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 54533 54226 54066 53763 53546 -0.4 %
(% of total population) 66.9 66.6 66.5 66.4 66.3 -0.1 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 41078 41207 41374 41351 41015 -0.8 %
Male 22343 22317 22353 22272 22175 -0.4 %
Female 18735 18890 19021 19080 18839 -1.3 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 75.3 76.0 76.5 76.9 76.6 -0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 50.3 51.4 52.5 52.0 51.3 -0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.6 87.8 87.9 88.0 87.3 -0.7 pps
Older (55-64) 55.2 57.5 58.8 61.1 62.5 1.4 pps
Nationals (15-64) 76.3 77.1 77.6 78.0 77.7 -0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 66.9 67.1 67.3 68.0 67.5 -0.5 pps
Male 81.3 81.8 82.1 82.3 82.3 0.0 pps
Young (15-24) 52.9 53.7 54.9 54.4 53.7 -0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 93.8 93.8 93.6 93.4 93.1 -0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 64.0 66.1 67.3 69.4 70.8 1.4 pps
Female 69.3 70.1 70.8 71.4 70.8 -0.6 pps
Young (15-24) 47.6 49.0 49.9 49.6 48.9 -0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 81.4 81.8 82.1 82.5 81.3 -1.2 pps
Older (55-64) 46.6 49.1 50.6 53.0 54.5 1.5 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 67.5 69.4 70.7 70.9 71.1 0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 43.4 45.3 46.9 46.2 46.2 0.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 79.4 80.9 81.8 81.6 81.5 -0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 48.4 51.5 53.8 56.2 57.7 1.5 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 47.3 46.6 40.6 40.1 40.7 0.6 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 74.4 77.9 75.8 73.9 73.6 -0.3 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 87.3 86.5 88.4 94.9 94.8 -0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64) 61.8 63.4 64.6 64.7 64.9 0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 5.5 5.8 6.0 6.2 6.2 0.0 pps
Male 72.8 74.7 75.9 75.6 76.0 0.5 pps
Young (15-24) 45.1 46.9 48.8 47.6 47.9 0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 84.9 86.4 87.2 86.2 86.5 0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 56.4 59.7 61.8 63.9 65.0 1.2 pps
Female 62.2 64.0 65.4 66.2 66.1 -0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 41.6 43.5 45.0 44.7 44.6 -0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 73.7 75.2 76.3 76.9 76.3 -0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 40.6 43.6 46.1 48.7 50.5 1.8 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 36833.4 37611.5 38238.7 38130.6 38072.7 -0.2 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 0.6 1.7 1.4 0.0 0.5 0.5 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) : : : : : : pps
Male : : : : : : pps
Female : : : : : : pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 10.6 10.4 10.2 10.4 10.5 0.1 pps
Male 7.3 7.1 7.0 7.1 7.1 0.0 pps
Female 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.4 0.1 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 14.5 14.6 14.7 14.5 14.7 0.2 pps
Male 14.8 14.7 14.8 14.4 14.5 0.1 pps
Female 14.2 14.5 14.7 14.7 15.0 0.3 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 25.2 25.4 25.2 25.4 25.5 0.1 pps
Male 8.5 8.5 8.4 8.6 8.7 0.1 pps
Female 45.1 45.3 44.9 44.8 45.0 0.2 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 10.3 8.7 7.5 7.8 7.1 -0.7 pps
Young (15-24) 13.7 11.9 10.5 11.2 9.9 -1.3 pps
Prime age (25-49) 9.3 7.8 6.9 7.2 6.7 -0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 12.4 10.3 8.5 8.0 7.7 -0.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 18.9 17.2 15.5 15.8 15.1 -0.7 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 10.0 8.3 7.2 7.6 7.0 -0.6 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 4.8 3.9 3.3 3.4 3.2 -0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64) 9.4 7.9 6.9 7.1 6.5 -0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 18.9 16.2 14.1 14.8 13.8 -1.0 pps
Male 10.3 8.6 7.4 8.1 7.5 -0.6 pps
Female 10.2 8.8 7.7 7.3 6.6 -0.7 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 56.4 56.6 52.6 45.5 47.4 1.9 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 42.2 42.3 42.1 41.4 41.7 0.7 %
Male 43.1 43.2 43.0 42.2 42.5 0.7 %
Female 40.3 40.4 40.4 39.8 40.0 0.5 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -1.9 1.6 1.2 -0.1 -1.2 -1.1 pps
Building and construction -0.2 1.6 -0.7 0.5 1.3 0.8 pps
Services 1.2 1.8 1.5 0.7 1.1 0.4 pps
Manufacturing industry -0.8 1.2 1.6 -2.9 -1.7 1.2 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 1.1 0.9 2.0 0.2 2.0 1.8 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 0.7 -0.9 0.9 -1.2 1.4 2.6 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 1.5 0.8 2.7 2.2 0.8 -1.4 pps
Wage and salaries 1.5 3.3 3.8 -0.2  :   : pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 2.7 1.0 -0.4 -4.7 3.1 7.8 pps
2009-2010
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Estonia 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 1339 1338 1336 1336 1335 0.0 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 913 909 907 906 904 -0.2 %
(% of total population) 68.1 68.0 67.9 67.8 67.7 -0.1 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 661 663 671 670 667 -0.4 %
Male 332 338 340 337 333 -1.2 %
Female 329 325 331 333 334 0.3 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 72.4 72.9 74.0 74.0 73.8 -0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 35.9 38.3 41.4 39.9 38.3 -1.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 89.1 88.5 88.1 87.8 88.2 0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 61.0 62.1 65.1 66.7 64.2 -2.5 pps
Nationals (15-64) 71.8 72.2 73.0 72.8 72.6 -0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 75.5 76.3 79.0 79.2 79.6 0.4 pps
Male 75.8 77.5 78.3 77.6 76.8 -0.8 pps
Young (15-24) 41.1 44.2 45.3 45.0 42.3 -2.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 92.8 93.6 92.9 91.9 91.8 -0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 61.6 63.7 68.8 67.4 64.5 -2.9 pps
Female 69.3 68.7 70.1 70.6 71.0 0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 30.6 32.3 37.4 34.7 34.2 -0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 85.7 83.7 83.6 83.9 84.9 1.0 pps
Older (55-64) 60.4 61.0 62.3 66.1 63.9 -2.1 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 68.1 69.4 69.8 63.5 61.0 -2.5 pps
Young (15-24) 31.6 34.5 36.4 28.9 25.7 -3.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 84.2 84.8 83.9 76.4 74.8 -1.6 pps
Older (55-64) 58.5 60.0 62.4 60.5 53.8 -6.7 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 32.1 33.0 35.2 25.3 23.5 -1.8 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 69.8 72.7 73.9 64.6 62.3 -2.3 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 95.5 90.3 86.9 89.3 85.3 -4.1 pps
Nationals (15-64) 56.6 57.9 57.9 52.8 51.6 -1.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 11.5 11.5 12.0 10.7 9.4 -1.3 pps
Male 71.1 73.2 73.6 64.1 61.5 -2.6 pps
Young (15-24) 37.0 38.8 39.5 30.7 27.4 -3.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.6 89.7 88.5 77.4 75.7 -1.7 pps
Older (55-64) 57.5 59.4 65.2 59.4 52.3 -7.2 pps
Female 65.3 65.9 66.3 63.0 60.5 -2.5 pps
Young (15-24) 26.0 30.0 33.2 27.0 24.0 -3.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 81.1 80.1 79.5 75.5 73.9 -1.6 pps
Older (55-64) 59.1 60.4 60.3 61.2 54.9 -6.3 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 621.1 630.7 633.5 575.8 551.8 -4.2 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 5.4 0.8 0.2 -9.9 -4.8 5.1 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) : : : : : : pps
Male : : : : : : pps
Female : : : : : : pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 7.9 8.7 7.5 8.0 7.9 0.0 pps
Male 5.6 6.2 5.2 5.4 5.4 0.0 pps
Female 2.3 2.5 2.3 2.6 2.5 0.0 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 2.7 2.2 2.4 2.5 3.7 1.2 pps
Male 3.2 2.8 3.5 3.1 4.9 1.8 pps
Female : : : 2.0 2.7 0.7 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 6.7 7.2 6.4 9.4 9.8 0.4 pps
Male 3.7 3.8 3.5 6.1 6.2 0.1 pps
Female 9.7 10.6 9.3 12.5 13.1 0.6 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 5.9 4.7 5.5 13.8 16.9 3.1 pps
Young (15-24) 12.0 10.0 12.0 27.5 32.9 5.4 pps
Prime age (25-49) 5.6 4.3 4.7 13.0 15.4 2.4 pps
Older (55-64) : : : 9.4 16.2 6.8 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 13.5 11.7 12.2 29.9 32.4 2.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 6.3 4.9 5.9 16.1 19.6 3.5 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 3.3 : 3.0 6.4 9.5 3.1 pps
Nationals (15-64) 5.0 4.0 4.6 12.1 14.5 2.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 11.0 8.5 10.2 22.6 29.7 7.1 pps
Male 6.2 5.4 5.8 16.9 19.5 2.6 pps
Female 5.6 3.9 5.3 10.6 14.3 3.7 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 48.2 49.2 30.1 27.4 45.3 17.9 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 41.3 41.3 40.6 39.5 40.5 2.5 %
Male 42.0 41.9 41.1 39.9 41.2 3.3 %
Female 40.6 40.6 40.0 39.0 39.8 2.1 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -2.5 -3.2 -17.0 -4.8 1.3 6.1 pps
Building and construction 25.1 27.6 -3.8 -29.9 -26.1 3.8 pps
Services 7.0 -1.4 1.4 -5.0 -2.8 2.2 pps
Manufacturing industry -2.3 -1.8 2.9 -15.9 -5.7 10.2 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 14.1 24.6 10.1 -3.3 -0.2 3.1 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 5.3 12.7 2.7 -3.3 -1.7 1.6 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 16.6 20.0 14.0 -1.9 -1.9 0.0 pps
Wage and salaries 20.2 24.0 11.5 -14.5  :   : pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 4.9 6.1 -5.2 -4.4 8.3 12.7 pps
2009-2010
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Ireland 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 4253 4357 4440 4468 4476 0.2 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 2919 2997 3041 3029 3002 -0.9 %
(% of total population) 68.6 68.8 68.5 67.8 67.1 -0.7 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 2099 2174 2189 2128 2087 -1.9 %
Male 1206 1236 1236 1184 1153 -2.6 %
Female 893 938 953 944 934 -1.1 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 71.9 72.5 72.0 70.2 69.5 -0.7 pps
Young (15-24) 55.0 55.4 52.6 46.7 42.0 -4.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 81.4 81.9 81.6 80.6 80.4 -0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 54.4 55.1 55.5 54.6 54.8 0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64) 71.1 71.5 71.0 69.5 69.0 -0.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 77.8 78.9 77.3 74.9 72.9 -2.0 pps
Male 81.7 81.6 80.7 78.1 77.1 -1.0 pps
Young (15-24) 59.3 58.8 55.2 48.0 42.8 -5.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 92.1 91.6 91.3 89.5 89.3 -0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 68.6 69.6 68.6 66.3 65.1 -1.2 pps
Female 61.9 63.3 63.1 62.4 62.0 -0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 50.6 51.9 49.9 45.4 41.2 -4.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 70.5 71.9 71.8 71.7 71.6 -0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 40.0 40.4 42.2 42.8 44.4 1.6 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 68.7 69.2 67.6 61.8 60.0 -1.9 pps
Young (15-24) 50.3 50.4 45.9 35.4 30.5 -4.9 pps
Prime age (25-54) 78.3 78.6 77.3 72.0 70.3 -1.7 pps
Older (55-64) 53.1 53.8 53.7 51.0 50.0 -1.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 47.7 46.9 44.1 36.5 31.9 -4.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 78.5 80.2 76.3 67.3 62.2 -5.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 106.6 105.9 104.4 96.4 92.0 -4.3 pps
Nationals (15-64) 59.7 58.5 56.7 53.0 52.4 -0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 8.9 10.6 10.9 8.8 7.6 -1.3 pps
Male 77.9 77.5 74.9 66.3 63.9 -2.4 pps
Young (15-24) 54.0 53.0 46.7 33.0 28.4 -4.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 88.4 87.7 85.5 77.2 75.0 -2.2 pps
Older (55-64) 66.9 67.8 66.1 60.9 58.1 -2.8 pps
Female 59.3 60.6 60.2 57.4 56.0 -1.3 pps
Young (15-24) 46.5 47.8 45.1 37.7 32.5 -5.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 68.0 69.3 69.0 66.8 65.7 -1.1 pps
Older (55-64) 39.0 39.5 41.1 41.0 41.9 0.9 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 2004.6 2072.6 2054.8 1873.3 1799.9 -3.9 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 4.3 3.7 -1.1 -8.2 -4.1 4.1 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) : : : : : : pps
Male : : : : : : pps
Female : : : : : : pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 14.8 15.4 15.7 15.7 15.3 -0.4 pps
Male 12.4 12.7 12.8 12.8 12.2 -0.6 pps
Female 2.4 2.6 2.8 2.9 3.1 0.1 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 6.0 8.0 8.4 8.5 9.3 0.8 pps
Male 5.1 6.7 7.1 7.4 8.6 1.2 pps
Female 6.9 9.5 9.8 9.5 10.0 0.5 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 16.6 17.3 18.1 20.7 21.9 1.2 pps
Male 6.0 6.4 7.1 9.8 11.1 1.3 pps
Female 30.8 31.6 31.9 33.4 34.2 0.8 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 4.5 4.6 6.3 11.9 13.7 1.8 pps
Young (15-24) 8.6 9.0 12.7 24.2 27.5 3.3 pps
Prime age (25-49) 3.9 4.1 5.4 11.2 13.0 1.8 pps
Older (55-64) 2.4 2.4 3.3 6.5 8.6 2.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 7.0 7.6 10.1 18.0 22.0 4.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 4.2 4.4 6.2 13.5 15.8 2.3 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 2.7 2.7 3.4 6.9 7.6 0.7 pps
Nationals (15-64) 4.1 4.4 5.8 11.3 13.2 1.9 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 6.8 6.1 7.7 15.8 17.3 1.5 pps
Male 4.6 4.9 7.4 14.9 16.9 2.0 pps
Female 4.2 4.1 4.9 8.0 9.7 1.7 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 31.6 29.6 27.1 29.0 49.0 20.0 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 40.8 40.5 40.2 39.5 39.6 0.3 %
Male 42.6 42.4 42.0 41.4 41.6 0.5 %
Female 37.2 36.9 36.8 36.2 36.4 0.6 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture 0.9 0.6 4.1 -16.3 -11.9 4.4 pps
Building and construction 11.2 3.2 -11.1 -32.3 -23.4 8.9 pps
Services 4.4 4.7 1.0 -2.8 -0.8 2.0 pps
Manufacturing industry -0.4 0.5 -4.7 -10.3 -6.3 4.0 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 4.7 5.4 3.4 0.0 -1.8 -1.9 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 1.4 4.5 8.0 3.0 -0.8 -3.8 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index)  :    :    :    :   : : pps
Wage and salaries 9.8 8.1 1.3 -8.3  :   : pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 0.9 1.9 -2.4 0.6 3.2 2.6 pps
2009-2010
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Greece 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 10710 10754 10780 10839 10882 0.4 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 7158 7208 7232 7222 7231 0.1 %
(% of total population) 66.8 67.0 67.1 66.6 66.5 -0.2 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 4799 4829 4851 4894 4934 0.8 %
Male 2825 2849 2860 2857 2858 0.0 %
Female 1974 1981 1991 2036 2077 2.0 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 67.0 67.0 67.1 67.8 68.2 0.5 pps
Young (15-24) 32.4 31.1 30.2 30.9 30.3 -0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 82.0 81.9 82.0 82.8 83.3 0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 43.9 43.9 44.2 44.2 45.1 0.9 pps
Nationals (15-64) 66.6 66.6 66.6 67.1 67.5 0.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 74.2 73.3 73.6 74.8 75.8 1.0 pps
Male 79.1 79.1 79.1 79.0 78.9 -0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 36.1 34.7 34.3 34.4 33.4 -1.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 94.7 94.6 94.4 94.4 94.2 -0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 61.0 60.8 60.9 60.1 60.2 0.1 pps
Female 55.0 54.9 55.1 56.5 57.6 1.1 pps
Young (15-24) 28.7 27.6 26.1 27.4 27.3 -0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 69.1 69.1 69.4 71.0 72.2 1.2 pps
Older (55-64) 28.0 28.2 28.6 29.3 30.9 1.6 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 61.0 61.4 61.9 61.2 59.6 -1.7 pps
Young (15-24) 24.2 24.0 23.6 22.9 20.3 -2.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 75.3 75.6 76.1 75.4 73.3 -2.1 pps
Older (55-64) 42.3 42.4 42.8 42.2 42.3 0.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 49.0 52.0 52.7 50.1 47.3 -2.8 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 60.5 60.2 59.5 61.8 59.7 -2.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 98.3 90.2 93.2 87.8 86.5 -1.3 pps
Nationals (15-64) 56.9 56.9 56.8 55.4 53.9 -1.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 4.1 4.4 5.1 5.8 5.6 -0.2 pps
Male 74.6 74.9 75.0 73.5 70.9 -2.6 pps
Young (15-24) 29.7 29.2 28.5 27.7 24.5 -3.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 90.0 90.1 90.2 88.4 85.3 -3.0 pps
Older (55-64) 59.2 59.1 59.1 57.7 56.5 -1.2 pps
Female 47.4 47.9 48.7 48.9 48.1 -0.8 pps
Young (15-24) 18.7 18.7 18.5 18.1 16.2 -2.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 60.5 60.8 61.9 62.2 61.1 -1.2 pps
Older (55-64) 26.6 26.9 27.5 27.7 28.9 1.2 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 4365.3 4423.5 4473.7 4423.2 4306.5 -2.6 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 3.3 1.7 0.2 -0.7 -2.1 -1.4 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) : : : : : : pps
Male : : : : : : pps
Female : : : : : : pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 29.2 28.7 28.8 29.2 29.6 0.4 pps
Male 21.1 20.9 20.6 20.9 20.9 0.0 pps
Female 8.1 7.8 8.2 8.3 8.7 0.4 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 10.7 10.9 11.5 12.1 12.4 0.3 pps
Male 9.1 9.3 9.9 10.6 11.0 0.4 pps
Female 13.0 13.2 13.7 14.1 14.4 0.3 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 5.5 5.4 5.4 5.8 6.2 0.4 pps
Male 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.9 3.4 0.5 pps
Female 9.9 9.9 9.8 10.1 10.2 0.1 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 8.9 8.3 7.7 9.5 12.6 3.1 pps
Young (15-24) 25.2 22.9 22.1 25.8 32.9 7.1 pps
Prime age (25-49) 8.6 8.3 7.6 9.4 12.6 3.2 pps
Older (55-64) 3.7 3.4 3.2 4.6 6.3 1.7 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 8.3 7.8 7.6 9.7 12.9 3.2 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 10.7 9.8 8.8 11.0 14.5 3.5 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 7.3 7.1 6.3 7.4 9.8 2.4 pps
Nationals (15-64) 9.1 8.5 7.9 9.5 12.5 3.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 7.9 7.5 6.8 10.5 15.0 4.5 pps
Male 5.6 5.2 5.1 6.9 9.9 3.0 pps
Female 13.6 12.8 11.4 13.2 16.2 3.0 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 54.3 49.9 47.5 40.8 45.0 4.2 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 42.7 42.4 42.2 42.1 42.3 0.5 %
Male 44.0 43.7 43.5 43.4 43.5 0.2 %
Female 40.4 40.1 40.1 39.9 40.2 0.8 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -1.6 -3.0 -0.1 1.4 1.7 0.3 pps
Building and construction 0.2 6.3 -1.1 -4.3 -10.7 -6.4 pps
Services 5.0 2.1 0.4 -0.5 -1.2 -0.7 pps
Manufacturing industry 0.8 1.2 -0.4 -1.6 -5.7 -4.1 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 3.6 6.1 7.0 3.6 -3.5 -7.1 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP  :    :    :    :    :   : pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 2.2 3.3 2.7 7.6 -1.0 -8.6 pps
Wage and salaries 9.0 7.6 6.6 4.2  :   : pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 1.8 2.5 0.8 -1.3 -2.4 -1.1 pps
2009-2010
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Spain 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 43835 44630 45329 45671 45820 0.3 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 30255 30808 31252 31349 31261 -0.3 %
(% of total population) 69.0 69.0 68.9 68.6 68.2 -0.4 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 21435 22043 22689 22881 22933 0.2 %
Male 12432 12702 12933 12844 12730 -0.9 %
Female 9003 9341 9756 10037 10203 1.7 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 70.8 71.6 72.6 73.0 73.4 0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 48.2 47.8 47.7 45.1 42.7 -2.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 82.0 82.8 83.8 84.7 85.5 0.9 pps
Older (55-64) 46.8 47.4 49.2 50.2 50.8 0.6 pps
Nationals (15-64) 69.7 70.5 71.5 71.9 72.2 0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 80.0 78.5 79.1 79.0 80.0 0.9 pps
Male 81.3 81.4 81.8 81.0 80.7 -0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 52.2 52.1 51.5 48.3 45.1 -3.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 92.5 92.6 92.6 92.3 92.5 0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 63.5 63.1 65.1 64.0 63.9 -0.1 pps
Female 60.2 61.4 63.2 64.8 65.9 1.1 pps
Young (15-24) 43.9 43.3 43.7 41.7 40.1 -1.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 71.2 72.7 74.7 76.7 78.3 1.6 pps
Older (55-64) 31.0 32.5 34.2 37.2 38.5 1.3 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 64.8 65.6 64.3 59.8 58.6 -1.2 pps
Young (15-24) 39.5 39.1 36.0 28.0 24.9 -3.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 75.8 76.8 75.3 70.7 69.6 -1.1 pps
Older (55-64) 44.1 44.6 45.6 44.1 43.6 -0.5 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 54.2 55.7 56.1 49.9 47.1 -2.9 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 80.2 79.2 74.0 66.3 62.5 -3.8 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 97.6 96.2 89.1 85.1 83.5 -1.6 pps
Nationals (15-64) 56.7 56.6 55.0 51.4 50.4 -1.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 8.1 9.0 9.3 8.4 8.1 -0.2 pps
Male 76.1 76.2 73.5 66.6 64.7 -1.9 pps
Young (15-24) 44.4 44.2 39.3 29.5 25.6 -3.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.6 87.6 84.4 77.3 75.7 -1.6 pps
Older (55-64) 60.4 60.0 60.9 56.7 54.7 -2.0 pps
Female 53.2 54.7 54.9 52.8 52.3 -0.5 pps
Young (15-24) 34.4 33.8 32.5 26.5 24.2 -2.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 63.7 65.6 65.9 63.8 63.2 -0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 28.7 30.0 31.1 32.3 33.2 0.9 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 19600.2 20211.3 20102.8 18736.0 18304.1 -2.3 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 3.9 3.0 -0.4 -6.6 -2.3 4.3 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) : : : : : : pps
Male : : : : : : pps
Female : : : : : : pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 16.2 16.3 16.3 15.7 15.7 0.0 pps
Male 11.5 11.5 11.4 10.8 10.8 0.0 pps
Female 4.7 4.8 4.9 5.0 4.9 0.0 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 34.1 31.7 29.3 25.5 25.0 -0.5 pps
Male 32.1 30.6 27.7 23.8 23.9 0.1 pps
Female 36.8 33.1 31.4 27.3 26.2 -1.1 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 11.8 11.6 11.8 12.6 13.1 0.5 pps
Male 4.1 3.9 4.0 4.7 5.2 0.5 pps
Female 23.0 22.7 22.6 22.9 23.1 0.2 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 8.5 8.3 11.3 18.0 20.1 2.1 pps
Young (15-24) 17.9 18.2 24.6 37.8 41.6 3.8 pps
Prime age (25-49) 7.7 7.4 10.4 17.1 19.2 2.1 pps
Older (55-64) 5.7 5.9 7.3 12.1 14.1 2.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 10.5 10.5 15.4 24.7 27.5 2.8 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 8.1 8.1 10.6 17.1 19.3 2.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 6.1 5.3 6.4 9.8 11.3 1.5 pps
Nationals (15-64) 8.1 7.7 10.3 16.1 18.3 2.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 11.8 12.2 17.5 28.5 30.2 1.7 pps
Male 6.3 6.4 10.1 17.7 19.7 2.0 pps
Female 11.6 10.9 13.0 18.4 20.5 2.1 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 21.7 20.4 17.8 23.7 36.6 12.9 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 41.3 41.1 41.0 40.7 40.7 0.0 %
Male 42.2 42.0 41.9 41.6 41.6 0.0 %
Female 39.5 39.5 39.4 39.2 39.3 0.3 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -5.7 -2.0 -4.9 -3.5 0.8 4.3 pps
Building and construction 6.0 5.6 -10.2 -22.5 -12.1 10.4 pps
Services 5.3 3.8 2.1 -2.5 -0.5 2.0 pps
Manufacturing industry -0.2 -0.8 -1.4 -14.4 -5.8 8.6 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 3.3 4.6 6.2 3.9 0.6 -3.3 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP -0.1 1.4 3.9 3.5 -0.3 -3.8 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 3.3 4.7 5.0 5.0 0.7 -4.3 pps
Wage and salaries 7.8 8.2 6.0 -2.5  :   : pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 0.1 0.5 1.3 3.1 2.2 -0.9 pps
2009-2010
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France 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 60124 60482 60797 61104 61410 0.5 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 39314 39555 39714 39841 39972 0.3 %
(% of total population) 65.4 65.4 65.3 65.2 65.1 -0.1 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 27473 27665 27843 28124 28214 0.3 %
Male 14501 14544 14610 14717 14748 0.2 %
Female 12972 13121 13234 13407 13466 0.4 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 69.9 69.9 70.1 70.6 70.6 0.0 pps
Young (15-24) 38.4 38.7 39.0 40.4 39.7 -0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.8 88.2 88.7 88.8 88.9 0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 40.4 40.2 40.0 41.4 42.5 1.1 pps
Nationals (15-64) 70.3 70.3 70.5 71.0 71.0 0.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 63.8 63.9 64.8 64.1 64.5 0.5 pps
Male 75.0 74.8 74.8 75.1 75.0 -0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 42.2 42.1 42.5 43.6 43.3 -0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 94.2 94.2 94.5 94.4 94.2 -0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 43.0 42.7 42.6 44.2 45.2 1.0 pps
Female 64.9 65.3 65.6 66.2 66.3 0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 34.6 35.4 35.5 37.2 36.1 -1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 81.7 82.4 83.1 83.5 83.8 0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 37.9 37.8 37.6 38.8 40.0 1.3 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 63.7 64.3 64.9 64.1 64.0 -0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 30.2 31.4 31.9 31.2 30.8 -0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 81.2 82.0 83.1 82.0 81.8 -0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 38.1 38.2 38.2 38.8 39.7 0.9 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 45.1 44.1 44.4 42.8 42.9 0.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 71.5 73.2 72.7 70.5 69.1 -1.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 89.2 90.0 87.5 88.0 87.4 -0.6 pps
Nationals (15-64) 60.7 61.2 61.5 61.0 60.6 -0.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.1 3.4 0.2 pps
Male 68.9 69.2 69.6 68.4 68.3 -0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 33.7 34.4 34.7 33.3 33.9 0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.9 88.3 89.1 87.6 87.1 -0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 40.5 40.5 40.6 41.3 42.1 0.8 pps
Female 58.6 59.7 60.4 60.0 59.9 -0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 26.7 28.4 29.0 29.1 27.7 -1.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 74.7 76.0 77.2 76.6 76.7 0.0 pps
Older (55-64) 35.8 36.0 35.9 36.5 37.5 1.0 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 25044.5 25447.9 25780.4 25554.6 25578.0 0.1 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 1.0 1.4 0.6 -1.2 0.0 1.2 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) : : : : : : pps
Male : : : : : : pps
Female : : : : : : pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 10.3 10.1 9.8 10.2 10.7 0.5 pps
Male 7.4 7.2 6.9 7.2 7.6 0.4 pps
Female 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.1 0.2 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 14.9 15.2 15.0 14.4 15.1 0.7 pps
Male 14.1 14.1 13.7 13.0 14.1 1.1 pps
Female 15.8 16.3 16.3 15.9 16.0 0.1 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 17.1 17.2 16.8 17.2 17.5 0.3 pps
Male 5.6 5.5 5.5 5.7 6.4 0.7 pps
Female 30.2 30.3 29.4 29.8 29.8 0.0 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 9.2 8.4 7.8 9.5 9.8 0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 21.4 18.9 18.4 22.8 22.5 -0.3 pps
Prime age (25-49) 7.8 7.2 6.5 8.0 8.3 0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 5.7 5.1 4.6 6.2 6.7 0.5 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 13.2 12.3 11.8 14.3 15.4 1.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 8.1 7.1 6.9 8.8 8.8 0.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 5.9 5.4 4.5 5.5 5.5 0.0 pps
Nationals (15-64) 8.4 7.5 7.0 8.6 8.9 0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 16.7 16.4 14.1 17.9 17.2 -0.7 pps
Male 8.5 7.8 7.3 9.3 9.4 0.1 pps
Female 10.1 9.0 8.4 9.8 10.2 0.4 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 42.0 40.2 37.5 35.1 40.1 5.0 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 39.6 39.6 39.5 39.3 39.8 1.3 %
Male 40.9 40.8 40.7 40.6 40.9 0.7 %
Female 37.7 37.6 37.7 37.5 38.0 1.3 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -2.4 -2.5 -3.6 : : : pps
Building and construction 4.4 4.1 3.1 : : : pps
Services 1.4 1.8 0.9 : : : pps
Manufacturing industry -1.9 -0.7 -1.3 : : : pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 3.3 2.5 2.5 1.6 2.0 0.4 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 1.0 -0.1 -0.1 1.4 1.3 -0.1 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 4.0 4.0 3.5 0.9 3.2 2.3 pps
Wage and salaries 4.5 4.2 3.1 0.0  :   : pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 1.5 0.8 -0.7 -1.5 1.4 2.9 pps
2009-2010
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Italy 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 58435 58880 59336 59752 60051 0.5 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 38726 38946 39182 39406 39546 0.4 %
(% of total population) 66.3 66.1 66.0 65.9 65.9 -0.1 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 24287 24350 24696 24591 24594 0.0 %
Male 14445 14483 14571 14498 14457 -0.3 %
Female 9842 9867 10125 10093 10137 0.4 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 62.7 62.5 63.0 62.4 62.2 -0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 32.5 30.9 30.9 29.1 28.4 -0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 77.8 77.6 78.1 77.2 76.9 -0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 33.4 34.6 35.5 37.0 38.0 1.0 pps
Nationals (15-64) 62.1 61.9 62.3 61.6 61.4 -0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 73.7 73.2 73.3 72.7 71.4 -1.3 pps
Male 74.6 74.4 74.4 73.7 73.3 -0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 37.8 36.1 35.9 34.0 33.2 -0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54) 91.3 91.0 91.0 90.0 89.4 -0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 45.0 46.3 47.0 48.5 49.6 1.0 pps
Female 50.8 50.7 51.6 51.1 51.1 0.0 pps
Young (15-24) 26.9 25.5 25.7 23.9 23.4 -0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 64.3 64.1 65.2 64.5 64.4 -0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 22.5 23.5 24.7 26.1 27.0 0.9 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 58.4 58.7 58.7 57.5 56.9 -0.6 pps
Young (15-24) 25.5 24.7 24.4 21.7 20.5 -1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 73.3 73.5 73.5 71.9 71.1 -0.8 pps
Older (55-64) 32.5 33.8 34.4 35.7 36.6 0.8 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 43.0 44.5 44.3 43.0 42.1 -0.9 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 71.1 70.6 70.0 69.5 69.2 -0.3 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 97.3 97.1 94.3 88.1 83.8 -4.3 pps
Nationals (15-64) 54.9 54.8 54.3 52.7 51.6 -1.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 3.5 3.8 4.4 4.8 5.2 0.4 pps
Male 70.5 70.7 70.3 68.6 67.7 -0.9 pps
Young (15-24) 30.6 29.6 29.1 26.1 24.3 -1.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.2 87.3 86.7 84.7 83.5 -1.2 pps
Older (55-64) 43.7 45.1 45.5 46.7 47.6 0.9 pps
Female 46.3 46.6 47.2 46.4 46.1 -0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 20.1 19.5 19.4 17.0 16.5 -0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 59.3 59.6 60.2 59.1 58.7 -0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 21.9 23.0 24.0 25.4 26.2 0.8 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 22618.5 22846.2 23010.5 22650.1 22496.5 -0.7 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 2.0 1.3 0.3 -1.7 -0.7 1.0 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) : : : : : : pps
Male : : : : : : pps
Female : : : : : : pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 23.7 23.4 22.9 22.5 22.7 0.2 pps
Male 16.8 16.7 16.3 16.1 16.3 0.2 pps
Female 6.9 6.8 6.6 6.4 6.4 0.0 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 13.1 13.2 13.3 12.5 12.8 0.3 pps
Male 11.2 11.2 11.5 10.8 11.4 0.6 pps
Female 15.8 16.0 15.7 14.6 14.5 -0.1 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 13.1 13.4 14.1 14.1 14.8 0.7 pps
Male 4.3 4.6 4.8 4.7 5.1 0.4 pps
Female 26.4 26.8 27.8 27.9 29.0 1.1 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 6.8 6.1 6.7 7.8 8.4 0.6 pps
Young (15-24) 21.6 20.3 21.3 25.4 27.8 2.4 pps
Prime age (25-49) 6.3 5.8 6.4 7.4 8.1 0.7 pps
Older (55-64) 2.9 2.4 3.1 3.4 3.6 0.2 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 8.2 7.5 8.6 9.6 10.5 0.9 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 6.2 5.7 6.2 7.3 8.0 0.7 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 5.3 4.5 4.6 5.6 5.8 0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64) 6.8 6.0 6.7 7.6 8.2 0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 8.6 8.3 8.5 11.2 11.7 0.5 pps
Male 5.4 4.9 5.5 6.8 7.6 0.8 pps
Female 8.8 7.9 8.5 9.3 9.7 0.4 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 49.6 47.4 45.6 44.4 48.4 4.0 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 40.4 40.6 40.4 39.9 40.1 0.5 %
Male 41.7 41.9 41.7 41.1 41.3 0.5 %
Female 37.7 37.8 37.7 37.4 37.6 0.5 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture 2.0 -2.4 -2.0 -2.6 1.7 4.3 pps
Building and construction 1.3 3.2 0.3 -1.2 -1.4 -0.2 pps
Services 2.4 1.5 0.7 -0.8 0.1 0.9 pps
Manufacturing industry 0.9 0.7 -0.8 -4.5 -3.8 0.7 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 2.2 2.1 3.0 -0.1 1.9 2.0 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 0.8 -0.2 1.0 -0.7 1.4 2.1 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 1.8 2.3 4.2 4.7 2.0 -2.7 pps
Wage and salaries 5.1 3.9 3.7 -0.6  :   : pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 0.1 0.2 -1.6 -3.6 2.0 5.6 pps
2009-2010
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Cyprus 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 737 752 758 763 771 1.1 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 500 518 524 528 534 1.2 %
(% of total population) 67.9 68.9 69.1 69.2 69.3 0.0 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 365 383 386 391 398 1.8 %
Male 202 209 210 213 215 0.8 %
Female 164 174 176 178 183 3.0 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 73.0 73.9 73.6 73.9 74.4 0.5 pps
Young (15-24) 41.5 41.6 41.8 41.1 40.6 -0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 86.2 86.7 86.4 86.6 87.2 0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 55.4 57.7 56.6 58.5 59.6 1.1 pps
Nationals (15-64) 72.6 73.7 73.0 73.5 73.2 -0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 76.0 75.5 76.8 76.1 79.1 3.0 pps
Male 82.8 82.9 82.0 82.0 81.7 -0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 44.9 43.9 43.2 42.2 40.3 -1.9 pps
Prime age (25-54) 95.3 95.0 94.0 93.5 93.5 0.0 pps
Older (55-64) 74.1 74.9 73.0 74.8 75.0 0.2 pps
Female 63.8 65.4 65.7 66.2 67.4 1.2 pps
Young (15-24) 38.3 39.7 40.5 40.2 40.8 0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 77.4 78.7 79.1 79.7 80.9 1.2 pps
Older (55-64) 37.8 41.5 41.1 42.7 44.8 2.1 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 69.6 71.0 70.8 69.9 69.7 -0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 37.4 37.5 38.0 35.5 33.8 -1.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 82.6 83.8 83.7 82.6 82.5 -0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 53.6 55.9 54.8 55.9 56.8 0.8 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 50.9 46.3 45.3 50.1 51.1 1.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 86.2 90.3 79.6 75.7 72.2 -3.5 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 98.9 109.9 110.6 100.1 93.1 -7.0 pps
Nationals (15-64) 60.0 60.6 58.6 57.5 55.0 -2.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 9.6 10.3 12.3 12.5 14.7 2.3 pps
Male 79.4 80.0 79.2 77.6 76.6 -1.0 pps
Young (15-24) 40.9 39.1 39.5 36.4 33.8 -2.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 92.0 92.4 91.4 89.2 88.4 -0.8 pps
Older (55-64) 71.7 72.6 70.8 71.6 71.3 -0.2 pps
Female 60.3 62.4 62.8 62.5 63.0 0.5 pps
Young (15-24) 34.2 35.9 36.7 34.5 33.7 -0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54) 73.6 75.5 76.3 76.0 76.6 0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 36.5 40.4 39.4 40.9 43.1 2.2 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 348.3 367.9 371.1 369.3 372.3 0.8 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 1.8 3.2 2.8 -0.7 -0.3 0.4 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) : : : : : : pps
Male : : : : : : pps
Female : : : : : : pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 18.4 17.5 16.9 16.6 15.5 -1.1 pps
Male 13.6 13.0 12.6 11.9 11.0 -0.9 pps
Female 4.8 4.5 4.3 4.7 4.5 -0.2 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 13.2 13.3 14.0 13.5 13.6 0.1 pps
Male 7.9 7.6 8.2 7.5 6.9 -0.6 pps
Female 19.0 19.2 20.0 19.9 20.6 0.7 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 6.6 6.4 6.8 7.4 8.1 0.7 pps
Male 2.8 3.0 3.4 3.9 4.9 1.0 pps
Female 11.3 10.4 10.8 11.5 11.8 0.3 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 4.6 4.0 3.6 5.3 6.3 1.0 pps
Young (15-24) 10.0 10.2 9.0 13.8 16.7 2.9 pps
Prime age (25-49) 4.1 3.3 3.3 4.7 5.7 1.0 pps
Older (55-64) 3.3 3.1 3.2 4.3 4.7 0.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 5.1 5.1 5.2 6.6 7.7 1.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 4.6 4.0 3.7 5.6 6.3 0.7 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 4.4 3.4 3.0 4.5 5.7 1.2 pps
Nationals (15-64) 4.5 3.7 3.4 4.9 5.7 0.8 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 5.8 5.7 5.4 8.0 8.7 0.7 pps
Male 4.0 3.4 3.1 5.2 6.2 1.0 pps
Female 5.4 4.6 4.2 5.5 6.5 1.0 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 19.3 18.6 13.6 10.3 20.3 10.0 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 40.7 40.4 40.5 40.2 40.7 1.2 %
Male 41.9 41.7 41.8 41.6 41.9 0.7 %
Female 39.0 38.7 38.7 38.4 39.2 2.1 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -14.1 10.7 -3.0 6.3 1.1 -5.2 pps
Building and construction 3.9 4.9 3.1 -5.4 -2.1 3.3 pps
Services 2.7 2.9 3.3 -0.4 -0.1 0.3 pps
Manufacturing industry 1.0 1.0 1.2 -1.2 0.8 2.0 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 2.9 3.0 2.3 3.2 2.8 -0.4 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 0.0 -1.6 -2.6 3.6 0.8 -2.8 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 4.7 3.6 6.2 3.8 1.9 -1.9 pps
Wage and salaries 6.9 7.4 8.3 2.9  :   : pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 2.3 1.8 0.8 -1.0 1.3 2.3 pps
2009-2010
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Latvia 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 2294 2281 2271 2261 2248 -0.6 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 1580 1573 1568 1560 1549 -0.7 %
(% of total population) 68.9 69.0 69.0 69.0 68.9 -0.1 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 1126 1145 1167 1153 1134 -1.7 %
Male 581 591 597 583 570 -2.1 %
Female 545 555 570 570 564 -1.2 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 71.3 72.8 74.4 73.9 73.2 -0.7 pps
Young (15-24) 40.8 43.0 42.9 41.7 40.4 -1.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 86.4 87.2 88.9 88.5 88.5 0.0 pps
Older (55-64) 57.1 60.3 63.3 61.4 57.2 -4.3 pps
Nationals (15-64) 71.2 72.8 73.8 73.6 73.1 -0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 83.6 69.9 77.8 75.7 74.0 -1.7 pps
Male 76.2 77.6 78.6 77.0 75.8 -1.2 pps
Young (15-24) 47.8 48.9 48.8 46.8 43.0 -3.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 90.0 91.0 92.2 91.1 91.3 0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 64.4 67.9 68.8 63.8 58.9 -4.9 pps
Female 66.7 68.3 70.5 71.0 70.7 -0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 33.7 36.8 36.7 36.3 37.7 1.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 82.9 83.6 85.7 86.1 85.9 -0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 51.6 54.6 59.3 59.7 55.8 -3.9 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 66.3 68.3 68.7 61.0 59.3 -1.6 pps
Young (15-24) 35.9 38.3 37.2 27.7 26.4 -1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 81.1 82.3 82.6 74.7 73.4 -1.3 pps
Older (55-64) 53.3 57.7 59.4 53.2 48.2 -5.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 32.1 36.1 34.3 25.8 23.3 -2.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 72.2 72.0 70.9 62.3 60.9 -1.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 101.0 99.9 105.5 100.1 95.0 -5.1 pps
Nationals (15-64) 65.7 67.4 58.1 51.7 50.6 -1.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 0.6 0.9 10.5 9.3 8.7 -0.6 pps
Male 70.4 72.5 72.1 61.0 59.2 -1.8 pps
Young (15-24) 42.8 43.4 42.4 29.3 27.8 -1.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 83.7 85.6 85.4 74.5 72.9 -1.6 pps
Older (55-64) 59.5 64.6 63.1 53.2 47.6 -5.6 pps
Female 62.4 64.4 65.4 60.9 59.4 -1.4 pps
Young (15-24) 28.7 33.1 31.9 26.0 25.0 -0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54) 78.6 79.1 79.9 74.9 73.8 -1.1 pps
Older (55-64) 48.7 52.4 56.7 53.3 48.7 -4.7 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 1047.3 1075.1 1076.3 950.9 918.9 -3.4 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 4.9 3.6 0.9 -13.2 -4.8 8.4 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) : : : : : : pps
Male : : : : : : pps
Female : : : : : : pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 9.7 8.8 8.5 9.7 9.9 0.2 pps
Male 5.9 5.8 5.7 6.1 5.9 -0.3 pps
Female 3.8 3.0 2.9 3.5 4.0 0.5 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 7.2 4.2 3.3 4.4 6.8 2.4 pps
Male 8.9 5.6 4.6 5.9 8.9 3.0 pps
Female 5.4 2.8 1.9 3.0 5.0 2.0 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 5.8 5.6 5.5 8.4 9.3 0.9 pps
Male 4.3 4.4 3.9 7.0 7.5 0.5 pps
Female 7.4 6.9 7.1 9.6 11.0 1.4 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 6.8 6.0 7.5 17.1 18.7 1.6 pps
Young (15-24) 12.2 10.7 13.1 33.6 34.5 0.9 pps
Prime age (25-49) 6.1 5.6 7.2 15.8 17.0 1.2 pps
Older (55-64) 6.6 4.4 6.2 13.4 15.6 2.2 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 14.9 10.8 14.6 31.4 32.3 0.9 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 6.3 5.9 7.7 18.7 20.4 1.7 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 3.8 3.7 4.2 8.4 10.5 2.1 pps
Nationals (15-64) 7.0 6.2 7.1 16.4 17.6 1.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) : : 11.1 23.5 26.1 2.6 pps
Male 7.4 6.4 8.0 20.3 21.7 1.4 pps
Female 6.2 5.6 6.9 13.9 15.7 1.8 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 36.6 26.3 25.7 26.7 45.1 18.4 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 42.6 41.8 40.7 40.6 40.2 -1.0 %
Male 43.8 42.6 41.3 41.1 40.6 -1.2 %
Female 41.4 40.8 40.0 40.0 39.8 -0.5 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture 3.2 -9.8 -18.3 -3.1 0.1 3.2 pps
Building and construction 12.9 23.1 0.2 -38.6 -18.8 19.8 pps
Services 5.1 4.6 4.7 -8.9 -5.1 3.7 pps
Manufacturing industry 1.9 -1.7 -2.1 -18.7 2.0 20.7 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 23.2 35.1 15.7 -12.2 -6.5 5.7 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 12.2 12.3 1.2 -10.8 -4.3 6.6 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 23.4 30.3 22.4 0.2 -2.9 -3.1 pps
Wage and salaries 29.4 43.3 19.4 -26.1  :   : pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 7.0 6.2 -5.1 -5.5 4.6 10.1 pps
2009-2010
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Lithuania 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 3403 3385 3366 3350 3311 -1.2 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 2321 2319 2316 2309 2283 -1.1 %
(% of total population) 68.2 68.5 68.8 68.9 68.9 0.0 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 1565 1575 1584 1612 1610 -0.1 %
Male 790 796 801 805 800 -0.6 %
Female 775 779 783 807 810 0.4 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 67.4 67.9 68.4 69.8 70.5 0.7 pps
Young (15-24) 26.3 27.4 30.8 30.4 29.6 -0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 86.2 86.0 85.5 87.3 88.5 1.2 pps
Older (55-64) 52.9 55.6 55.6 57.6 56.8 -0.8 pps
Nationals (15-64) 67.4 67.9 68.3 69.8 70.5 0.7 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 71.6 69.3 76.1 63.8 72.0 8.2 pps
Male 70.5 71.0 71.4 72.0 72.4 0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 29.3 31.8 35.4 33.8 32.8 -1.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 88.7 87.9 87.4 88.3 89.2 0.9 pps
Older (55-64) 59.9 63.4 63.0 63.9 62.9 -0.9 pps
Female 64.6 65.0 65.5 67.8 68.8 1.0 pps
Young (15-24) 23.1 22.8 26.0 26.7 26.3 -0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 83.8 84.2 83.8 86.3 87.9 1.5 pps
Older (55-64) 47.6 49.7 50.0 52.9 52.2 -0.7 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 63.6 64.9 64.3 60.1 57.8 -2.3 pps
Young (15-24) 23.7 25.2 26.7 21.5 19.2 -2.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 81.7 82.5 81.2 76.3 73.8 -2.5 pps
Older (55-64) 49.6 53.4 53.1 51.6 48.6 -3.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 22.0 23.3 18.2 15.5 12.2 -3.4 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 68.5 67.4 66.9 60.7 56.5 -4.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 101.0 104.1 100.6 97.5 94.1 -3.4 pps
Nationals (15-64) 63.1 64.4 64.0 59.8 57.5 -2.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.1 pps
Male 66.3 67.9 67.1 59.5 56.8 -2.7 pps
Young (15-24) 26.4 29.6 30.9 22.0 20.2 -1.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 84.1 84.3 82.7 74.6 71.4 -3.2 pps
Older (55-64) 55.7 60.8 60.2 56.0 52.3 -3.7 pps
Female 61.0 62.1 61.8 60.7 58.7 -1.9 pps
Young (15-24) 20.9 20.5 22.2 20.9 18.2 -2.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 79.5 80.8 79.7 78.0 76.1 -1.9 pps
Older (55-64) 45.1 47.9 47.7 48.3 45.8 -2.5 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 1475.9 1505.8 1490.2 1387.5 1319.6 -4.9 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 1.8 2.8 -0.7 -6.8 -5.1 1.7 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) : : : : : : pps
Male : : : : : : pps
Female : : : : : : pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 13.1 11.7 10.0 10.2 9.1 -1.1 pps
Male 8.1 7.5 6.6 6.4 5.4 -1.0 pps
Female 5.1 4.2 3.4 3.8 3.7 -0.1 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 4.5 3.5 2.4 2.3 2.4 0.1 pps
Male 6.4 4.8 2.9 3.0 3.3 0.3 pps
Female 2.6 2.3 1.9 1.6 1.7 0.1 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 9.5 8.1 6.5 8.0 7.7 -0.3 pps
Male 7.5 6.5 4.7 6.7 6.3 -0.4 pps
Female 11.5 9.7 8.3 9.1 8.9 -0.2 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 5.6 4.3 5.8 13.7 17.8 4.1 pps
Young (15-24) 9.8 8.2 13.4 29.2 35.1 5.9 pps
Prime age (25-49) 4.8 4.0 4.9 12.5 16.8 4.3 pps
Older (55-64) 6.2 3.8 4.4 10.4 14.5 4.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 10.6 7.7 13.7 30.9 41.1 10.2 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 6.5 5.1 6.7 16.4 21.9 5.5 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 2.6 2.1 3.0 6.1 7.8 1.7 pps
Nationals (15-64) 5.7 4.3 5.9 13.9 18.0 4.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) : : : : : : pps
Male 5.8 4.3 6.1 17.1 21.2 4.1 pps
Female 5.4 4.3 5.6 10.4 14.5 4.1 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 44.2 32.0 21.1 23.2 41.4 18.2 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 39.8 40.0 40.3 39.9 39.8 -0.3 %
Male 40.4 40.6 40.9 40.5 40.4 -0.2 %
Female 39.0 39.3 39.7 39.4 39.3 -0.3 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -9.9 -14.2 -23.9 9.4 -6.8 -16.2 pps
Building and construction 12.7 15.9 -2.4 -24.4 -23.2 1.2 pps
Services 3.6 4.6 3.6 -4.1 -1.4 2.7 pps
Manufacturing industry -0.6 1.7 -0.3 -12.2 -8.2 4.0 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 16.7 13.9 14.3 -11.1 -1.3 9.8 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 9.5 4.9 4.2 -7.7 -3.3 4.4 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 18.5 21.8 17.6 -6.5 -4.9 1.6 pps
Wage and salaries 20.4 18.8 15.8 -18.1  :   : pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 5.9 6.9 3.6 -8.5 6.8 15.3 pps
2009-2010
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Luxembourg 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 456 465 467 481 488 1.5 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 307 316 318 330 335 1.7 %
(% of total population) 67.2 68.0 68.1 68.5 68.6 0.2 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 205 211 213 227 229 1.0 %
Male 115 118 120 128 128 0.4 %
Female 90 94 92 99 100 1.6 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 66.7 66.9 66.8 68.7 68.2 -0.5 pps
Young (15-24) 27.8 26.6 29.1 32.3 24.7 -7.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 84.5 84.8 83.4 84.8 85.7 0.9 pps
Older (55-64) 33.7 32.6 35.1 39.3 40.5 1.2 pps
Nationals (15-64) 62.8 62.7 62.7 64.8 64.3 -0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 72.0 72.1 71.9 73.3 72.8 -0.4 pps
Male 75.3 75.0 74.7 76.5 76.0 -0.6 pps
Young (15-24) 30.5 30.7 30.8 34.8 26.7 -8.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 95.3 94.9 93.8 94.1 94.8 0.7 pps
Older (55-64) 38.8 36.3 39.6 47.7 48.9 1.2 pps
Female 58.2 58.9 58.7 60.7 60.3 -0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 25.2 22.4 27.0 29.2 22.5 -6.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 73.8 74.7 72.9 75.3 76.3 1.0 pps
Older (55-64) 28.3 29.2 30.4 30.8 32.2 1.4 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 63.5 64.2 63.4 65.2 65.2 0.0 pps
Young (15-24) 23.2 22.5 23.9 26.7 21.2 -5.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 81.0 81.9 80.0 81.2 82.3 1.1 pps
Older (55-64) 33.1 32.0 34.1 38.1 39.6 1.5 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 44.7 50.1 48.3 34.4 33.3 -1.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 63.7 70.2 70.7 70.9 71.9 1.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 140.8 95.7 90.5 129.4 114.2 -15.1 pps
Nationals (15-64) 35.1 33.7 33.5 33.6 33.7 0.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 28.4 30.4 29.9 31.5 31.5 0.0 pps
Male 72.7 72.3 71.5 73.2 73.1 -0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 25.6 26.7 27.1 29.0 22.1 -6.9 pps
Prime age (25-54) 92.7 92.2 90.2 90.8 92.0 1.2 pps
Older (55-64) 38.8 35.4 38.8 46.6 47.8 1.2 pps
Female 54.6 56.1 55.2 57.0 57.2 0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 21.4 18.3 20.6 24.2 20.4 -3.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 69.4 71.7 69.5 71.4 72.5 1.1 pps
Older (55-64) 27.9 28.8 29.5 29.6 31.4 1.8 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 194.9 202.6 201.8 214.8 218.6 1.8 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 3.6 4.5 4.7 0.9 1.6 0.7 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) : : : : : : pps
Male : : : : : : pps
Female : : : : : : pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 7.6 7.0 6.1 7.4 7.2 -0.2 pps
Male 5.0 4.5 3.7 5.0 4.7 -0.3 pps
Female 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.5 0.0 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 6.1 6.8 6.2 7.2 7.1 -0.1 pps
Male 5.7 6.2 5.9 6.3 6.2 -0.1 pps
Female 6.6 7.6 6.6 8.3 8.3 0.0 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 17.1 17.8 17.9 17.6 17.5 -0.1 pps
Male 2.6 2.6 2.7 4.5 3.4 -1.1 pps
Female 36.2 37.1 38.2 34.9 35.8 0.9 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 4.6 4.2 4.9 5.1 4.5 -0.6 pps
Young (15-24) 16.2 15.2 17.9 17.2 14.2 -3.0 pps
Prime age (25-49) 4.3 3.4 4.3 4.5 4.0 -0.5 pps
Older (55-64) : : : : : : pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 6.6 5.8 6.6 8.2 6.1 -2.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 4.4 3.4 5.9 4.3 4.0 -0.3 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 3.1 3.2 2.4 4.2 3.8 -0.4 pps
Nationals (15-64) 3.1 3.3 3.0 3.0 2.8 -0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 6.7 4.9 7.3 7.3 6.1 -1.2 pps
Male 3.6 3.4 4.1 4.5 3.9 -0.6 pps
Female 6.0 5.1 5.9 5.9 5.3 -0.6 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 29.5 28.7 32.2 23.2 29.3 6.1 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 40.8 40.8 40.4 41.4 41.4 0.0 %
Male 41.3 41.2 40.9 42.4 42.2 -0.5 %
Female 39.8 40.0 39.3 39.3 39.6 0.8 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture 0.0 6.1 -3.8 -2.0 6.1 8.1 pps
Building and construction 4.7 5.1 3.8 -0.3 0.8 1.1 pps
Services 4.0 5.1 5.6 1.7 2.0 0.3 pps
Manufacturing industry 0.0 -1.1 1.7 -2.8 -1.2 1.6 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 2.6 3.7 2.1 1.8 1.6 -0.3 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP -3.9 0.1 -2.1 2.2 -3.8 -5.9 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 2.6 3.3 3.3 4.1 2.4 -1.7 pps
Wage and salaries 7.6 8.9 6.9 1.8  :   : pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 1.4 2.1 -3.2 -4.5 1.9 6.4 pps
2009-2010
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Hungary 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 9921 9907 9893 9867 9852 -0.2 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 6816 6800 6794 6771 6769 0.0 %
(% of total population) 68.7 68.6 68.7 68.6 68.7 0.1 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 4222 4209 4178 4172 4225 1.3 %
Male 2286 2290 2267 2260 2270 0.4 %
Female 1936 1919 1911 1912 1955 2.3 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 62.0 61.9 61.5 61.6 62.4 0.8 pps
Young (15-24) 26.8 25.6 25.0 24.6 24.9 0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 79.6 80.0 80.1 80.2 80.9 0.7 pps
Older (55-64) 34.9 34.5 33.1 35.0 37.3 2.3 pps
Nationals (15-64) 61.9 61.9 61.4 61.5 62.4 0.9 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 66.8 68.0 70.4 73.8 67.8 -6.0 pps
Male 68.7 69.0 68.3 68.2 68.3 0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 30.1 29.3 28.6 27.7 27.7 0.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 86.5 86.9 87.0 86.9 87.2 0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 43.1 43.6 40.5 42.6 43.1 0.5 pps
Female 55.5 55.1 55.0 55.3 56.7 1.4 pps
Young (15-24) 23.4 21.8 21.3 21.5 22.1 0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 72.9 73.2 73.3 73.6 74.6 1.1 pps
Older (55-64) 28.2 27.3 27.0 28.8 32.4 3.7 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 57.3 57.3 56.7 55.4 55.4 0.0 pps
Young (15-24) 21.7 21.0 20.0 18.1 18.3 0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 74.2 74.6 74.4 72.9 72.5 -0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 33.6 33.1 31.4 32.8 34.4 1.6 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 24.7 24.0 24.5 23.4 23.9 0.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 65.9 67.0 64.1 61.5 60.9 -0.7 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 94.7 86.8 89.3 87.3 86.7 -0.6 pps
Nationals (15-64) 56.9 56.9 56.2 54.9 55.0 0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 -0.1 pps
Male 63.8 64.0 63.0 61.1 60.4 -0.7 pps
Young (15-24) 24.5 24.2 23.1 19.9 20.0 0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 81.0 81.3 81.0 78.9 77.9 -0.9 pps
Older (55-64) 41.4 41.7 38.5 39.9 39.6 -0.3 pps
Female 51.1 50.9 50.6 49.9 50.6 0.7 pps
Young (15-24) 18.8 17.8 16.9 16.3 16.6 0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 67.6 67.9 67.9 66.9 67.1 0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 27.1 26.2 25.7 27.0 30.1 3.1 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 3906.0 3897.0 3849.2 3751.2 3750.1 0.0 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 0.6 -0.3 -1.3 -2.8 0.2 3.0 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) : : : : : : pps
Male : : : : : : pps
Female : : : : : : pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 12.1 11.8 11.6 11.9 11.7 -0.1 pps
Male 8.3 8.0 8.0 8.0 7.9 -0.1 pps
Female 3.7 3.8 3.6 3.9 3.8 0.0 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 6.7 7.3 7.8 8.4 9.6 1.2 pps
Male 7.3 7.7 8.6 9.0 10.0 1.0 pps
Female 6.0 6.8 7.0 7.8 9.2 1.4 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 3.8 3.9 4.3 5.2 5.5 0.3 pps
Male 2.4 2.5 3.0 3.6 3.6 0.0 pps
Female 5.4 5.5 5.8 7.1 7.6 0.5 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 7.5 7.4 7.8 10.0 11.2 1.2 pps
Young (15-24) 19.1 18.0 19.9 26.5 26.6 0.1 pps
Prime age (25-49) 7.1 7.0 7.3 9.4 10.7 1.3 pps
Older (55-64) 3.9 4.2 5.0 6.3 7.8 1.5 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 16.7 17.5 18.9 23.4 25.3 1.9 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 6.9 6.6 7.2 9.4 10.6 1.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 2.8 2.9 2.8 4.0 4.7 0.7 pps
Nationals (15-64) 7.5 7.4 7.9 10.1 11.3 1.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) : : : 11.2 8.4 -2.8 pps
Male 7.2 7.1 7.6 10.3 11.6 1.3 pps
Female 7.8 7.7 8.1 9.7 10.7 1.0 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 45.1 46.8 46.5 41.6 49.3 7.7 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 40.9 40.7 40.7 40.5 40.5 0.0 %
Male 41.8 41.5 41.5 41.1 41.1 0.0 %
Female 39.8 39.6 39.8 39.8 39.8 0.0 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -2.4 -6.2 -5.7 -4.9 -1.4 3.5 pps
Building and construction 1.5 2.8 -6.3 -1.6 -3.8 -2.2 pps
Services 1.1 -0.2 0.0 -0.9 1.4 2.3 pps
Manufacturing industry -0.2 0.9 -0.1 -8.6 -1.3 7.3 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 5.3 6.7 7.0 -2.2 -0.1 2.0 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 1.1 0.8 2.1 -6.3 -2.9 3.3 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 8.9 9.7 7.9 2.3 -1.2 -3.5 pps
Wage and salaries 7.0 6.8 5.6 -3.5  :   : pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 3.0 1.1 2.1 -4.0 1.0 5.0 pps
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Malta 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 406 409 411 414 415 0.1 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 281 285 288 292 290 -0.8 %
(% of total population) 69.2 69.7 70.1 70.5 69.8 -0.6 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 162 166 169 172 175 1.3 %
Male 111 112 113 114 115 0.4 %
Female 51 54 57 58 60 3.4 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 57.6 58.4 58.8 59.0 60.2 1.2 pps
Young (15-24) 52.5 53.1 52.2 51.4 51.5 0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 67.9 69.7 70.8 71.8 73.1 1.2 pps
Older (55-64) 30.6 29.5 30.5 29.7 31.7 2.0 pps
Nationals (15-64) 57.7 58.5 58.9 58.9 60.1 1.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 54.2 57.5 56.1 61.1 63.4 2.4 pps
Male 78.1 77.6 76.9 76.6 77.6 1.0 pps
Young (15-24) 56.7 56.9 55.2 55.0 55.3 0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 93.9 94.2 93.6 93.7 94.3 0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 50.8 47.5 47.9 47.5 50.2 2.7 pps
Female 36.5 38.6 40.2 40.6 42.2 1.6 pps
Young (15-24) 48.1 48.9 49.1 47.5 47.3 -0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 40.8 44.0 46.8 48.8 50.8 2.0 pps
Older (55-64) 11.0 12.4 13.1 11.8 13.2 1.5 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 53.6 54.6 55.3 54.8 56.1 1.2 pps
Young (15-24) 44.2 45.7 45.8 44.0 44.7 0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 64.4 66.2 67.4 68.0 68.7 0.8 pps
Older (55-64) 29.9 28.4 29.1 27.8 30.2 2.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 43.5 46.0 47.8 46.8 47.2 0.4 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 90.6 80.1 73.9 76.9 76.2 -0.7 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 112.3 103.7 102.5 93.6 89.8 -3.8 pps
Nationals (15-64) 52.2 53.2 53.8 53.1 54.2 1.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.9 0.1 pps
Male 73.3 73.0 72.6 71.5 72.2 0.7 pps
Young (15-24) 47.0 48.2 47.8 46.4 47.7 1.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 89.7 89.9 89.5 89.0 88.7 -0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 49.2 46.0 46.5 45.2 47.8 2.6 pps
Female 33.4 35.7 37.4 37.5 39.2 1.7 pps
Young (15-24) 41.3 43.3 44.1 41.4 41.5 0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 38.1 41.2 44.0 45.8 47.7 1.9 pps
Older (55-64) 10.7 11.7 12.5 11.1 12.9 1.8 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 150.7 155.5 159.1 160.1 162.4 1.4 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 1.3 3.2 2.6 -0.3 2.0 2.3 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) : : : : : : pps
Male : : : : : : pps
Female : : : : : : pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 13.7 13.8 13.1 13.4 13.7 0.4 pps
Male 11.9 11.5 11.1 11.2 11.8 0.6 pps
Female 1.8 2.3 2.0 2.1 2.0 -0.2 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 3.7 5.1 4.2 4.8 5.6 0.8 pps
Male 2.6 3.7 3.3 3.6 4.5 0.9 pps
Female 5.8 7.7 5.8 6.8 7.3 0.5 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 9.7 10.6 11.1 10.7 11.6 0.9 pps
Male 4.5 4.0 4.0 4.4 4.9 0.5 pps
Female 21.4 24.6 25.3 23.2 24.5 1.3 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 7.1 6.4 5.9 7.0 6.9 -0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 15.9 13.9 12.2 14.4 13.0 -1.4 pps
Prime age (25-49) 5.0 5.2 5.1 5.6 6.0 0.4 pps
Older (55-64) : : : : : : pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 9.0 8.6 8.4 9.1 9.1 0.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) : : : 4.7 5.2 0.5 pps
High-skilled (15-64) : : : : : : pps
Nationals (15-64) 6.9 6.4 6.1 6.8 6.9 0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) : : : : : : pps
Male 6.3 5.9 5.6 6.6 6.7 0.1 pps
Female 8.7 7.6 6.6 7.7 7.2 -0.5 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 40.6 41.9 42.2 43.6 46.1 2.5 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 40.6 41.0 41.2 41.0 40.6 -1.0 %
Male 41.3 41.9 42.0 41.8 41.4 -1.0 %
Female 38.7 38.6 39.1 38.9 38.5 -1.0 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture 0.4 2.2 1.7 0.8 1.8 1.0 pps
Building and construction 8.1 3.2 0.5 -3.1 1.9 5.0 pps
Services 2.1 4.1 4.5 1.5 2.0 0.5 pps
Manufacturing industry -3.0 -0.1 -4.3 -7.5 2.0 9.5 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 4.1 1.3 4.5 2.6 -1.1 -3.7 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 1.0 -1.8 1.8 0.1 -3.9 -4.0 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 3.5 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.0 -0.4 pps
Wage and salaries 5.6 4.7 7.5 1.8 0.7 -1.1 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 0.6 1.4 2.7 -3.1 1.1 4.2 pps
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Netherlands 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 16142 16180 16190 16223 16350 0.8 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 10964 10986 10970 10970 11017 0.4 %
(% of total population) 67.9 67.9 67.8 67.6 67.4 -0.2 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 8484 8622 8704 8742 8614 -1.5 %
Male 4636 4680 4705 4700 4632 -1.5 %
Female 3848 3942 3999 4042 3982 -1.5 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 77.4 78.5 79.3 79.7 78.2 -1.5 pps
Young (15-24) 70.8 72.7 73.2 72.8 69.0 -3.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.1 87.6 88.5 88.8 87.9 -0.9 pps
Older (55-64) 49.6 52.8 54.7 56.8 55.9 -0.9 pps
Nationals (15-64) 78.0 79.1 79.8 80.2 78.7 -1.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 63.7 65.1 68.8 68.4 67.0 -1.3 pps
Male 83.9 84.6 85.3 85.3 83.7 -1.6 pps
Young (15-24) 71.5 73.1 73.7 72.7 68.6 -4.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 94.1 94.0 94.5 94.4 93.3 -1.1 pps
Older (55-64) 60.4 64.0 65.9 67.6 67.3 -0.2 pps
Female 70.7 72.2 73.3 74.1 72.6 -1.4 pps
Young (15-24) 70.1 72.4 72.6 72.9 69.4 -3.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 80.1 81.2 82.5 83.0 82.4 -0.7 pps
Older (55-64) 38.6 41.4 43.5 46.0 44.5 -1.5 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 74.4 76.0 77.2 77.0 74.7 -2.3 pps
Young (15-24) 66.2 68.4 69.3 68.0 63.0 -5.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 84.2 85.4 86.8 86.3 84.7 -1.7 pps
Older (55-64) 47.7 50.9 53.0 55.1 53.7 -1.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 54.6 57.2 60.7 60.3 60.4 0.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 79.0 82.0 80.5 79.0 76.6 -2.5 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 96.2 92.2 93.8 95.2 90.5 -4.7 pps
Nationals (15-64) 71.3 72.8 73.8 73.6 71.7 -1.9 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 2.5 2.6 2.8 2.7 2.5 -0.2 pps
Male 80.9 82.2 83.2 82.4 80.0 -2.4 pps
Young (15-24) 67.2 68.9 69.8 67.5 62.6 -5.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 91.4 92.1 93.0 92.0 90.0 -2.0 pps
Older (55-64) 58.0 61.5 63.7 65.4 64.5 -0.9 pps
Female 67.7 69.6 71.1 71.5 69.3 -2.2 pps
Young (15-24) 65.1 67.9 68.8 68.4 63.5 -5.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 77.0 78.7 80.5 80.7 79.3 -1.4 pps
Older (55-64) 37.2 40.1 42.2 44.7 42.8 -1.9 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 8152.0 8345.1 8467.6 8443.4 8226.9 -2.6 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 1.7 2.5 1.4 -1.1 -0.5 0.6 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) : : : : : : pps
Male : : : : : : pps
Female : : : : : : pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 11.6 12.0 12.1 12.4 13.8 1.4 pps
Male 7.7 8.0 8.0 8.1 9.2 1.1 pps
Female 3.9 4.0 4.1 4.3 4.6 0.3 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 16.4 17.9 17.9 18.0 18.3 0.3 pps
Male 15.2 16.4 16.2 16.0 16.9 0.9 pps
Female 17.9 19.5 19.8 20.2 19.8 -0.4 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 45.8 46.3 46.8 47.7 48.3 0.6 pps
Male 22.1 22.5 22.8 23.6 24.2 0.6 pps
Female 74.5 74.8 75.2 75.7 76.2 0.5 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 4.4 3.6 3.1 3.7 4.5 0.8 pps
Young (15-24) 6.6 5.9 5.3 6.6 8.7 2.1 pps
Prime age (25-49) 3.3 2.5 2.0 2.8 3.7 0.9 pps
Older (55-64) 3.8 3.6 3.2 3.1 4.0 0.9 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 6.1 5.3 4.6 5.5 7.4 1.9 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 3.6 2.9 2.4 3.1 4.0 0.9 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 2.3 1.8 1.6 2.1 2.8 0.7 pps
Nationals (15-64) 3.7 3.1 2.6 3.2 4.3 1.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 8.8 6.5 6.2 7.0 9.5 2.5 pps
Male 3.9 3.1 2.8 3.7 4.4 0.7 pps
Female 5.0 4.1 3.4 3.8 4.5 0.7 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 42.9 39.3 34.4 24.2 27.5 3.3 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 41.3 41.3 41.1 41.0 41.2 0.5 %
Male 41.9 41.9 41.7 41.6 41.8 0.5 %
Female 38.8 38.9 38.9 38.8 38.9 0.3 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -1.6 -1.1 -1.4 -4.5 3.1 7.6 pps
Building and construction 1.9 1.2 1.9 -1.8 -2.4 -0.6 pps
Services 2.1 3.1 1.6 -0.7 -0.2 0.6 pps
Manufacturing industry -0.3 0.5 0.9 -3.1 -3.1 0.0 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 2.3 3.0 3.4 2.2 1.1 -1.1 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 0.7 1.6 1.2 2.4 -0.5 -2.9 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 3.0 3.3 4.3 2.0 1.7 -0.3 pps
Wage and salaries 4.3 6.1 4.8 1.1  :   : pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 1.7 1.3 0.4 -2.8 2.3 5.1 pps
2009-2010
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Austria 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 8155 8191 8220 8238 8259 0.3 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 5532 5551 5576 5588 5606 0.3 %
(% of total population) 67.8 67.8 67.8 67.8 67.9 0.0 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 4077 4149 4182 4207 4209 0.1 %
Male 2215 2257 2259 2252 2256 0.2 %
Female 1862 1891 1923 1955 1953 -0.1 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 73.7 74.7 75.0 75.3 75.1 -0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 59.4 60.8 60.8 60.5 58.8 -1.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.1 87.4 87.3 87.7 87.7 -0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 36.8 39.8 41.9 42.1 43.3 1.3 pps
Nationals (15-64) 74.1 75.3 75.7 75.9 75.8 -0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 70.4 70.5 69.5 70.3 70.1 -0.2 pps
Male 80.5 81.7 81.4 81.0 80.9 -0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 63.9 65.0 64.6 64.0 63.6 -0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 93.2 93.7 93.0 92.6 92.5 -0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 47.3 51.3 52.8 52.3 53.0 0.7 pps
Female 67.0 67.8 68.6 69.6 69.3 -0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 55.1 56.7 56.9 57.0 54.1 -2.9 pps
Prime age (25-54) 80.9 81.1 81.5 82.8 82.8 0.0 pps
Older (55-64) 26.9 28.9 31.6 32.4 34.2 1.8 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 70.2 71.4 72.1 71.6 71.7 0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 54.0 55.5 55.9 54.5 53.6 -0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 83.5 84.0 84.4 84.0 84.2 0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 35.5 38.6 41.0 41.1 42.4 1.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 47.5 53.7 51.9 47.3 45.7 -1.6 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 77.2 78.5 77.6 77.3 78.1 0.8 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 90.6 80.6 87.5 94.1 95.1 1.0 pps
Nationals (15-64) 63.2 64.0 64.5 64.2 63.9 -0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 6.9 7.4 7.6 7.5 7.8 0.3 pps
Male 76.9 78.4 78.5 76.9 77.1 0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 58.2 59.6 59.5 57.3 57.9 0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 89.9 90.6 90.2 88.5 88.7 0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 45.3 49.8 51.8 51.0 51.6 0.7 pps
Female 63.5 64.4 65.8 66.4 66.4 -0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 49.9 51.5 52.3 51.6 49.4 -2.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 77.0 77.5 78.6 79.5 79.7 0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 26.3 28.0 30.8 31.7 33.7 2.0 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 3881.3 3963.2 4019.8 4002.4 4021.1 0.5 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 1.4 1.8 1.8 -0.9 1.0 1.9 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) : : : : : : pps
Male : : : : : : pps
Female : : : : : : pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 11.7 11.7 11.1 10.9 11.3 0.3 pps
Male 7.6 7.5 7.2 7.1 7.3 0.2 pps
Female 4.1 4.1 3.9 3.8 4.0 0.2 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 9.0 8.9 9.0 9.1 9.3 0.2 pps
Male 9.1 8.8 8.9 9.1 9.8 0.7 pps
Female 8.9 9.0 9.1 9.0 8.9 -0.1 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 21.3 21.8 22.6 23.7 24.3 0.6 pps
Male 5.8 6.2 6.9 7.4 7.8 0.4 pps
Female 39.9 40.7 41.1 42.4 43.3 0.9 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 4.8 4.4 3.8 4.8 4.4 -0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 9.1 8.7 8.0 10.0 8.8 -1.2 pps
Prime age (25-49) 4.2 3.9 3.4 4.2 4.0 -0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 3.5 3.0 2.1 2.4 2.2 -0.2 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 9.4 8.8 8.1 10.1 8.7 -1.4 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 4.1 3.7 3.3 4.2 4.0 -0.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 2.6 2.5 1.8 2.3 2.4 0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64) 4.1 3.8 3.4 4.2 3.9 -0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 10.6 9.6 7.8 10.4 8.7 -1.7 pps
Male 4.3 3.9 3.6 5.0 4.6 -0.4 pps
Female 5.2 5.0 4.1 4.6 4.2 -0.4 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 27.4 26.8 24.2 21.3 25.2 3.9 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 43.3 43.1 42.9 42.0 41.9 -0.2 %
Male 44.1 43.9 43.7 42.8 42.7 -0.2 %
Female 41.6 41.4 41.1 40.4 40.4 0.0 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -2.4 -4.4 -1.5 -1.5 -0.5 1.0 pps
Building and construction 0.0 2.0 0.8 -1.2 0.1 1.3 pps
Services 1.7 2.2 2.1 0.2 1.7 1.6 pps
Manufacturing industry 2.2 2.3 1.8 -5.3 -1.9 3.4 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 3.0 3.1 3.2 1.8 1.6 -0.2 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 1.6 0.9 1.4 1.5 0.1 -1.4 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 2.1 3.5 4.8 4.3 1.1 -3.2 pps
Wage and salaries 4.9 5.3 5.6 0.8  :   : pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 2.2 1.9 0.4 -3.0 1.1 4.1 pps
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Poland 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 37446 37277 37158 37196 37368 0.5 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 26325 26299 26266 26338 26527 0.7 %
(% of total population) 70.3 70.5 70.7 70.8 71.0 0.2 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 16679 16610 16765 17039 17414 2.2 %
Male 9127 9086 9170 9310 9492 2.0 %
Female 7552 7524 7595 7728 7922 2.5 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 63.4 63.2 63.8 64.7 65.6 1.0 pps
Young (15-24) 34.2 33.0 33.1 33.8 34.5 0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 81.7 81.7 82.5 83.4 84.1 0.8 pps
Older (55-64) 30.7 31.8 33.3 34.5 36.7 2.2 pps
Nationals (15-64) 63.4 63.2 63.8 64.7 65.6 1.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 56.0 69.7 71.4 72.6 68.2 -4.5 pps
Male 70.1 70.0 70.9 71.8 72.4 0.7 pps
Young (15-24) 37.5 36.5 36.5 38.1 39.1 1.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 88.2 87.9 88.8 89.4 89.7 0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 42.6 44.8 46.8 47.5 48.9 1.4 pps
Female 56.8 56.5 57.0 57.8 59.0 1.2 pps
Young (15-24) 30.7 29.3 29.6 29.4 29.7 0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 75.4 75.6 76.3 77.5 78.6 1.2 pps
Older (55-64) 20.3 20.6 21.6 23.2 25.9 2.8 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 54.5 57.0 59.2 59.3 59.3 -0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 24.0 25.8 27.4 26.8 26.3 -0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 71.8 74.9 77.5 77.6 77.1 -0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 28.1 29.7 31.6 32.3 34.0 1.7 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 20.0 21.8 23.0 21.9 20.8 -1.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 59.2 61.4 62.9 61.8 61.0 -0.7 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 108.6 103.8 99.7 101.8 105.4 3.6 pps
Nationals (15-64) 54.4 56.9 59.1 59.3 59.2 -0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 pps
Male 60.9 63.6 66.3 66.1 65.6 -0.5 pps
Young (15-24) 26.9 29.2 31.0 30.4 30.3 0.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 78.3 81.1 84.0 83.7 82.6 -1.1 pps
Older (55-64) 38.4 41.4 44.1 44.3 45.3 0.9 pps
Female 48.2 50.6 52.4 52.8 53.0 0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 21.0 22.4 23.7 23.2 22.1 -1.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 65.3 68.8 71.0 71.6 71.7 0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 19.0 19.4 20.7 21.9 24.2 2.4 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 14338.4 14996.5 15557.4 15629.5 15718.9 0.6 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 3.2 4.4 3.8 0.3 0.4 0.1 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) : : : : : : pps
Male : : : : : : pps
Female : : : : : : pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 19.4 18.7 18.3 18.3 18.5 0.2 pps
Male 12.7 12.3 12.0 12.0 12.1 0.1 pps
Female 6.7 6.5 6.3 6.3 6.3 0.0 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 27.3 28.2 26.9 26.4 27.2 0.8 pps
Male 28.4 28.4 26.2 26.2 27.3 1.1 pps
Female 25.9 27.9 27.6 26.6 27.1 0.5 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 8.9 8.5 7.7 7.7 7.6 -0.1 pps
Male 6.2 5.8 5.1 5.0 5.0 0.0 pps
Female 12.2 11.7 10.9 10.9 10.8 -0.1 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 13.9 9.6 7.1 8.2 9.6 1.4 pps
Young (15-24) 29.8 21.7 17.3 20.6 23.7 3.1 pps
Prime age (25-49) 12.4 8.4 6.1 7.0 8.4 1.4 pps
Older (55-64) 8.5 6.8 5.3 6.3 7.1 0.8 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 23.7 16.5 12.8 15.4 18.4 3.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 15.0 10.3 7.6 8.8 10.6 1.8 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 6.0 4.7 3.8 4.4 5.0 0.6 pps
Nationals (15-64) 14.0 9.7 7.2 8.3 9.7 1.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) : : : : : : pps
Male 13.0 9.0 6.4 7.8 9.3 1.5 pps
Female 14.9 10.4 8.0 8.7 10.0 1.3 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 56.2 51.4 33.5 30.3 31.1 0.8 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 42.3 42.2 41.8 41.4 41.3 -0.2 %
Male 44.1 43.9 43.4 42.9 42.8 -0.2 %
Female 39.9 39.9 39.7 39.4 39.3 -0.3 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -6.3 -2.4 -1.3 -4.1 -2.7 1.4 pps
Building and construction 9.2 14.5 15.5 5.9 -2.4 -8.3 pps
Services 5.0 5.0 3.6 2.7 2.9 0.1 pps
Manufacturing industry 5.4 5.7 4.3 -4.9 -3.3 1.6 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 1.8 4.9 8.9 3.5 8.4 4.9 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 0.3 0.9 5.7 -0.2 6.8 7.0 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 5.7 10.6 10.1 5.2 1.2 -4.0 pps
Wage and salaries 7.2 11.1 15.3 3.3  :   : pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 2.9 2.3 1.3 1.3 3.4 2.1 pps
2009-2010
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Portugal 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 10586 10604 10623 10638 10636 0.0 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 7116 7135 7145 7143 7114 -0.4 %
(% of total population) 67.2 67.3 67.3 67.1 66.9 -0.3 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 5258 5285 5299 5263 5264 0.0 %
Male 2796 2801 2811 2775 2755 -0.7 %
Female 2462 2484 2488 2488 2509 0.8 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 73.9 74.1 74.2 73.7 74.0 0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 42.7 41.9 41.6 39.2 36.7 -2.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.7 87.8 88.0 87.9 88.7 0.9 pps
Older (55-64) 53.4 54.4 54.4 53.9 54.0 0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64) 73.7 73.8 73.8 73.4 73.7 0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 80.3 81.4 82.2 79.8 80.8 1.0 pps
Male 79.5 79.4 79.5 78.5 78.2 -0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 46.6 45.3 44.4 40.8 38.6 -2.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 92.9 92.8 93.2 92.4 92.5 0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 62.7 63.0 63.0 62.7 61.8 -0.9 pps
Female 68.4 68.8 68.9 69.0 69.9 0.9 pps
Young (15-24) 38.7 38.4 38.6 37.5 34.8 -2.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 82.7 82.8 82.9 83.4 84.9 1.6 pps
Older (55-64) 45.1 46.7 46.6 45.9 47.0 1.1 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 67.9 67.8 68.2 66.3 65.6 -0.7 pps
Young (15-24) 35.8 34.9 34.7 31.3 28.5 -2.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 81.3 81.0 81.6 79.7 79.2 -0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 50.1 50.9 50.8 49.7 49.2 -0.5 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 62.7 64.2 64.4 61.0 58.0 -3.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 74.2 70.2 67.4 70.4 75.3 4.9 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 110.9 93.3 96.8 94.7 94.9 0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64) 65.4 65.1 65.0 63.4 62.8 -0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 2.4 2.7 3.1 2.9 2.8 -0.1 pps
Male 73.9 73.8 74.0 71.1 70.1 -1.0 pps
Young (15-24) 39.8 39.1 38.5 33.2 30.4 -2.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.4 87.2 87.6 84.5 83.9 -0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 58.2 58.6 58.5 57.5 55.6 -1.9 pps
Female 62.0 61.9 62.5 61.6 61.1 -0.5 pps
Young (15-24) 31.6 30.6 30.8 29.4 26.5 -2.9 pps
Prime age (25-54) 75.3 74.9 75.8 74.9 74.6 -0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 42.8 44.0 43.9 42.7 43.5 0.7 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 4830.3 4836.6 4872.2 4735.5 4663.4 -1.5 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 0.5 0.0 0.5 -2.6 -1.5 1.1 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) : : : : : : pps
Male : : : : : : pps
Female : : : : : : pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 19.0 19.0 18.8 18.5 17.5 -1.0 pps
Male 11.0 11.2 10.9 11.1 10.5 -0.5 pps
Female 8.0 7.8 7.9 7.5 7.0 -0.5 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 20.6 22.4 22.9 22.0 23.0 1.0 pps
Male 19.5 21.8 21.7 20.8 22.4 1.6 pps
Female 21.8 23.0 24.2 23.3 23.7 0.4 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 8.1 8.8 8.6 8.4 8.4 0.0 pps
Male 4.1 4.7 4.1 4.3 4.9 0.6 pps
Female 12.7 13.6 13.9 13.0 12.3 -0.7 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) : 8.9 : : : : pps
Young (15-24) 16.3 16.6 16.4 20.0 22.4 2.4 pps
Prime age (25-49) 7.4 7.9 7.4 9.5 11.1 1.6 pps
Older (55-64) 6.3 6.5 6.6 7.7 8.9 1.2 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 8.4 8.7 8.3 11.0 12.5 1.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 8.5 8.2 7.9 9.7 11.4 1.7 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 6.4 7.6 7.0 6.5 7.2 0.7 pps
Nationals (15-64) 8.0 8.3 7.9 9.7 11.1 1.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 11.1 12.1 10.9 16.4 18.9 2.5 pps
Male : 8.0 : : : : pps
Female : 10.0 : : : : pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 50.2 47.1 47.4 44.2 52.3 8.1 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 40.7 40.5 40.4 40.4 40.5 0.2 %
Male 41.5 41.3 41.2 41.2 41.3 0.2 %
Female 39.6 39.5 39.4 39.3 39.5 0.5 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture 0.0 -1.9 -0.2 -3.4 -4.2 -0.8 pps
Building and construction -2.0 0.9 -2.5 -5.6 -3.8 1.8 pps
Services 1.6 0.7 1.8 -1.7 -0.6 1.1 pps
Manufacturing industry -1.2 -1.7 -1.7 : : : pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 1.8 3.6 3.0 3.4 1.5 -1.9 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP -0.9 0.4 1.4 2.8 0.4 -2.4 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 1.3 5.3 4.3 3.3 1.4 -1.9 pps
Wage and salaries 5.6 4.2  :    :    :   : pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 0.9 2.4 -0.5 0.1 2.9 2.8 pps
2009-2010
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Romania 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 21575 21551 21517 21484 21447 -0.2 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 15035 15046 15042 15028 14999 -0.2 %
(% of total population) 69.7 69.8 69.9 69.9 69.9 0.0 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 9566 9483 9457 9485 9547 0.6 %
Male 5287 5261 5294 5313 5352 0.7 %
Female 4279 4222 4164 4172 4195 0.5 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 63.6 63.0 62.9 63.1 63.6 0.5 pps
Young (15-24) 30.6 30.5 30.4 30.9 31.2 0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 79.9 79.0 78.3 78.5 79.5 1.0 pps
Older (55-64) 42.8 42.4 44.2 43.9 42.5 -1.5 pps
Nationals (15-64) 63.6 63.0 62.9 63.1 63.6 0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 71.5 66.9 62.9 64.7 0.0 -64.7 pps
Male 70.7 70.1 70.6 70.9 71.5 0.7 pps
Young (15-24) 35.1 35.9 35.9 35.9 36.2 0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.1 85.9 85.8 86.3 87.5 1.1 pps
Older (55-64) 52.0 52.1 55.1 54.5 52.7 -1.8 pps
Female 56.6 56.0 55.2 55.4 55.8 0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 25.9 24.9 24.7 25.8 26.1 0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 72.6 72.0 70.7 70.6 71.4 0.8 pps
Older (55-64) 34.8 33.9 34.7 34.7 33.5 -1.1 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 58.8 58.8 59.0 58.6 58.8 0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 24.0 24.4 24.8 24.5 24.3 -0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 74.7 74.6 74.4 73.7 74.4 0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 41.7 41.4 43.1 42.6 41.1 -1.6 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 35.4 35.8 37.1 39.5 41.9 2.4 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 68.1 67.4 65.3 62.5 60.6 -1.8 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 104.2 99.7 101.3 98.6 98.9 0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64) 58.7 58.7 59.0 58.5 58.8 0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1 pps
Male 64.6 64.8 65.7 65.2 65.7 0.5 pps
Young (15-24) 27.3 28.3 29.1 28.3 28.1 -0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 80.8 80.6 80.9 80.5 81.5 1.0 pps
Older (55-64) 50.0 50.3 53.0 52.3 50.3 -2.0 pps
Female 53.0 52.8 52.5 52.0 52.0 0.0 pps
Young (15-24) 20.6 20.2 20.2 20.6 20.4 -0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 68.6 68.5 67.8 66.9 67.2 0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 34.5 33.6 34.4 34.1 33.0 -1.2 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 8837.6 8842.5 8882.2 8804.7 8822.0 0.2 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 0.7 0.4 0.0 -1.8 -1.8 0.0 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) : : : : : : pps
Male : : : : : : pps
Female : : : : : : pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 18.3 18.6 18.2 18.4 19.5 1.1 pps
Male 13.3 13.4 13.2 13.4 14.3 0.9 pps
Female 5.0 5.1 5.0 5.0 5.2 0.2 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 1.8 1.6 1.3 1.0 1.1 0.1 pps
Male 2.0 1.7 1.3 1.1 1.2 0.1 pps
Female 1.6 1.5 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.0 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.5 9.7 1.2 pps
Male 8.7 8.3 8.1 8.0 9.6 1.6 pps
Female 8.5 8.9 9.3 9.1 9.9 0.8 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 7.3 6.4 5.8 6.9 7.3 0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 21.4 20.1 18.6 20.8 22.1 1.3 pps
Prime age (25-49) 6.7 5.8 5.1 6.1 6.6 0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 2.6 2.3 2.5 3.0 3.3 0.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 9.0 8.6 8.6 8.9 7.2 -1.7 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 7.9 6.9 6.0 7.3 8.3 1.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 3.8 3.0 2.7 4.4 5.4 1.0 pps
Nationals (15-64) 7.6 6.8 6.1 7.2 7.6 0.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) : : : : : : pps
Male 8.2 7.2 6.7 7.7 7.9 0.2 pps
Female 6.1 5.4 4.7 5.8 6.5 0.7 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 57.8 50.0 41.3 31.6 34.9 3.3 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 41.1 41.1 41.0 40.7 40.7 0.0 %
Male 41.9 41.8 41.7 41.4 41.3 -0.2 %
Female 40.2 40.1 40.0 39.9 40.0 0.3 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -7.5 -0.4 -1.5 -8.4 -9.2 -0.8 pps
Building and construction 8.1 22.1 10.6 5.1 4.8 -0.3 pps
Services 5.6 0.6 1.0 1.7 1.7 0.0 pps
Manufacturing industry 3.0 -3.2 -2.3 -0.7 -0.8 -0.1 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 12.4 22.0 31.9 -6.6 1.3 8.0 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 1.7 7.5 14.5 -10.3 -3.0 7.3 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 19.1 21.0 20.6 11.8 6.0 -5.8 pps
Wage and salaries 17.0 22.8 36.3  :    :   : pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 7.1 5.9 7.3 -5.4 0.5 5.9 pps
2009-2010
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Slovenia 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 2006 2015 2033 2037 2048 0.5 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 1407 1412 1422 1414 1422 0.6 %
(% of total population) 70.1 70.1 70.0 69.4 69.4 0.0 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 998 1007 1021 1016 1017 0.1 %
Male 537 547 554 550 551 0.3 %
Female 461 460 466 466 466 -0.2 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 70.9 71.3 71.8 71.8 71.5 -0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 40.6 41.8 42.9 40.9 39.9 -0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54) 89.0 89.3 90.1 89.6 90.0 0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 33.4 34.6 34.2 36.9 36.5 -0.4 pps
Nationals (15-64) 70.9 71.3 71.8 71.9 71.5 -0.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 65.5 72.3 71.6 64.5 68.9 4.4 pps
Male 74.9 75.8 75.8 75.6 75.4 -0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 44.4 47.7 47.6 45.3 44.4 -1.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 91.0 91.3 91.6 91.2 91.7 0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 45.7 46.7 46.4 48.2 47.5 -0.7 pps
Female 66.8 66.6 67.5 67.9 67.4 -0.5 pps
Young (15-24) 36.4 35.4 37.4 35.8 34.8 -1.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.0 87.3 88.5 88.0 88.1 0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 21.4 23.1 22.2 25.6 25.5 -0.1 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 66.6 67.8 68.6 67.5 66.2 -1.3 pps
Young (15-24) 35.0 37.6 38.4 35.3 34.1 -1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 84.2 85.3 86.8 84.9 83.7 -1.2 pps
Older (55-64) 32.6 33.4 32.8 35.6 35.0 -0.5 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 37.2 37.7 39.7 37.7 37.6 0.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 69.3 71.3 72.8 70.6 68.5 -2.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 108.7 105.3 100.9 97.6 95.6 -2.0 pps
Nationals (15-64) 66.3 67.2 67.7 66.8 65.2 -1.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 0.2 0.5 0.9 0.7 1.0 0.2 pps
Male 71.1 72.7 72.7 71.0 69.6 -1.4 pps
Young (15-24) 39.2 43.2 43.0 39.1 37.6 -1.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.1 88.1 88.6 86.4 85.2 -1.2 pps
Older (55-64) 44.5 45.2 44.7 46.4 45.5 -0.9 pps
Female 61.8 62.6 64.2 63.8 62.6 -1.3 pps
Young (15-24) 30.3 31.5 33.2 31.0 30.0 -0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54) 81.2 82.4 84.8 83.2 82.1 -1.1 pps
Older (55-64) 21.0 22.2 21.1 24.8 24.6 -0.2 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 936.7 957.0 975.2 954.8 941.5 -1.4 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 1.6 3.3 2.6 -1.8 -2.0 -0.2 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) : : : : : : pps
Male : : : : : : pps
Female : : : : : : pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 10.4 10.0 9.3 10.1 11.6 1.5 pps
Male 7.8 7.4 6.8 7.5 8.2 0.7 pps
Female 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.6 3.4 0.8 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 17.1 18.4 17.3 16.2 17.1 0.9 pps
Male 15.2 16.3 15.2 14.9 15.2 0.3 pps
Female 19.1 20.7 19.6 17.6 19.2 1.6 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 8.0 8.1 8.1 9.5 10.3 0.8 pps
Male 6.0 6.5 6.2 7.4 7.4 0.0 pps
Female 10.4 10.0 10.4 12.1 13.6 1.5 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 6.0 4.9 4.4 5.9 7.3 1.4 pps
Young (15-24) 13.9 10.1 10.4 13.6 14.7 1.1 pps
Prime age (25-49) 5.5 4.4 3.8 5.5 7.3 1.8 pps
Older (55-64) 2.5 3.3 4.0 3.6 4.0 0.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 8.4 7.4 6.6 9.5 12.5 3.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 6.6 5.0 4.4 6.4 7.6 1.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.2 4.3 1.1 pps
Nationals (15-64) 6.1 4.9 4.4 5.9 7.3 1.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) : : : 14.8 13.8 -1.0 pps
Male 4.9 4.0 4.0 5.9 7.5 1.6 pps
Female 7.2 5.9 4.8 5.8 7.1 1.3 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 49.3 45.7 42.2 30.1 43.3 13.2 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 41.7 41.8 41.6 41.3 41.2 -0.2 %
Male 42.3 42.5 42.3 41.9 41.8 -0.2 %
Female 40.8 40.8 40.6 40.4 40.4 0.0 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -3.1 -2.3 -2.0 -1.7 -1.9 -0.2 pps
Building and construction 6.9 10.9 11.6 -1.8 -9.5 -7.7 pps
Services 3.2 4.0 3.7 1.2 0.5 -0.7 pps
Manufacturing industry -1.6 0.8 -0.4 -9.4 -6.3 3.1 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 5.4 6.2 7.2 1.8 3.9 2.0 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 3.2 2.0 3.0 -1.1 3.1 4.3 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 5.6 5.3 9.5 2.5 2.4 -0.1 pps
Wage and salaries 7.0 10.2 10.2 -1.1  :   : pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 4.2 3.4 1.1 -6.4 3.3 9.7 pps
2009-2010
 
Annex 
Statistical annex 
 
147 
Slovak Republic 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 5389 5391 5396 5409 5422 0.2 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 3862 3873 3892 3917 3926 0.2 %
(% of total population) 71.7 71.8 72.1 72.4 72.4 0.0 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 2651 2646 2679 2680 2696 0.6 %
Male 1468 1464 1481 1491 1491 0.0 %
Female 1182 1182 1198 1189 1205 1.3 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 68.6 68.3 68.8 68.4 68.7 0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 35.3 34.6 32.4 31.4 31.1 -0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.6 86.9 87.8 87.2 86.9 -0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 36.7 38.8 41.9 42.8 45.1 2.3 pps
Nationals (15-64) 68.6 68.3 68.8 68.4 68.7 0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 78.8 71.2 77.6 74.2 59.5 -14.7 pps
Male 76.4 75.9 76.4 76.3 76.1 -0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 39.6 38.9 37.8 37.1 36.4 -0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 94.0 93.1 93.4 93.6 92.9 -0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 55.2 57.0 59.9 58.7 59.7 1.1 pps
Female 60.9 60.8 61.3 60.6 61.3 0.7 pps
Young (15-24) 30.8 30.2 26.8 25.4 25.5 0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 81.2 80.7 82.1 80.7 80.9 0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 20.9 23.3 26.4 29.0 32.2 3.3 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 59.4 60.7 62.3 60.2 58.8 -1.4 pps
Young (15-24) 25.9 27.6 26.2 22.8 20.6 -2.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 77.2 78.0 80.1 77.8 75.8 -2.0 pps
Older (55-64) 33.1 35.6 39.2 39.5 40.5 1.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 13.7 13.0 14.2 12.7 12.7 0.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 69.1 72.2 72.8 68.9 65.0 -3.9 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 110.5 98.0 92.7 91.7 100.1 8.3 pps
Nationals (15-64) 59.3 60.6 62.1 60.1 58.6 -1.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 pps
Male 67.0 68.4 70.0 67.6 65.2 -2.4 pps
Young (15-24) 29.2 30.9 30.8 26.8 23.8 -3.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 84.1 85.0 86.4 84.2 81.4 -2.8 pps
Older (55-64) 49.8 52.6 56.7 54.9 54.0 -0.9 pps
Female 51.9 53.0 54.6 52.8 52.3 -0.5 pps
Young (15-24) 22.5 24.1 21.5 18.7 17.4 -1.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 70.3 71.0 73.7 71.2 70.1 -1.1 pps
Older (55-64) 18.9 21.2 24.2 26.1 28.7 2.6 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 2295.2 2350.5 2423.4 2356.6 2307.2 -2.1 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 2.1 2.1 2.9 -2.5 -1.4 1.1 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) : : : : : : pps
Male : : : : : : pps
Female : : : : : : pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 12.5 12.8 13.6 15.5 15.8 0.3 pps
Male 9.3 9.6 10.3 11.3 11.7 0.4 pps
Female 3.2 3.1 3.3 4.2 4.1 -0.1 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 5.0 5.0 4.5 4.3 5.6 1.3 pps
Male 4.9 4.9 4.4 4.5 5.5 1.0 pps
Female 5.0 5.1 4.7 4.0 5.8 1.8 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 2.7 2.5 2.5 3.4 3.8 0.4 pps
Male 1.2 1.0 1.3 2.6 2.6 0.0 pps
Female 4.5 4.3 4.1 4.5 5.2 0.7 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 13.4 11.1 9.5 12.0 14.4 2.4 pps
Young (15-24) 26.6 20.3 19.0 27.3 33.6 6.3 pps
Prime age (25-49) 11.9 10.2 8.8 10.9 13.0 2.1 pps
Older (55-64) 9.8 8.2 6.4 7.7 10.1 2.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 48.6 45.1 39.6 41.7 44.3 2.6 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 11.8 9.4 8.1 11.5 14.1 2.6 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 3.3 4.1 3.6 4.3 5.8 1.5 pps
Nationals (15-64) 13.4 11.2 9.6 12.1 14.5 2.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) : : : : : : pps
Male 12.3 9.9 8.4 11.4 14.2 2.8 pps
Female 14.7 12.7 10.9 12.8 14.6 1.8 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 76.3 74.2 69.5 54.0 64.0 10.0 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 40.7 40.8 40.4 39.9 40.3 1.0 %
Male 41.6 41.7 41.3 40.7 41.1 1.0 %
Female 39.4 39.5 39.1 38.8 39.2 1.0 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -7.5 -5.1 -1.8 -12.6 -8.0 4.6 pps
Building and construction 4.3 5.1 7.4 4.4 -2.5 -6.9 pps
Services 3.0 2.6 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 pps
Manufacturing industry 1.3 1.8 3.4 -9.7 -3.9 5.8 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 7.9 8.4 6.9 5.0 2.7 -2.4 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 4.8 7.2 3.9 6.3 2.2 -4.1 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 7.5 7.0 5.5 3.7 1.4 -2.3 pps
Wage and salaries 10.7 10.7 7.7 1.4  :   : pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 6.3 8.3 2.8 -2.3 5.5 7.8 pps
2009-2010
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Finland 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 5242 5266 5289 5317 5343 0.5 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 3484 3497 3514 3527 3537 0.3 %
(% of total population) 66.5 66.4 66.4 66.3 66.2 -0.2 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 2620 2642 2669 2644 2634 -0.4 %
Male 1350 1358 1376 1355 1360 0.4 %
Female 1270 1284 1293 1289 1274 -1.1 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 75.2 75.6 76.0 75.0 74.5 -0.5 pps
Young (15-24) 51.8 53.4 53.5 50.4 49.4 -1.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.8 88.0 88.6 88.2 87.5 -0.7 pps
Older (55-64) 58.5 58.8 59.7 59.1 60.2 1.0 pps
Nationals (15-64) 75.3 75.7 76.0 75.0 74.6 -0.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 69.0 70.5 72.3 71.7 69.3 -2.4 pps
Male 77.1 77.2 77.9 76.4 76.4 0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 52.6 53.2 53.4 49.7 49.4 -0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 90.3 90.4 91.2 90.6 90.5 -0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 58.8 59.1 60.6 58.7 60.1 1.3 pps
Female 73.3 73.8 73.9 73.5 72.5 -1.0 pps
Young (15-24) 51.0 53.6 53.5 51.2 49.3 -1.9 pps
Prime age (25-54) 85.3 85.6 85.9 85.7 84.4 -1.3 pps
Older (55-64) 58.2 58.4 58.8 59.5 60.3 0.8 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 69.3 70.3 71.1 68.7 68.1 -0.6 pps
Young (15-24) 42.1 44.6 44.7 39.6 38.8 -0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 82.4 83.3 84.3 82.4 81.6 -0.8 pps
Older (55-64) 54.5 55.0 56.5 55.5 56.3 0.8 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 41.4 42.9 43.7 40.4 38.7 -1.7 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 75.5 75.5 76.2 72.8 72.3 -0.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 91.0 91.4 91.6 90.9 89.4 -1.5 pps
Nationals (15-64) 68.3 69.2 69.8 67.4 66.8 -0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.3 0.0 pps
Male 71.4 72.1 73.1 69.5 69.4 -0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 42.6 44.5 44.3 37.7 37.7 0.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 85.2 86.0 87.3 84.3 83.9 -0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 54.8 55.1 57.1 54.6 55.6 1.0 pps
Female 67.3 68.5 69.0 67.9 66.9 -1.0 pps
Young (15-24) 41.6 44.7 45.0 41.5 40.0 -1.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 79.6 80.6 81.2 80.5 79.2 -1.3 pps
Older (55-64) 54.3 55.0 55.9 56.3 56.9 0.6 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 2416.1 2458.5 2497.2 2423.3 2410.1 -0.5 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 1.8 2.2 1.6 -2.7 -0.4 2.3 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) : : : : : : pps
Male : : : : : : pps
Female : : : : : : pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 11.9 11.5 11.8 12.6 12.2 -0.3 pps
Male 8.2 7.9 8.0 8.5 8.3 -0.2 pps
Female 3.7 3.7 3.8 4.1 4.0 -0.1 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 16.3 15.9 14.9 14.5 15.4 0.9 pps
Male 12.6 12.3 11.1 10.5 12.3 1.8 pps
Female 20.0 19.4 18.7 18.3 18.4 0.1 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 13.5 13.4 12.7 13.3 13.9 0.6 pps
Male 8.6 8.3 7.9 8.3 8.9 0.6 pps
Female 18.7 18.8 17.8 18.5 19.0 0.5 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 7.7 6.9 6.4 8.2 8.4 0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 18.7 16.5 16.5 21.5 21.4 -0.1 pps
Prime age (25-49) 6.1 5.3 4.9 6.7 6.8 0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 6.8 6.3 5.4 6.2 6.5 0.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 14.2 13.0 12.8 15.3 16.7 1.4 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 8.2 7.1 6.4 9.2 9.0 -0.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 3.7 3.6 3.3 4.1 4.5 0.4 pps
Nationals (15-64) 7.6 6.8 6.2 8.1 8.2 0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 18.5 16.7 15.8 18.0 19.6 1.6 pps
Male 7.4 6.5 6.1 8.9 9.1 0.2 pps
Female 8.1 7.2 6.7 7.6 7.6 0.0 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 25.2 22.8 18.4 16.7 24.0 7.3 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 39.3 39.2 39.2 38.6 39.0 1.0 %
Male 40.9 40.7 40.6 40.1 40.4 0.7 %
Female 37.4 37.4 37.3 36.8 37.2 1.1 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -0.3 0.2 -0.9 -0.4 -4.4 -4.0 pps
Building and construction 4.0 7.1 3.6 -7.0 -0.8 6.2 pps
Services 2.0 2.2 2.2 -0.6 0.8 1.5 pps
Manufacturing industry 0.8 0.9 -1.0 -10.1 -4.4 5.7 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 2.9 3.7 5.1 1.7 2.0 0.2 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 2.0 0.6 3.2 0.7 -0.2 -0.9 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index)  :    :    :    :   : : pps
Wage and salaries 4.9 6.1 6.5 -1.2  :   : pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 2.5 3.1 -0.6 -5.6 3.5 9.1 pps
2009-2010
 
Annex 
Statistical annex 
 
149 
Sweden 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 9084 9147 9203 9297 9363 0.7 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 5951 6002 6046 6080 6101 0.3 %
(% of total population) 65.5 65.6 65.7 65.4 65.2 -0.2 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 4687 4750 4797 4799 4852 1.1 %
Male 2452 2482 2508 2513 2550 1.5 %
Female 2235 2268 2289 2286 2302 0.7 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 78.8 79.1 79.3 78.9 79.5 0.6 pps
Young (15-24) 51.3 52.2 52.8 51.0 51.7 0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 89.4 90.0 90.4 90.0 90.6 0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 72.8 72.8 72.8 73.9 74.5 0.6 pps
Nationals (15-64) 79.3 79.7 79.8 79.4 80.1 0.8 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 68.1 68.6 71.8 72.5 71.0 -1.4 pps
Male 81.2 81.4 81.7 81.4 82.3 0.9 pps
Young (15-24) 50.8 51.8 52.6 51.1 52.1 1.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 92.5 92.9 93.1 92.8 93.6 0.8 pps
Older (55-64) 76.0 76.2 76.5 77.8 79.1 1.4 pps
Female 76.3 76.8 76.9 76.4 76.7 0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 51.9 52.7 53.1 51.0 51.4 0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 86.3 87.1 87.6 87.1 87.5 0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 69.6 69.4 69.0 69.9 69.8 -0.1 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 73.1 74.2 74.3 72.2 72.7 0.5 pps
Young (15-24) 40.3 42.2 42.2 38.3 38.7 0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 84.7 86.1 86.5 84.5 85.0 0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 69.6 70.0 70.1 70.0 70.5 0.5 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 66.0 67.9 66.1 50.2 49.4 -0.8 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 72.7 74.1 75.7 80.1 80.5 0.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 97.4 97.9 95.8 94.7 96.2 1.4 pps
Nationals (15-64) 70.0 71.2 71.1 68.8 69.2 0.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 3.1 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.4 0.1 pps
Male 75.5 76.5 76.7 74.2 75.1 0.9 pps
Young (15-24) 40.2 42.0 42.2 37.6 38.2 0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.8 89.1 89.4 86.9 88.0 1.1 pps
Older (55-64) 72.3 72.9 73.4 73.2 74.2 1.0 pps
Female 70.7 71.8 71.8 70.2 70.3 0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 40.4 42.3 42.1 38.9 39.2 0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 81.5 83.0 83.5 81.9 82.0 0.0 pps
Older (55-64) 66.9 67.0 66.7 66.7 66.8 0.0 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 4351.9 4453.3 4493.8 4391.4 4437.5 1.0 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 1.7 2.3 0.9 -2.0 1.1 3.1 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) : : : : : : pps
Male : : : : : : pps
Female : : : : : : pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 9.8 9.6 9.4 9.6 9.8 0.2 pps
Male 7.3 7.1 6.9 7.0 7.1 0.1 pps
Female 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 0.1 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 17.0 17.2 15.8 14.9 15.4 0.5 pps
Male 15.0 14.7 13.2 12.6 13.5 0.9 pps
Female 18.9 19.7 18.5 17.3 17.3 0.0 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 24.3 24.2 25.7 26.0 25.3 -0.7 pps
Male 10.6 10.5 11.9 12.6 12.2 -0.4 pps
Female 39.7 39.5 40.9 40.5 39.7 -0.8 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 7.1 6.1 6.2 8.3 8.4 0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 21.5 19.3 20.2 25.0 25.2 0.2 pps
Prime age (25-49) 5.5 4.6 4.5 6.5 6.4 -0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 4.4 4.0 3.8 5.3 5.4 0.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 12.7 11.9 12.6 16.7 18.2 1.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 6.1 5.2 5.0 7.7 7.6 -0.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 4.4 3.6 3.4 4.5 4.5 0.0 pps
Nationals (15-64) 6.8 5.9 5.9 8.0 7.9 -0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 13.7 13.0 14.3 16.8 18.8 2.0 pps
Male 6.9 5.9 5.9 8.6 8.5 -0.1 pps
Female 7.2 6.5 6.6 8.0 8.2 0.2 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) : 13.9 12.7 13.2 17.8 4.6 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 39.7 39.6 39.6 39.2 39.9 1.8 %
Male 40.6 40.5 40.5 40.0 40.7 1.8 %
Female 38.1 38.1 38.2 37.9 38.5 1.6 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -2.1 -1.7 1.7 -1.8 2.7 4.5 pps
Building and construction 6.4 7.6 7.3 -1.2 5.2 6.4 pps
Services 2.0 2.1 0.5 -0.5 1.1 1.6 pps
Manufacturing industry -0.8 2.2 0.1 -9.9 -1.1 8.8 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 2.1 5.2 1.5 1.3 2.7 1.4 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 0.1 2.4 -1.6 -0.6 1.4 2.0 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 1.7 3.4 2.5 3.7 1.8 -1.9 pps
Wage and salaries 5.4 7.0 5.5 0.1  :   : pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 2.6 1.0 -1.5 -3.4 4.5 7.9 pps
2009-2010
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United Kingdom 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 - Population (total, 1000 pers.) 59518 59862 60305 60734 61099 0.6 %
2 - Population (working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 39540 39845 40094 40318 40441 0.3 %
(% of total population) 66.4 66.6 66.5 66.4 66.2 -0.2 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 29935 30089 30409 30525 30529 0.0 %
Male 16159 16260 16416 16433 16433 0.0 %
Female 13776 13829 13993 14093 14096 0.0 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 75.7 75.5 75.8 75.7 75.5 -0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 62.5 61.7 61.7 59.7 59.2 -0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 84.5 84.5 84.9 85.1 85.0 -0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 59.1 59.3 59.9 60.3 59.9 -0.4 pps
Nationals (15-64) 75.9 75.8 76.1 76.0 75.7 -0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 73.1 72.5 73.3 73.1 73.6 0.5 pps
Male 82.3 82.2 82.4 82.0 81.7 -0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 65.1 64.6 64.8 62.0 61.8 -0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 91.6 91.6 91.6 91.7 91.4 -0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 68.4 69.0 69.9 70.3 69.1 -1.2 pps
Female 69.2 69.0 69.4 69.5 69.4 -0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 59.7 58.7 58.4 57.4 56.4 -1.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 77.6 77.6 78.2 78.7 78.6 -0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 50.1 50.0 50.2 50.6 51.1 0.4 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 71.6 71.5 71.5 69.9 69.5 -0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 53.8 52.9 52.4 48.4 47.6 -0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 81.2 81.3 81.4 80.2 79.8 -0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 57.3 57.4 58.0 57.5 57.1 -0.5 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 56.6 55.0 55.4 52.9 48.9 -4.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 96.3 79.7 78.8 75.0 74.8 -0.3 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 99.3 98.2 97.1 96.3 96.9 0.7 pps
Nationals (15-64) 66.8 66.2 65.8 64.2 63.7 -0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 4.7 5.3 5.7 5.7 5.7 0.0 pps
Male 77.5 77.5 77.3 74.8 74.5 -0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 54.9 54.4 53.8 48.5 48.5 0.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.9 88.2 87.7 85.7 85.4 -0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 66.0 66.3 67.3 66.2 65.0 -1.2 pps
Female 65.8 65.5 65.8 65.0 64.6 -0.5 pps
Young (15-24) 52.6 51.4 51.0 48.2 46.6 -1.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 74.6 74.6 75.2 74.7 74.3 -0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 49.0 48.9 49.0 49.2 49.5 0.3 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 28306.7 28477.7 28670.8 28183.5 28109.6 -0.3 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 0.9 0.7 0.7 -1.6 0.2 1.8 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) : : : : : : pps
Male : : : : : : pps
Female : : : : : : pps
8 - Self employed (% of total employment ) 12.4 12.6 12.5 12.7 13.0 0.2 pps
Male 9.0 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.1 0.1 pps
Female 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.7 3.8 0.2 pps
9 - Temporary employment (% of total employment) 5.7 5.7 5.3 5.5 6.0 0.5 pps
Male 5.0 5.1 4.7 5.1 5.6 0.5 pps
Female 6.4 6.4 5.9 5.9 6.4 0.5 pps
10 - Part-time (% of total employment ) 24.3 24.2 24.2 25.0 25.7 0.7 pps
Male 9.2 9.4 9.8 10.4 11.0 0.6 pps
Female 41.7 41.4 41.0 41.7 42.4 0.7 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 5.4 5.3 5.6 7.6 7.8 0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 14.0 14.3 15.0 19.1 19.6 0.5 pps
Prime age (25-49) 4.1 3.9 4.3 6.0 6.3 0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 3.0 3.2 3.1 4.6 4.7 0.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 9.2 9.5 10.4 13.3 14.2 0.9 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 5.3 5.2 5.6 7.9 8.3 0.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 2.8 2.6 2.8 4.0 4.1 0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64) 5.2 5.2 5.6 7.6 7.8 0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 8.4 7.7 7.0 8.9 9.0 0.1 pps
Male 5.8 5.6 6.1 8.6 8.6 0.0 pps
Female 4.9 5.0 5.1 6.4 6.8 0.4 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment rate (% of total unemployment) 22.2 23.7 24.1 24.5 32.6 8.1 pps
13 - Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 41.3 41.3 41.0 41.0 41.1 0.2 %
Male 42.7 42.7 42.4 42.3 42.4 0.2 %
Female 38.6 38.6 38.4 38.6 38.6 0.0 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -2.8 0.4 4.5 3.1 : : pps
Building and construction 1.5 2.1 -0.6 -7.1 : : pps
Services 1.5 0.8 0.8 -1.4 : : pps
Manufacturing industry -2.8 -2.0 -4.7 -6.5 : : pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 4.5 5.0 1.5 2.5 3.3 0.8 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 1.8 2.0 -1.5 1.1 0.4 -0.7 pps
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 4.8 4.7 4.3 0.2 2.1 1.9 pps
Wage and salaries  :    :    :    :    :   : pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 1.9 2.0 -0.8 -3.4 1.1 4.5 pps
2009-2010
 
APPENDIX 2 
Policy indicators 
 
151 
B elgium
List o f po licy variables
M onthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, %); Eurostat 2008 2009 2010
mean : : :
median : : :
2008 2009 2010
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer : : :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 55.87 55.33 55.34
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 51.58 50.96 51.00
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 55.88 55.35 55.37
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 50.18 49.41 49.47
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD 2.15 2.18 2.18
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD 1.68 1.73 1.73
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD 2.63 2.63 2.63
Employment Protection Legislation for co llective dismissals; OECD 4.13 4.13 4.13
2007 2008 2009
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.58 0.57 0.67
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.58 0.57 0.62
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.48 0.51 0.52
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.48 0.51 0.52
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD unlimited unlimited unlimited
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD unlimited unlimited unlimited
Last three data po ints
 
 
B ulgaria
List o f po licy variables
M onthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, %); Eurostat 2008 2009 2010
mean 39.50 38.30 :
median : : :
2008 2009 2010
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer 18.30 16.70 :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 35.10 33.81 :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 31.29 29.00 :
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD : : :
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD : : :
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD : : :
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD : : :
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD : : :
Employment Protection Legislation for co llective dismissals; OECD : : :
2007 2008 2009
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD : 0.47 0.54
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD : 0.47 0.54
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD : 0.00 0.00
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD : 0.00 0.00
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 12 12 12
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 4 4 4
Last three data po ints
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C zech R epublic
List o f po licy variables
M onthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, %); Eurostat 2008 2009 2010
mean 35.20 33.80 :
median : : :
2008 2009 2010
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer 15.20 14.70 :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW : : :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW : : :
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 43.44 42.01 42.16
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 40.06 38.72 38.94
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD 1.90 1.90 1.96
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD 3.31 3.31 3.05
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD 0.50 0.50 0.88
Employment Protection Legislation for co llective dismissals; OECD 2.13 2.13 2.13
2007 2008 2009
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.52 0.53 0.66
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.13 0.15 0.18
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.13 0.15 0.18
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.13 0.15 0.18
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 12 11 11
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 6 5 5
Last three data po ints
 
 
D enmark
List o f po licy variables
M onthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, %); Eurostat 2008 2009 2010
mean : : :
median : : :
2008 2009 2010
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer : : :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 51.46 50.89 49.05
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 47.04 46.22 44.10
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 40.90 39.53 38.29
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 38.53 37.98 36.67
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD 1.50 1.50 1.50
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD 1.63 1.63 1.63
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD 1.38 1.38 1.38
Employment Protection Legislation for co llective dismissals; OECD 3.88 3.88 3.13
2007 2008 2009
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.61 0.61 0.60
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.61 0.61 0.60
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.61 0.61 0.60
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.05 0.05 0.05
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 48 48 48
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 48 48 48
Last three data po ints
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Germany
List o f po licy variables
M onthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, %); Eurostat 2008 2009 2010
mean : : :
median : : :
2008 2009 2010
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer 26.30 27.00 :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 43.44 42.01 42.16
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 37.90 37.24 37.26
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 51.46 50.89 49.05
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 46.59 45.98 44.85
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD 2.34 2.09 2.12
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD 2.68 2.68 3.00
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD 2.00 1.50 1.25
Employment Protection Legislation for co llective dismissals; OECD 3.75 3.75 3.75
2007 2008 2009
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.60 0.60 0.60
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.60 0.60 0.60
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.11 0.11 0.15
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.11 0.11 0.15
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 18 18 18
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 6 6 6
Last three data po ints
 
 
Esto nia
List o f po licy variables
M onthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, %); Eurostat 2008 2009 2010
mean 34.90 36.20 :
median : : :
2008 2009 2010
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer : : :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 40.90 39.53 38.29
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 37.72 36.36 35.00
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 38.38 39.17 40.01
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 37.03 37.75 38.58
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD .. .. 2.10
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD .. .. 2.46
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD .. .. 1.75
Employment Protection Legislation for co llective dismissals; OECD .. .. 3.25
2007 2008 2009
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.54 0.54 0.53
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.44 0.44 0.44
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.11 0.10 0.10
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.00 0.00 0.00
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 12 12 12
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 6 6 6
Last three data po ints
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Ire land
List o f po licy variables
M onthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, %); Eurostat 2008 2009 2010
mean : : :
median : : :
2008 2009 2010
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer : : :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 44.20 44.13 :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 41.05 40.84 :
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 26.82 28.98 29.35
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 20.06 22.72 23.36
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD 0.93 1.11 1.11
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD 1.60 1.60 1.60
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD 0.25 0.63 0.63
Employment Protection Legislation for co llective dismissals; OECD 2.38 2.38 2.38
2007 2008 2009
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.30 0.31 0.33
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.30 0.31 0.33
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.30 0.31 0.34
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.30 0.31 0.34
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 15 12 12
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 12 9 9
Last three data po ints
 
 
Greece
List o f po licy variables
M onthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, %); Eurostat 2008 2009 2010
mean 50.60 45.20 47.10
median 64.40 57.50 60.00
2008 2009 2010
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer : : :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW : : :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW : : :
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 36.97 38.17 36.59
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 34.41 34.41 34.41
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD 3.50 2.73 2.73
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD 2.25 2.33 2.33
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD 4.75 3.13 3.13
Employment Protection Legislation for co llective dismissals; OECD 3.25 3.25 3.25
2007 2008 2009
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.49 0.53 0.52
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.49 0.53 0.52
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.33 0.35 0.33
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.00 0.00 0.00
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD : : :
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD : : :
Last three data po ints
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Spain
List o f po licy variables
M onthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, %); Eurostat 2008 2009 2010
mean 35.20 35.10 :
median 42.10 : :
2008 2009 2010
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer : 27.10 :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 38.38 39.17 40.01
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 33.96 35.93 36.76
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 37.99 38.26 39.62
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 34.05 34.35 36.35
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD 2.93 2.98 2.98
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD 2.61 2.46 2.46
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD 3.25 3.50 3.50
Employment Protection Legislation for co llective dismissals; OECD 3.13 3.13 3.13
2007 2008 2009
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.62 0.61 0.60
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.62 0.61 0.60
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.62 0.61 0.60
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.00 0.00 0.00
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 24 24 24
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 4 4 4
Last three data po ints
 
 
F rance
List o f po licy variables
M onthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, %); Eurostat 2008 2009 2010
mean 46.30 : :
median 58.90 : :
2008 2009 2010
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer : : :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 44.42 44.33 43.95
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 41.30 41.05 40.68
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 49.25 49.21 49.27
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 45.29 45.08 45.54
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD 2.98 3.05 3.05
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD 2.34 2.47 2.47
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD 3.63 3.63 3.63
Employment Protection Legislation for co llective dismissals; OECD 2.13 2.13 2.13
2007 2008 2009
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.66 0.66 0.67
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.66 0.66 0.67
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.66 0.66 0.67
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.32 0.34 0.34
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 36 36 36
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 7 4 4
Last three data po ints
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Ita ly
List o f po licy variables
M onthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, %); Eurostat 2008 2009 2010
mean : : :
median : : :
2008 2009 2010
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer : : :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 43.84 42.31 42.00
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 41.11 39.61 39.31
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 46.67 46.84 46.87
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 43.28 43.53 43.61
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD 2.70 1.82 1.89
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD 1.77 1.77 1.77
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD 3.63 1.88 2.00
Employment Protection Legislation for co llective dismissals; OECD 4.88 4.88 4.88
2007 2008 2009
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.62 0.59 0.59
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.54 0.59 0.59
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.00 0.00 0.00
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.00 0.00 0.00
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 12 12 12
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 8 8 8
Last three data po ints
 
 
C yprus
List o f po licy variables
M onthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, %); Eurostat 2008 2009 2010
mean : : :
median : : :
2008 2009 2010
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer : : :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 21.73 21.93 21.96
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 16.16 16.80 16.82
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD : : :
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD : : :
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD : : :
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD : : :
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD : : :
Employment Protection Legislation for co llective dismissals; OECD : : :
2007 2008 2009
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.58 : :
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.00 : :
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.00 : :
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.00 : :
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 5 5 5
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 5 5 5
Last three data po ints
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Latvia
List o f po licy variables
M onthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, %); Eurostat 2008 2009 2010
mean 36.20 40.90 42.20
median : : :
2008 2009 2010
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer : : :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 54.10 53.09 46.44
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 49.02 48.15 41.36
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD : : :
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD : : :
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD : : :
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD : : :
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD : : :
Employment Protection Legislation for co llective dismissals; OECD : : :
2007 2008 2009
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.84 0.83 0.84
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.42 0.41 0.42
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.23 0.23 0.26
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.23 0.23 0.26
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 9 9 9
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 4 9 9
Last three data po ints
 
 
Lithuania
List o f po licy variables
M onthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, %); Eurostat 2008 2009 2010
mean 39.60 40.50 :
median : : :
2008 2009 2010
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer : : :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 49.25 49.21 49.27
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 46.34 46.22 46.36
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD : : :
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD : : :
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD : : :
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD : : :
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD : : :
Employment Protection Legislation for co llective dismissals; OECD : : :
2007 2008 2009
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.69 0.61 0.68
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.00 0.00 0.00
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.00 0.00 0.00
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.00 0.00 0.00
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 9 9 9
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 6 6 6
Last three data po ints
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Luxembo urg
List o f po licy variables
M onthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, %); Eurostat 2008 2009 2010
mean : 45.40 45.90
median : 56.30 56.80
2008 2009 2010
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer : : :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 38.34 39.32 37.51
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 38.44 39.40 37.56
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 34.66 33.83 34.01
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 28.18 27.34 27.46
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD .. .. 3.25
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD .. .. 2.75
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD .. .. 3.75
Employment Protection Legislation for co llective dismissals; OECD .. .. 3.88
2007 2008 2009
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.85 0.85 0.84
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.85 0.85 0.84
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.00 0.00 0.00
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.00 0.00 0.00
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 12 12 12
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 12 12 12
Last three data po ints
 
 
H ungary
List o f po licy variables
M onthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, %); Eurostat 2008 2009 2010
mean : 38.60 :
median : : :
2008 2009 2010
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer : : :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 44.23 44.15 :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 41.07 40.85 :
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 54.10 53.09 46.44
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 46.70 46.16 43.56
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD 1.27 1.52 1.65
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD 1.92 1.92 1.92
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD 0.63 1.13 1.38
Employment Protection Legislation for co llective dismissals; OECD 2.88 2.88 2.88
2007 2008 2009
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.63 0.59 0.58
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.35 0.33 0.33
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.02 0.02 0.02
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.02 0.02 0.02
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 9 9 9
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 9 9 9
Last three data po ints
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M alta
List o f po licy variables
M onthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, %); Eurostat 2008 2009 2010
mean 48.80 45.20 45.40
median 56.30 53.50 52.40
2008 2009 2010
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer 14.00 13.90 :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 26.82 28.98 29.35
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 22.42 24.52 25.24
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD : : :
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD : : :
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD : : :
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD : : :
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD : : :
Employment Protection Legislation for co llective dismissals; OECD : : :
2007 2008 2009
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.37 0.36 0.36
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.45 0.41 0.42
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.45 0.41 0.42
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.45 0.41 0.42
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 5 5 5
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 5 5 5
Last three data po ints
 
 
N etherlands
List o f po licy variables
M onthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, %); Eurostat 2008 2009 2010
mean 44.20 44.10 :
median 51.70 51.40 :
2008 2009 2010
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer : : :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 46.67 46.84 46.87
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 44.06 44.30 44.35
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 39.17 37.99 38.42
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 34.02 33.19 33.68
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD 2.73 2.12 1.95
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD 3.08 3.05 2.72
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD 2.38 1.19 1.19
Employment Protection Legislation for co llective dismissals; OECD 3.00 3.00 3.00
2007 2008 2009
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.74 0.74 0.74
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.70 0.70 0.70
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.70 0.70 0.70
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.14 0.14 0.14
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 38 38 38
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 3 3 3
Last three data po ints
 
 
European Commission 
Labour Market Developments in Europe, 2011 
 
160 
A ustria
List o f po licy variables
M onthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, %); Eurostat 2008 2009 2010
mean : : :
median : : :
2008 2009 2010
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer : : :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 48.83 47.83 47.91
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 44.33 42.73 42.86
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 48.83 47.83 47.91
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 44.42 43.22 43.32
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD 2.21 1.93 1.93
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD 2.92 2.37 2.37
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD 1.50 1.50 1.50
Employment Protection Legislation for co llective dismissals; OECD 3.25 3.25 3.25
2007 2008 2009
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.55 0.55 0.55
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.55 0.55 0.55
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.51 0.51 0.51
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.51 0.51 0.51
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 12 12 12
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 5 5 5
Last three data po ints
 
 
P o land
List o f po licy variables
M onthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, %); Eurostat 2008 2009 2010
mean 35.70 39.70 :
median : : :
2008 2009 2010
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer : : :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW : : :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW : : :
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 34.69 34.15 34.27
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 33.61 33.17 33.35
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD 1.40 1.65 1.90
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD 2.06 2.06 2.06
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD 0.75 1.25 1.75
Employment Protection Legislation for co llective dismissals; OECD 4.13 4.13 3.63
2007 2008 2009
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.47 0.46 0.45
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.47 0.46 0.45
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.22 0.22 0.21
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.22 0.22 0.21
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 18 18 12
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 6 6 6
Last three data po ints
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P o rtugal
List o f po licy variables
M onthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, %); Eurostat 2008 2009 2010
mean 44.60 43.20 42.80
median : 58.30 :
2008 2009 2010
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer 27.90 28.30 :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 41.61 40.73 :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 39.47 37.87 :
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 37.62 37.47 37.73
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 32.90 32.67 32.83
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD 3.67 3.67 3.15
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD 4.33 4.33 4.17
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD 3.00 3.00 2.13
Employment Protection Legislation for co llective dismissals; OECD 2.88 2.88 1.88
2007 2008 2009
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.84 0.84 0.84
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.84 0.84 0.84
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.84 0.84 0.84
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.00 0.00 0.00
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 38 38 38
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 9 9 9
Last three data po ints
 
 
R o mania
List o f po licy variables
M onthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, %); Eurostat 2008 2009 2010
mean 30.10 33.30 :
median : : :
2008 2009 2010
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer : : :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 33.00 32.24 32.42
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 25.80 25.23 25.47
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD : : :
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD : : :
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD : : :
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD : : :
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD : : :
Employment Protection Legislation for co llective dismissals; OECD : : :
2007 2008 2009
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD : 0.42 0.48
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD : 0.42 0.48
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD : 0.00 0.00
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD : 0.00 0.00
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 12 15 12
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 6 9 6
Last three data po ints
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Slo venia
List o f po licy variables
M onthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, %); Eurostat 2008 2009 2010
mean 41.00 41.10 47.70
median : : :
2008 2009 2010
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer : : :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 22.77 22.28 :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 21.38 20.92 :
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 42.88 42.24 42.35
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 40.32 39.72 38.46
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD .. .. 2.51
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD .. .. 3.15
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD .. .. 1.88
Employment Protection Legislation for co llective dismissals; OECD .. .. 2.88
2007 2008 2009
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.62 0.64 0.65
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.62 0.64 0.65
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.08 0.08 0.08
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.08 0.08 0.08
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 24 24 24
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 3 3 3
Last three data po ints
 
 
Slo vak R epublic
List o f po licy variables
M onthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, %); Eurostat 2008 2009 2010
mean 34.70 36.50 :
median 43.80 46.10 :
2008 2009 2010
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer 22.50 : :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 38.84 37.99 39.17
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 35.88 34.23 36.30
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 38.84 37.72 37.79
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 36.05 34.36 34.48
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD 1.80 1.34 1.44
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD 2.47 2.31 2.50
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD 1.13 0.38 0.38
Employment Protection Legislation for co llective dismissals; OECD 4.00 3.75 3.75
2007 2008 2009
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.64 0.65 0.64
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.00 0.00 0.00
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.00 0.00 0.00
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.00 0.00 0.00
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 6 6 6
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 4 4 4
Last three data po ints
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F inland
List o f po licy variables
M onthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, %); Eurostat 2008 2009 2010
mean : : :
median : : :
2008 2009 2010
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer 26.30 26.70 :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 37.99 38.26 39.62
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 36.45 36.78 38.16
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 43.84 42.31 42.00
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 38.59 36.87 36.33
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD 2.09 2.02 1.96
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD 2.31 2.17 2.17
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD 1.88 1.88 1.75
Employment Protection Legislation for co llective dismissals; OECD 2.63 2.63 2.38
2007 2008 2009
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.51 0.51 0.52
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.51 0.51 0.52
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.51 0.51 0.52
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.36 0.35 0.35
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 23 23 23
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 23 23 23
Last three data po ints
 
 
Sweden
List o f po licy variables
M onthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, %); Eurostat 2008 2009 2010
mean : : :
median : : :
2008 2009 2010
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer 20.90 21.50 :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 41.61 55.74 :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 37.74 52.89 :
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 44.81 43.23 42.70
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 42.54 41.29 40.60
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD 2.24 2.24 1.87
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD 2.86 2.86 2.86
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD 1.63 1.63 0.88
Employment Protection Legislation for co llective dismissals; OECD 3.75 3.75 3.75
2007 2008 2009
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.53 0.50 0.48
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.53 0.50 0.48
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.53 0.50 0.48
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.00 0.00 0.00
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 21 21 21
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 14 14 14
Last three data po ints
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United Kingdo m
List o f po licy variables
M onthly minimum wage (proportion of average monthly earnings, %); Eurostat 2008 2009 2010
mean 38.10 38.40 38.20
median 47.30 47.20 47.20
2008 2009 2010
Social security and other labour costs paid by employer : : :
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, no children, 100% and 100% of AW 37.54 36.87 36.83
Total tax wedge (incl.employers SSC) - M arried couple, 2 children, 100% and 100% of AW 35.21 34.54 34.57
Tax wedge, average wage person, no children; EC/OECD 32.78 32.51 32.75
Tax wedge, low wage person, no children; EC/OECD 29.67 29.26 29.62
1998 2003 2008
Employment Protection Legislation overall; OECD 0.60 0.75 0.75
Employment Protection Legislation for regular employment; OECD 0.95 1.12 1.12
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary employment; OECD 0.25 0.38 0.38
Employment Protection Legislation for co llective dismissals; OECD 2.88 2.88 2.88
2007 2008 2009
NRR; average wage person; no children; 2nd month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.40 0.38 0.38
NRR; average wage person; no children; 7th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.40 0.38 0.38
NRR; average wage person; no children; 13th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.40 0.38 0.38
NRR; average wage person; no children; 60th month of unemployment; incl. SA; EC/OECD 0.40 0.38 0.38
2008 2009 2010
Unemployment benefit duration_maximum; EC/OECD 6 6 6
Unemployment benefit duration_minimum; EC/OECD 6 6 6
Last three data po ints
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